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1. Mining Conflicts in 
Liberalising India
In the late 1980s, the small social advocacy organisation Samatha 
(‘Equality’) started working with impoverished Adivasi communities1 
facing land alienation in the Eastern Ghats hill range of northeastern 
Andhra Pradesh. Members of the organisation had earlier experienced 
first-hand how outsiders, whether for private gain or through government 
projects, were acquiring land that was intended to be reserved for Adivasis, 
thus pushing people into deep poverty. Realising the lack of understanding 
of the formal procedures of the government on the part of the Adivasis, 
Samatha started helping people to secure the land documents they needed 
in order to make use of existing legal protection. 
In the early 1990s, villagers approached Samatha when a subsidiary of the 
Birla Group, one of India’s biggest industrial conglomerates, wanted to 
mine calcite in their village. As the mining plans were believed to violate 
the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation 1959, which 
bans the sale or transfer of land from a tribal to a non-tribal person, what 
came to be known as ‘the Samatha case’ was taken to court in 1993 and 
later appealed to the Supreme Court in Delhi (Vagholikar and Moghe 
2003; Krishnakumar 2004).
1  The term ‘Adivasi’ is widely used as an alternative to the official designation of ‘Scheduled Tribes’ 
(or ‘tribals’) as groups of people with special constitutional benefits who mainly live in central India’s 
forested hill region. 
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A final verdict in the Samatha case was reached by the Supreme Court 
in 1997. Relying on a combination of the Indian Constitution’s Fifth 
Schedule, set up to protect and support Adivasis across the country, 
and Andhra Pradesh state land transfer legislation,2 the court reached 
the conclusion that no land, including government (or ‘revenue’) land, 
private land or forest land, could be leased out to non-tribals or to private 
companies for mining or industrial operations. The judgment stated 
that ‘[i]f the government was allowed to transfer or dispose of its own 
land in favour of non-tribals, it would completely destroy the legal and 
constitutional fabric made to protect the Scheduled Tribes’ (India 1997). 
The court ordered an immediate closure of all existing private mines in 
Andhra Pradesh, and suggested a process for other states with Scheduled 
Areas3 to review their laws in accordance with the judgment. 
The Samatha judgment has been widely acclaimed for reaffirming the 
constitutional right to land for Adivasis. But where the similar Mabo 
judgment in Australia in 1993 successfully opened up a space for 
Aborigines to become participants in all discussions over what should 
happen on their traditional land, and resulted in strengthened overall 
environmental protection (O’Faircheallaigh 2006), the efforts of the 
Indian authorities have mainly been directed to limiting the impact of 
the Samatha judgment by confining its application to Andhra Pradesh. 
As the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution applies to some of the 
country’s main (existing and potential) mining areas across nine states 
in central eastern India, the judgment at the time created a lot of unease 
among policymakers across the country. If it was implemented in Andhra 
Pradesh, and even expanded to the other states with similar legislation, 
a large share of India’s main reserves of iron, bauxite, chromium and coal 
would be off-limits to the private investment that was supposed to be 
the basis of future expansion since the new national mineral policy was 
announced in 1993. 
2  The new state of Telangana was separated from the state of Andhra Pradesh on 2 June 2014, but 
the tribal land transfer legislation has been retained by both states.
3  The Scheduled Areas are the territories reserved for India’s tribal communities in the Fifth 
Schedule of the Constitution. It applies to the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha (formerly Orissa), Telangana, 
and Rajasthan. Due to migration, the tribes do not exclusively live in the Scheduled Areas nowadays. 
Similarly, there are parts of the Scheduled Areas where non-tribal peoples are now the majority.
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The judgment continues to stand but has not been implemented outside 
of Andhra Pradesh. The current impasse has thus been interpreted as a ban 
on private mining in Andhra Pradesh despite continued mining in other 
states. Mining across much of central, tribal India has even been able to 
expand despite the many controversies repeatedly surrounding mineral 
projects. These have perhaps been most severe in Odisha (formerly Orissa) 
State, where clashes between the police and local people protesting 
against land alienation have resulted in violence on several occasions, 
with casualties suffered in specific protests against bauxite mining in 
Kashipur (Reddy 2006; Goodland 2007) and a proposed steel plant at 
Kalinganagar (Mishra 2006; Padhi and Adve 2006). Also, in the states 
of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, Adivasis have been at the receiving end 
of  violence when finding themselves caught between Maoist Naxalite 
rebel groups and the government, including the allegedly state-sponsored 
Salwa Judum militia. This was seen by some as a conflict over access to 
valuable mineral resources (Sundar 2006; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2012). It is 
clear that the present approach to industrialisation is one that leaves large 
parts of the rural population alienated, despite much protective legislation 
and at least some supportive court verdicts.
Reinterpreting the Samatha Judgment 
to Allow Mining
In Andhra Pradesh, and in the newly formed state of Telangana, private-
sector mining is still unable to encroach on Adivasi lands, yet these lands 
are in great demand for many government projects seen as operating 
in the public interest, including coal mines and irrigation dams. Since 
2005, new attempts have been made to exploit the bauxite ore in this 
region, even though the Samatha judgment is an accepted part of the 
legislation. The relevant project instead relies on a weakness of the 
Samatha judgment by using an Andhra Pradesh Government company to 
carry out the mining while the private investor, Jindal South West (JSW), 
which is financing the entire project, locates its associated refinery just 
outside of the Scheduled Areas, where private land ownership is allowed 
(see Figure 1.1). A confident state government with a strong role to play in 
national politics, and the support of one of India’s major business families, 
at the time looked certain to be able to implement the project in this new 
form of public–private partnership, which in large part appeared to have 
been designed to circumvent the Samatha judgment.
Landlock
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Figure 1.1 Map of northern Andhra Pradesh with proposed bauxite 
mining and refining locations.
Source: Cartography by Patrick Wennström, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
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The legal form of this public–private partnership was perceived by anti-
mining activists as an overly generous interpretation of the law in favour of 
private-sector interests. However, given the slow pace and unpredictability 
of court procedures, it was still possible to launch this major investment. 
Along the way, significant protests were staged, not only at the sites 
chosen for the mine and refinery, but also in the wealth of local, state and 
national government and other forums that form part of India’s extensive 
framework for democratic debate and decision-making.
Since its inception, a great amount of uncertainty has characterised the 
project implementation, allowing it to linger for many years in a condition 
similar to that of a range of other high-profile mineral projects in central 
eastern India’s mineral tracts.4 Government responses continued to 
indicate that bauxite mining and refining was still under implementation, 
with tangible signs on the ground when land was acquired, and some—but 
crucially far from all—administrative approvals provided for the refinery. 
In 2013, however, the company confirmed in a newspaper interview that 
it had cancelled its investment because of the slow pace of implementation 
and a lack of government support (Anon. 2013). Without an officially 
declared cancellation, and in any case all too experienced with radical 
about-turns for controversial projects, civil society actors continued to 
be vigilant, fuelling further media speculation about renewed mining in 
2014 (Patnaik 2014). The continued vigilance after the 2014 elections 
appears to have been well founded, since the new state government 
quickly initiated discussions about restarting the controversial bauxite 
mining and refining projects (Anon. 2014).
This book examines the controversial attempt to start new private mining 
in the state of Andhra Pradesh in 2005. This was one of many conflicts over 
(and acts of resistance to) economic reform involving tribal land that have 
been happening across central eastern India.5 It explores, on one hand, the 
tension between existing tribal land rights legislation and concerns over 
land use changes resulting from mining industry operations, and on the 
4  The Posco steel plant in Odisha State was proposed in 2005 and officially cancelled in 2016. 
Vedanta Resources planned a bauxite mining project that has remained locked in local protests 
over land, but also in various legal and other disputes, since 2003 (Pingle et al. 2010; Amnesty 
International 2011).
5  Tribal land is here defined as any land in areas traditionally inhabited and/or used by people 
officially categorised as members of Scheduled Tribes, whether this land is officially designated as 
private, forest, revenue or any other form of land, or is located within or outside of the Fifth Schedule 
areas, since many tribal villages are outside of these borders.
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other hand, the potential profitability of mining projects, especially for 
politically influential interests. A key issue at stake is the choice between 
alternative uses of the land for mining or for low-intensity cultivation 
and extraction of forest products. The choice is either to prioritise the 
protection of Adivasis from absolute poverty or to promote economic 
growth through mining, thus reflecting alternative visions of development 
and justice.
In this case, the many different forces and processes working to promote 
or frustrate industrialisation developed into a paralysing stand-off. This 
book explains how this unexpected outcome was the result of permanent 
distortions in the way that different groups understood one another and 
dealt with their differences about how Adivasi land and natural resources 
should best be used. The core concern over how land should be used 
resulted in a deadlock—here described as a ‘landlock’—in which the 
extension of local cultivation and forest use was just as impossible as the 
extraction of mineral ores. This outcome was to no one’s benefit, since 
the minerals are not being used yet stronger tenure rights for local people 
cannot be translated into improved livelihoods. It is argued that the sort 
of long-running conflict detailed here, while perhaps not paradigmatic, 
offers insights into the deeply ingrained inability to resolve the differences 
expressed in countless conflicts over Adivasi land and resources 
in recent decades.
Mineral Extraction, Land and 
Indigenous People
In many parts of the world, the conflict between mining projects and 
indigenous people has become an increasingly significant issue. In these 
conflicts, not only are different uses of land and resources under 
contestation; often it is two entirely different views about what is of value 
and how society should progress (Godoy 1985; Ballard and Banks 2003; 
Bebbington 2011; Gilberthorpe and Hilson 2012). As mining imposes 
radical transformations on indigenous territories, with potentially 
permanent changes to local environments and societies, long-running 
conflict has been the result.
Among the most difficult conflicts to reconcile have been the conflicts 
on indigenous lands. India’s Adivasis, like indigenous populations 
in Australia,  Melanesia or South America, continue to suffer 
7
1. Mining Conflicts in Liberalising India
disproportionately when their lands and cultures are disrupted as a result 
of mining. However, a history of exploitation, combined with modern-day 
dispossession, has also generated wider support for the ‘indigenous’ cause, 
even to the point where the term ‘has come to be embedded in discourse 
surrounding resource extraction’ (Gilberthorpe and Hilson 2012: 4–5). 
Even so, the struggles of Adivasis in India cannot be fully and easily 
reconciled with indigenous struggles elsewhere. The basic point that most 
Indians are indigenous, given that they have lived within the country’s 
present borders for many centuries, is hard to ignore. Even more so, the 
internal variations and divisions among those designated as Adivasis make 
a unitary struggle harder to envision (Baviskar 1995; Guha 2007).
At the same time, while global mineral investment offers opportunities, 
it provides new challenges for accountability. As Hilson argues:
circumstances are severest in developing countries, where governmental 
intervention is minimal, regulatory frameworks are commonly incomplete, 
and fewer effective support schemes are in place for community and 
industrial groups. Compounding the problem is the fact that a number 
of these countries’ governments, which have heavily promoted foreign 
investment in their minerals sectors in recent years, almost exclusively side 
with mining companies on key land use issues (Hilson 2002: 65).
The difficulties of relying on a mineral-dependent development 
strategy have been the subject of frequent discussion in the literature. 
Developmental failures resulting from a heavy reliance on minerals have 
led to a broad acceptance of the ‘resource curse’ theory (Ross 1999; 
Auty 2002) amongst policymakers. However, the extraction and sale of 
minerals remains a tempting pathway out of poverty, especially in times 
of high mineral commodity prices, and this has driven the combination 
of continued mining with attempts to improve policy measures to avoid 
the resource curse. 
Some of the efforts to improve social and economic outcomes nationally, as 
well as in mineral-producing regions, have focused on getting international 
companies to implement best practices in all their project locations 
around the world through corporate social responsibility programs, often 
following the recommendations of the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. These efforts have nevertheless tended to work on terms set 
by the companies themselves rather than by the affected communities 
(Gilberthorpe and Banks 2012). In some countries, attempts have 
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been made to provide local people with a share of mineral benefits, and 
sometimes the right to participate in decision-making, but even when 
there are mandatory negotiations between indigenous communities and 
mining companies, as in Australia, uneven power relations tend to be 
significant and local outcomes are highly variable (O’Faircheallaigh and 
Corbett 2005). 
Despite India’s long history of mining, the industry did not attract much 
interest from social scientists before it started to expand, and therefore 
become more visible, as the result of the liberalisation of the mining 
legislation in the early 1990s. There has since been a growth in the 
number of civil society publications (e.g. Reddy 2006; Kalshian 2007; 
Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008; Amnesty International 2010) and in 
more academic works (e.g. Herbert and Lahiri-Dutt 2004; Padel and Das 
2010; Bedi 2013; Kumar 2014; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2012; Oskarsson 2013a, 
2015; Lahiri-Dutt 2014, 2016). Research on mining in India has been 
particularly concerned with the negative consequences of displacement, 
especially for the Adivasis, and the effects of deforestation. Coverage of 
current conflicts is part of a larger body of literature on land and natural 
resources in tribal India, and on the social movements that have worked 
towards securing land rights in the face of threats from non-tribal farmers 
and moneylenders, from forest departments and commercial forestry 
operations, or from the building of large dams (e.g. Baviskar 1995; 
Balagopal 2007a; Guha 2007; Springate-Baginski and Blaikie 2007; 
Kumar and Kerr 2012). When violence became more common in central 
India, Arundhati Roy (2009) referred to this as a struggle between the 
Maoists and the ‘MoUists’ because of the large number of mining deals—
known as memoranda of understanding—that had been signed.
India, however, represents something of a special case within the 
international literature, given its surprising degree of insulation from 
international mining industry practices and actors. While the country 
has nominally opened up its economy, and now has a policy framework 
designed to attract foreign investment, the investors in mining remain 
overwhelmingly domestic, and it is mainly the technology that is sourced 
from abroad. Some of the raw materials and end products, especially 
alumina and aluminium,6 are exported, but the domestic market is more 
6  Aluminium production is a three-stage process of bauxite mining, alumina refining and 
aluminium smelting. Alumina is aluminium oxide, an intermediary product usually manufactured 
close to the mine site.
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significant. International financial institutions like the World Bank, while 
active in the country in many other ways, are not involved in mining 
projects (Herbert and Lahiri-Dutt 2004), and indications are that most of 
the future expansion is going to be funded either by domestic banks or by 
the mining companies themselves.
The virtual absence of international companies or financial institutions 
in the mining sector has resulted in an avoidance of the international 
discourse on best practices in the sector, including the discussion of 
corporate social responsibility and community relations programs. Indian 
legislation on mining, while certainly extensive, has not been significantly 
influenced by international policies or standards. The result is an industry 
characterised by insularity in both policy and practice, with only very 
modest improvements in community relations in recent decades. While 
this might represent a seemingly difficult scenario, there is a possible 
upside, given that the industry is more locally accountable and less 
dependent on decisions made by foreign companies with headquarters 
far away, as has often been the case, for example, in Africa or Melanesia 
(e.g. Ferguson 2006; Bainton 2010).
This is why it might make more sense to situate the conflict over mining 
on Adivasi land in India within the broader literature on land rights. Land 
continues to be the most important productive asset for rural communities 
in India, and ownership of land is linked to a reduced incidence of poverty 
(Mearns 1999). The Samatha judgment has strengthened tribal rights 
to this crucial asset by preventing the development of several proposed 
mining projects. Yet the contested nature of its implementation, as well 
as continued attempts to mine the mountains, make it doubtful whether 
local people have been able to utilise these stronger rights for economic 
improvement. This is especially the case since private landholdings are still 
frequently denied to tribal farmers in forests controlled by the government. 
Because tribals have no security of tenure and live under the constant 
threat of eviction, they cannot invest in improving their land. Their 
poverty prevents them from planting tree crops that have long gestation 
periods, and the illegality of their position precludes their receiving loans 
from the government to make their agriculture more productive (Baviskar 
1994: 2500).
Although alienation of the best agricultural land has been a serious 
issue in many Adivasi areas, access to land has often been a somewhat 
less important issue, with the average landholding size being larger than 
Landlock
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the Indian national average. Instead, infertile soils, a lack of agricultural 
inputs and poor infrastructure, including a lack of irrigation facilities, 
have been among the main reasons for low productivity (IFAD 1991; 
Purushothaman 2005). When settled agriculture has not been sufficient, 
the commons—especially forest lands—have been an important 
additional resource (Mearns 1999), but even in the case of forests, there 
continue to be significant challenges to local access and management.
India has been characterised as having experienced ‘thousands of small 
wars against land acquisitions’ (Levien 2011: 66) in recent decades, when 
farmers, forest-dwellers, herders and many other groups dependent on 
land for their survival have fought with the state and private companies 
over increasingly scarce pockets of land. Land is a very sensitive subject 
anywhere in India, with a close relationship to the livelihoods of the 
poor, but also to social identities, the food security of the nation, and 
the desire for industrialisation and progress. In tribal, central India this 
connection is even starker due to the intense poverty of the region, 
people’s inability to move into alternative employment once land has 
been lost to mining or other industries, and a lack of other possibilities 
for economic improvement. Adding to this already bleak picture, there 
have been violent clashes between Maoist groups and counter-insurgency 
forces, partly related to the process of industrial expansion on tribal land 
(Sundar 2006).
When Adivasis across India have been unable to participate directly in 
political debate (Guha 2007), demands for protection of their rights 
have instead been organised through social movements, mainly engaging 
directly with the bureaucracy or the judiciary (Katzenstein et al. 2001). 
This approach to strengthening tribal claims to resources seemed to be 
successful in parts of central India as mass movements for the protection 
of jal, jungle and jameen (water, forest and land) became increasingly 
common in recent decades. But the failure to achieve significant change, 
as in the case of opposition to the Sardar Sarovar dam on the Narmada 
River, seems to have provided the opportunity for counter-claims. 
One example of this is the way that right-wing Hindu organisations have 
made significant inroads into tribal India in recent years (Chatterji 2004; 
Baviskar 2005). This ongoing fight for the right to interpret tribal identity 
remains uncertain and, like the many other contestations underway 
at any point in time in India, is cross-cut by a multitude of different issues 
and voices.
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As a result of centuries of struggle, Adivasi land protection and a wealth 
of other Adivasi rights continue to exist in different forms with widely 
variable implementation across central India. Adding to this complexity 
is a significant expansion in rights for disadvantaged groups that has been 
secured in recent years, coupled with other legislation that has been added 
or altered in favour of mineral-led industrialisation. And while the overall 
thrust of national economic policy is in favour of private investment, the 
public sector continues to be a major participant in all forms of mining, 
as well as in refining and thermal power generation. What emerges is 
a mixed picture, not only of mineral governance and land rights, but 
also strategic approaches somewhat at odds with the official rhetoric 
of economic liberalisation, as various forces within and outside of the 
political establishment struggle to influence the way that various resources 
are best utilised and by whom. 
The landscape of rights is constantly changing across India, with local 
adjustments as well as laws targeted to certain socio-economic groups. 
The result is a confused mix of laws that, though significant on paper, take 
on a much less clear meaning on the ground. Frequently, the intended 
beneficiaries need to mobilise in order to demand their implementation. 
In worst-case scenarios, rights passed into legislation become little more 
than empty rhetoric when politicians seek re-election. The resultant 
governance framework contains a multiplicity of institutions, following 
regulations that often overlap, are at odds with one another, or with 
contradictions that are unresolved. Governance often comes with great 
democratic ambition, but is fuelled by much uncertainty and controversy.
The strongly stated intention of the state to work for economic growth 
with the private sector as its partner have combined, in a somewhat 
ad hoc manner, with a significant expansion of social legislation meant 
to strengthen local people’s rights. Many active participants, plenty of 
forums in which to debate development, and very extensive legislation 
thus characterise India’s democracy. However, the reach of participatory 
democracy does not easily extend to the pursuit of industrialisation and 
economic growth. Here uncertainty, secrecy, complexity and overlapping 
authorities are some of the underlying factors that have resulted in much 
controversy between supporters and opponents of industrialisation on 
Adivasi land. While these concerns have long existed in India, recent 
controversies in the extractive industry sector have been exaggerated by 
the combination of national economic liberalisation with an international 
resource boom and the seeming contradiction between the pursuit 
of public goals and personal profits by many of the key actors.
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Private-Sector Mining for Economic Growth 
and Political Patronage
The language of liberalisation commonly used to describe India’s economic 
reform process (Bhagwati 1993; Krueger 2002) suggests that the country 
should end up with a rule-bound, transparent economy that uses the 
market to allocate resources. When India continues to have significant 
government interventions in the economy, there has been a tendency to 
explain this as a result of the liberalising reforms not proceeding as far as 
was intended. An alternative and more credible characterisation of the 
economy views it as one based on the preferences of a narrow public–
private alliance with limited intentions to let go of earlier opportunities 
for control. The political system remains remarkably similar to that which 
existed before the onset of economic reforms, with the same drivers 
that invited Indian politicians to look for opportunities to control the 
economy for political and personal gain, and with the same business 
groups willing to bargain for preferential treatment. According to Kohli 
(2007: 113), ‘the development model pursued in India since about 1980 
is a pro-business model that rests on a fairly narrow ruling alliance of 
the political and the economic elite’. A pro-business approach favours 
established interests by means of active state intervention. Reasons to 
support existing businesses may be nationalistic or may be based on other 
ties—including monetary ones—that cause decision-makers to intervene. 
Before the economic reforms, patronage was largely based on opportunities 
for bureaucrats and politicians to selectively award licences and contracts, 
or simply to accept kickbacks for the grant of particular administrative 
approvals (Kochanek 2007).
The essential business of a state minister is not to make policy. It is to 
modify the application of rules and regulations on a particularistic 
basis, in return for money and/or loyalty. The telephone is his essential 
instrument, for his orders modifying the application of general rules are 
only rarely written (Wade 1985: 480).
The state–business developmental alliance is able to use old-style political 
control techniques to gain benefits in the newly ‘reformed’ economy. 
The  system of regulation and control in the sphere of industrialisation 
remains impossibly complex for any administrator to manage effectively, 
despite the recent reforms intended to simplify the system. Lack of 
information, split responsibilities in the federal system, multiple laws with 
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overlapping and often contradictory content, unclear implementation 
procedures, and frequent changes to the rules make it impossible to stay 
up to date with regulatory demands. This regulatory complexity is a key 
factor that continues to allow politicians to use their discretionary power 
for the benefit of select business partners in a system of legally reasonable 
market orientation and democratic division of power. ‘At a very basic 
level, politicians continue to be needed as fixers’ (Jenkins 1999: 116).
The best opportunities for earning additional direct incomes in the 
reformed economy are to be found in land transactions. Land acquisition 
cannot take place without state government cooperation, and within each 
of the states, fixers are needed from each particular area of acquisition. 
Direct kickbacks for enabling land transactions might not even be 
necessary, since opportunities will exist to divert funds from the purchase, 
including diverting land to relatives and friends, or simply to profit from 
knowing that the value of land next to any industrial project will inevitably 
rise (Jenkins 1999). 
Whenever cases questioning the public purpose of certain land 
acquisitions have been made, the courts have generally said that whatever 
democratically elected governments decide counts as a public purpose, so 
long as rules are followed regarding compensation for those losing land 
(Iyer 2007). But the acquisition of land for private companies is politically 
sensitive, so there is indecision as to whether or not governments should 
intervene and on whose behalf they should act (Fernandes 2009). Just as 
in the distribution of benefits, informal possibilities exist for politicians 
to negotiate compensation whenever enough power can be assembled 
to seriously challenge development plans. The opportunities rest with 
individual political brokers who can use personal influence to intervene 
on a case-by-case basis (Jenkins 1999; Newell and Wheeler 2006). 
Since the early 1980s, with a radically reduced level of national public 
investment, state governments have been forced to compete for private 
investment in a completely new way. In some sectors, like mining, state 
governments nevertheless have some means to strongly influence—if not 
control—decisions about who gets to operate where. The exploitation 
of especially valuable ore deposits depends on investment in plants to 
refine the ore, otherwise contracts will not be awarded. A complete lack 
of transparency in the award of these contracts ensures that consideration 
will only be given to politically favoured investors. Even for smaller 
mining leases, administrative approval procedures remain complex and 
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hidden from the exercise of any independent authority, thereby allowing 
scope for manipulation. Industrial investment also creates opportunities 
beyond those associated with land acquisition, as in the sub-contracting 
of construction or other activities. These contracts can either be won by 
companies owned by politicians or distributed to other contractors as 
a form of patronage.
The chief ministers are key actors in the process of seeking out sources 
of private investment.
In the 1990s drama of economic liberalisation state chief ministers play 
leading roles in India’s emergent federal market economy. They are seen 
on front pages, covers of news magazines and television screens, making 
and breaking coalition governments, welcoming foreign statesmen 
and investors, dealing with natural disasters and domestic violence 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 2001a: 1541). 
Having never been especially prominent among Indian states, either 
economically or politically, Andhra Pradesh shot to sudden fame in the 
early 1990s when Chandrababu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 
became the first state government politician to openly embrace a package 
of economic reforms (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001a; Suri 2005). Whether 
Naidu was as reform-minded as he claimed to be remains uncertain, 
since many of the welfare programs instituted by previous governments 
continued during his period in office. Eventually, his government was 
damaged by the accusation of neglecting the countryside (Suri 2004), and 
once the Congress Party came back into power in 2004, there was a return 
to standard state government behaviour, with reform measures carried 
out by stealth, and the promulgation of well-advertised populist welfare 
packages for the poor (Srinivasulu 2009).
It was in this highly politicised setting that proposals for a number of 
large-scale bauxite mining and refining projects were made from the 
early 1990s onwards. India’s significant bauxite ore deposits, confined to 
a relatively small geographical area in the Eastern Ghats hill range in the 
states of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh, were first identified in the 1970s. 
The first—and to date the only—large-scale mining operation to be 
established was implemented by the public company Nalco (the National 
Aluminium Corporation) in Odisha in the 1980s, with the French 
company Pechiney involved as a supplier of technology. Direct private-
sector involvement only began with the economic reforms of the 1990s, 
but despite significant efforts, such attempts by Indian and multinational 
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companies have so far not resulted in new mining operations. This has 
forced related alumina refineries, like Vedanta’s Lanjigarh refinery in 
Odisha, to operate with a mix of bauxite ore from other parts of India or 
from abroad.
The world aluminium industry, like much of the metals sector, underwent 
rapid expansion in the 2000s, with the price of alumina reaching an 
all-time high in the summer of 2007.7 An important factor behind the 
sustained growth since the early 1990s has been Chinese demand (World 
Bank 2006). China is now the world’s largest aluminium producer, and 
Indian bauxite deposits have been among those geographically best placed 
to cater to this demand. China accounted for as much as 82  per cent 
of Indian alumina exports in 2006/07, with a value of US$339 million. 
The aluminium industry is the biggest metal industry in the world after 
iron and steel, and production of its raw material has been shifting towards 
the tropics over the course of the last 50 years as new deposits have been 
found in countries like Brazil, Guinea and Jamaica (Barham et al. 1994). 
At the same time, the industry has been constrained by the high energy 
costs and increasingly stringent environmental norms applied in the 
Western consumer countries, while ore-producing nations have long 
sought to obtain a greater share of the final value of processed aluminium 
(Francis 1981; Bunker 1994). 
Economic and technical obstacles to the growth of this industry in India 
have been reduced by the availability of international technology and 
private-sector funds, and by greater access to the world market. But as far 
as Adivasis are concerned, the continued lack of benefits from this or any 
other changes to the modern economy might not make much difference.
Adivasis were displaced from their lands and villages when the state 
occupied the commanding heights of the economy. And they continue to 
be displaced under the auspices of liberalisation and globalisation (Guha 
2007: 3306). 
The main difference in recent years may not have consisted of formal 
policy  changes, but rather the scale of the threat of displacement as 
the mineral industry has looked to expand its operations by means of 
private-sector investment and the importation of large-scale technologies 
of extraction. 
7  The onset of a global recession towards the end of 2008 significantly reduced prices—a trend 
that has since continued.
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Whether the developmental alliance will be able to implement its plans 
is not so easily predictable when its discourse of economic growth and 
export-oriented industry is clashing with a strong oppositional discourse. 
As is clear from the public interest litigation that enabled and later 
defended the Samatha judgment, there is significant capacity in civil 
society to support continued Adivasi land and livelihood protection in 
Andhra Pradesh, and this is supported in turn by a well-established—even 
if at times unpredictable—democratic framework.
Deliberative Democracy in India
Indian democracy affords opportunities for widespread deliberations over 
the reasons for and against a certain choice. These deliberations take place 
in upper and lower houses of the national parliament, in state government 
assemblies, in district and local councils, as well as in many other forums, 
such as print media and television. They extend over geographical scales, 
and are increasingly conducted in local languages, allowing the inclusion 
of a wider group of people than at any earlier point in time (Kohli 2001). 
Furthermore, the issue of tribal land protection has been defined as 
a  matter of public policy through earlier struggles. Legal protection is 
prescribed in the national constitution and in state land rights acts, and 
it is therefore open to public debate. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed in 
the Samatha judgment that governments cannot diminish the importance 
of this legislation in favour of other societal goals such as promoting 
broader economic growth. 
As part of the dominant discourse on land use, the extraction of mineral 
ores from central India is justified by an ideology of modernisation and 
economic development through industrialisation that has been present 
in top policymaking circles ever since Independence (Chibber 2003; 
Kohli 2004). Minerals are seen as vital inputs to industrial processes or as 
sources of crucial export revenues, which are key for progress technically 
and economically, and one of the few realistic hopes for impoverished 
central Indian states to improve their economies. The focus is on economic 
growth rather than on mitigating the costs borne in the Scheduled 
Areas, or ensuring that a significant share of the income is returned 
to the mineral-producing areas. A related and influential factor is the 
unreformed nature of the political system, where the need for resources to 
fund political patronage incentivises politicians to attempt to extract rents 
by controlling access to land and natural resources.
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Habermas treats systematically distorted communication, the failure to 
reach the goal of communicative action and therefore to reach mutual 
understanding (Edgar 2006), as unintentional, thereby indicating 
that a refusal to participate in deliberations is not part of a conscious 
strategy of domination. But Bohman (2000) argues that this is not 
necessarily the case, and that there are situations of purposefully distorted 
communication. In his view, domination is often based on the avoidance 
of consensus building, and that is how elites can best assure themselves 
of a disproportionate share of resources. Avoidance of debate over the 
bauxite project discussed in this book is exemplified by the way that the 
state government secretly signed a deal with JSW in 2005 and proceeded 
to make comprehensive plans without sharing the details with the public. 
Indian laws, however, require certain documents to be produced as part of 
government procedures. At least some parts of the administration cannot 
remain completely silent on what is being planned: there may be attempts 
to prevent information from reaching the public, but legislation exists to 
ensure at least some degree of transparency, which can open matters up for 
wider debate. In addition, the media produce many stories, often based 
on protests or controversy, but also allowing a voice to project proponents. 
In these cases, the nature, its quality and timing of the information that 
reaches the public are likely to be crucial for the stimulation or suppression 
of public deliberations. Even if project promoters attempt to suppress 
such deliberations, it might be possible to create alternative public spheres 
in civil society to support communication on such matters of concern. 
The varying capacities and interests of the actors in the bauxite project 
opposition, first to access, and then to interpret and share, information in 
various forums, is decisive for the success of such alternatives.
The many years of delay in the development of mineral projects in central 
India seem to show that it is not merely the available material resources 
and capabilities that are important for the outcomes. If this were the case, 
the promoters of bauxite mining would be certain to come out on top due 
to their ability to influence state functions and their greater command over 
technical and financial resources. A starting point for the need to extend 
a political economy analysis is the subject of land rights that constitutes 
the focus of this book. The demand for tribal land rights depends on 
claims to identity, in addition to material livelihood needs, rather in the 
way that other natural resources have come to be imagined and contested 
in the cultural politics approach favoured by Baviskar (2008). But while 
the symbolic opposition to polluting extractive industries proposed in 
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the green hills reserved for Adivasis continues to provide support for 
traditional land uses, this book is focused on the possibilities for affecting 
policy preferences and implementation across a range of different forums 
across the whole of India. A discursive model can here be seen as more 
appropriate, since it involves: 
a plurality of forms of association, roles, groups, institutions, and 
discourses … [where] the means of interpretation and communication 
are not all of a piece. They do not constitute a coherent, monolithic 
web but rather a heterogeneous, polyglot field of diverse possibilities 
and alternatives (Fraser 1989: 165). 
In this cacophony of claims and counter-claims, the outcomes sought by 
the groups involved are not necessarily the same, and different groups may 
not even use the same discourse. 
A core difference does exist where the developmental alliance favours 
a discourse based on economic growth while civil society concerns over 
Adivasi land rights are based on the politics of identity. Additionally, there 
is a significant geographical dispersion of forums across the country as 
a whole, despite the physical challenge of gaining access to national forums, 
particularly for those losing land to extractive projects in remote, central 
eastern parts of the country. And different forms of communication are 
being used, both in terms of the common language being spoken and the 
technical vocabulary required by those identified as experts, as for example 
in the domain of environmental science. The  claims for redistribution 
and recognition (Fraser 1989, 1997), or claims about economic growth as 
opposed to the protection of Adivasi identity, are thus not able to speak 
back to one another. The analysis offered here is therefore broadened to 
include the ability to make claims embedded in material and cultural 
discursive contexts in a setting where vast differences between decision-
makers and citizens call for attention to a third term that is crucial for 
Fraser (2009), namely representation. 
Information is crucial to communication, since without it very little 
purposeful communication can take place. If people do not know the 
what, where and how of the planning made for a bauxite project, there 
is really very little that can be learnt, even if more inclusive deliberations 
take place. Informational issues are particularly relevant when significant 
knowledge exists, even though such knowledge is often fragmented among 
many different actors, and this point applies to the extension of bauxite 
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industry operations in the country and the work of oppositional groups 
whose members have used the law to improve the realisation of rights in 
support of tribal livelihoods. 
Genuine deliberations resembling the Habermasian ideal of inclusive, 
deliberative democracy, where all citizens can engage in open and 
unhindered communicative exchanges, require that ‘information about 
state functioning be made accessible so that state activities would be subject 
to critical scrutiny and the force of “public opinion”’ (Fraser 1997: 72). 
Without basic information flows in place, it becomes difficult to even start 
imagining new and better ways of understanding the changes brought on 
by large-scale extractive industries in tribal India, and how the current 
social and economic development dilemmas should be resolved.
Nowadays, some Indian government agencies are pursuing increased 
openness in policy implementation, and to some extent in policy 
deliberations, while other agencies seem to want to keep that space closed. 
Different federal ministries have vastly different approaches, as shown by 
comparison of the drafting and implementation of the Special Economic 
Zone Act 2005 by the Ministry of Commerce with that of the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act 2006 by the Ministry of Rural Development. 
Where the former has been made without any civil society influence, the 
latter has a lok adalat (people’s court) as part of its mandatory monitoring 
mechanisms (Dreze and Khera 2009). When specific information-
sharing and public accountability provisions are lacking, as in the Special 
Economic Zone Act, then the Right to Information Act 2005 allows every 
citizen to access a wide range of information related to government action. 
Before this important act was passed:
[a]ctivists had to rely on ‘leaked’ documents and information gleaned from 
government responses submitted to the courts and to donor organizations 
such as the World Bank which had a more liberal public disclosure policy 
(Baviskar 2007: 5). 
Meaningful deliberations depend not only on the ability to access 
information, but also on the possibilities for people to convert this 
information into useful knowledge (Thomas and Parayil 2008). 
The average citizen cannot be expected to understand technical planning 
reports relating to the mining industry, and indigenous people around 
the world ‘often lack the financial resources and the access to “technical” 




In India, the environmental impact assessment report, normally written by 
environmental engineers for decision-makers who are also environmental 
engineers, is the only mandatory piece of public information about 
a proposed industrial project that has to be translated into the local 
language. Due to the technical approach adopted in such documents, the 
critique of them depends on middle-class activists who have the formal 
education and other necessary resources to understand and challenge the 
legalities and technicalities of extractive industry plans.
Since basic information flows about a project are already guaranteed 
through the independence of the media and a few legal transparency 
clauses, complete secrecy is not likely to be a viable option for those 
promoting them. Instead, ‘the powerful use control over the production 
of knowledge as a way of setting the public agenda, and for including or 
excluding certain voices and participants in action upon it’ (Gaventa and 
Cornwall 2008: 175). These actions can include the framing of scientific 
rules that exclude certain people and/or claims in favour of decisions made 
by technical experts, or the denial of representation in various democratic 
forums. However, if the right kind of information can be accessed, it might 
be possible to reorganise the terms of deliberation; for example, by means 
of a court case. In the present case, oppositional groups and individuals 
with relevant skills might be able to counter their exclusion by using new 
information technologies and rights to information legislation in addition 
to the forms of opposition that have previously prevented mining on tribal 
land. The struggle over tribal land can thus be seen as being just as much 
a struggle over the right to define who is affected and who is not, and who 
is supposed to make decisions about the use and distribution of resources. 
In the contestations over tribal land, information is a resource that can be 
used to blunt the overt exercise of power.
This book uses an analytical framework based on Fraser’s (1989) ‘three 
moments in the politics of needs interpretation’, but also draws on her 
more recent work (Fraser 1997, 2009). This allows a transition from an 
initial examination of the natural characteristics of the resource and its 
political economy, to the mediation of the state and the possibilities for 
different oppositional claims to be heard across India’s many deliberative 
forums during project implementation, and finally to an examination 
of the outcomes of the contestation.
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The Legitimisation or Denial of Needs
The legitimisation of the need to protect Adivasi land has both 
a material and cultural basis. The strength of this need ensures that the 
proponents of mining cannot easily and completely deny the value of 
tribal land protection, especially since the Samatha judgment. Instead, 
if industrialisation is allowed to proceed, alliance members must attempt to 
modify the interpretation of what is meant by these rights by emphasising 
other forms of material gain. Oppositional groups may point to the strong 
cultural image of the tribal people to show the need to continue with 
land protection or justify it as a means to livelihood protection. These 
interchanges create a tension between demands for redistribution and 
recognition.
The first part of the legitimisation or denial of needs, as detailed in 
Chapter 3, is the way in which the mining project is formally organised 
and what its terms of reference mean for the distribution of material 
benefits derived from it. The proponents rely on significant advantages in 
accessing state and market resources when attempting to use tribal land 
for industrial purposes. The ability to formalise a business agreement that 
sets out certain rights and obligations between those who are party to 
the agreement, but also conditions the way that future costs and benefits 
will affect third parties, involves an apparent use of power. The issues are 
political economy questions concerned with the creation and organisation 
of the bauxite project itself, and how political and economic power has 
directed its design towards certain outcomes. 
The second important legitimacy concern is with the specific pieces 
of land, and their current users, located at the centre of the contestations, 
as detailed in Chapter 4. The importance of land rights for tribal people 
has been well established as a general principle, but the particular 
ways in which the bauxite project proposes to divert and use the land, 
and how these new uses compete with existing livelihoods, affects the 
perception of the need to protect existing land use in each specific case. 
This need is shaped by the compensation offered to the land users and 
the opportunities to build new livelihoods when old ones are no longer 
possible. Environmental degradation will indirectly affect local livelihoods 
beyond the experience of immediate displacement, and to some extent 




The Negotiation over Needs
Analysis of the negotiation over needs is still concerned with the material 
issue of tribal land and its many uses, but shifts to a discursive arena of 
government mediation and competitive bargaining processes, where the 
claims of different actors are voiced at different discursive sites, ranging 
across scales from specific project locations to the state and central capitals. 
The exercise of power and the complexity, not only of the planned bauxite 
project and its many potential ‘externalities’, but also of the legal and 
administrative processes that are meant to mediate its implementation, 
contribute to the contested and uncertain nature of the process. 
The government is meant to mediate between different claims by 
application of the rule of law to ensure justice for all citizens, and 
additionally to ensure special affirmative rights for especially disadvantaged 
groups like tribal people, as detailed in Chapter 5. For example, the way 
that issues are framed over land acquisition, compensation policies, or 
forest and water use will have crucial importance for the way that these 
issues are discussed. In the former statist economy, the bureaucracy almost 
took on a life of its own with regard to promoting or preventing different 
programs and plans, but this autonomy is seen here as having been 
significantly curtailed by the action of the most influential politicians, 
even if other forums might be able to counteract this dominant influence. 
Representation is therefore a key issue in the negotiation over needs, since 
it determines who is allowed to voice a claim in relation to the project.
Furthermore, opportunities to mediate are offered by actors and 
organisations in civil society, including those immediately affected by 
the prospect of displacement and pollution, as detailed in Chapter  6. 
The many forums that exist across India’s federal democratic system can 
be used to stake oppositional claims on issues related to the alienation 
of tribal land and the way that these concerns have been framed in 
government procedures. Issues of representation are also important for 
the ability of opposition groups and individuals to claim legitimacy when 
speaking on behalf of those who are negatively affected. Politicians in 
power may have an advantage on this score, despite the many problems 
associated with the way that elections are fought, since they can claim 
that they were democratically elected, as opposed to most of those who 
disagree with their plans.
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The Satisfaction of Needs
The final stage in the analytical framework is the satisfaction of needs, 
or the extent to which it is possible to reach the outcomes that are being 
sought. The model of communication proposed by Habermas treats access 
to information as the basis for people to debate how they wish to have 
their societies organised. However, differences in access to—and use of—
information across India’s many public forums can limit deliberations, 
thus creating openings for those in power to shape future tribal land use 
according to their own wishes. Resourceful civil society organisations and 
actors may be able access the informational resources that would allow 
for challenges to be made to the power of the developmental alliance. 
Whether the alliance is able to control access to information, rather than 
rely on the exercise of overt power based on its superior material resources, 
is thus seen as a crucial factor in satisfying the need to protect tribal land 
rights. Chapter 8 uses informational problems experienced during my own 
fieldwork as a way to understand the eventual outcomes of this process.
Methodology
Due to the crucial role that information is found to play in struggles 
over land and mineral resources, this book frequently mentions the 
informational problems experienced by various actors, including myself 
as a researcher. This reflexive approach was chosen in order to emphasise 
the way that context-specific informational resources are crucial to an 
explanation of outcomes in a setting characterised by a great deal of 
uncertainty and apparent gross inequality of power, not only between the 
two opposing sides but also within these broad coalitions. The capacity to 
access and process information was found to vary enormously from one 
individual to the next, and I was one such individual during the course 
of my fieldwork.8 The strategies that I used to uncover information are 
taken as further evidence of the depth and nature of these informational 
problems, illustrating the need to move beyond standard political ecology 
explanations, as shown in Chapter 7. Information is here seen not only 
as a vital resource, with access determined by sheer power, but also as 
being uncertain, complex, full of contradictions and coded in particular 
languages that determine who can and cannot access and make use of it.
8  Fieldwork was carried out during three visits, lasting a total of 10 months, between 2006 and 
2008. Another, shorter visit was made to the proposed mine and refinery sites in June 2012.
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It was far from obvious where I should start enquiring about the planned 
bauxite industry operations during my fieldwork. If you try to see 
company  representatives in their local registered offices, you will find 
JSW  located on the outskirts of Visakhapatnam, in the housing estate 
built for employees from their other small facility in Vizianagaram 
District. A few rooms seem to function as temporary offices, while others 
are reserved for managers staying overnight. There are no reception staff 
other than the local security guard; in fact, the office seems to have very 
few, if any, permanent employees. Similarly, AnRak Aluminium, the 
other proponent of an aluminium project in Andhra Pradesh, is housed 
in a  plain family home in the upmarket suburb of Jubilee Hills in 
Hyderabad,9 without any hint of it actually functioning as an office space. 
There is not even a company name to be seen there.
The state government offices are only marginally more approachable, 
since they at least have official addresses with signboards. Key in the 
Andhra Pradesh Government planning effort is the Mines and Geology 
Department and its head, who is designated as the vice-chairman and 
managing director. This department operates on the seventh floor of 
the extremely worn-down BRK Bhavan building in central Hyderabad, 
where the lifts rarely work, adjacent to some of the most insignificant 
departments of the state government. There was an air of efficiency about 
the managing director’s dealings, and I encountered a significant number 
of other visitors on several of my own visits. Nevertheless, whenever one 
approached him with specific questions, some obstacle or another would 
make an appearance. In the end, these personal interactions were curtailed 
by the absence of a second authorisation from the state government, 
despite the grant of a research visa by the central government, which 
supposedly required the state government’s approval.
My fieldwork strategy then changed from making largely unsuccessful 
attempts to find company representatives or meet policymakers in 
Hyderabad to engaging with the vocal and widespread opposition in the 
more directly affected city of Visakhapatnam. This is where bauxite 
mining had become a major issue, perhaps even disproportionately so 
when compared to its actual economic importance, or even to the area of 
land to be acquired or the amount of pollution to be caused. Many other 
9  Visakhapatnam District is located in the residual state of Andhra Pradesh, while Hyderabad is 
now the official capital of Telangana. However, Andhra Pradesh will have Hyderabad as its capital 
until the construction of a new state capital has been completed.
25
1. Mining Conflicts in Liberalising India
projects were being proposed at the time, in and around Visakhapatnam 
city, such as the expansion of the Vizag Special Economic Zone, with 
its focus on information technology, and a ‘coastal corridor’ made up of 
other infrastructure and industrial projects. 
The various opposition parties and activist groups that had been 
campaigning on the bauxite issue, as well as local journalists, would not 
necessarily be close to the corridors of power in Hyderabad and Delhi, 
where all decisions and detailed plans were being made, but they had 
often managed to get hold of some government document or other 
piece of information that could reveal something about what was being 
planned. Much effort had been put into the discovery of such information 
by a  dedicated set of groups and individuals, but there was little 
coordination in the analysis and dissemination of their findings. Only an 
outside researcher could manage to stay sufficiently clear of the politics of 
information access amongst these oppositional groups to gather the data 
presented in this book.
The politics of information access worked in many ways—sometimes 
unexpected or even quite random. Claiming neutrality as a researcher 
was a good start when meeting people for the first time. Nonetheless, 
the topic was highly politicised, with no apparently neutral position. Not 
taking a stance might seem suspect and thereby limit my own access to 
information. Affiliation with a foreign university only worked to some 
extent to establish trust with respondents. Introductions were much more 
reliable, and these opened up opportunities for further enquiries with the 
project’s opponents, but almost never with the government, and especially 
not with the company, which was unknown to just about everyone in 
the state. Connections established in my previous work as a volunteer 
in a non-governmental organisation (NGO) could open some doors, but 
could also be a drawback; for example, when I encountered one of the 
many feuds between various civil society groups and political parties.
Sheer luck was certainly also an element of my fieldwork. I came across 
a person who had a good friend and former ‘junior’10 who was high up in 
the local administration. When the senior made a request on my behalf, 
it was possible to get access to a wide range of government documents that 
would never have been made available otherwise, or at least would have 
taken months or even years to obtain. 
10  A ‘junior’ is someone a year or two below you in university.
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As the research moved from policy corridors to the project opposition 
and then to the sites of implementation, issues of access to information 
became less and less problematic. In the towns and villages on and next 
to the proposed project sites, people would even go out of their way to 
contact others I might be interested to meet, irrespective of their particular 
position on the issue. 
It was known that some activists had been very active in obtaining 
information through the recently introduced Right to Information (RTI) 
Act. As it turned out, almost every respondent had some document to add 
to the puzzle of what was actually being planned. They rarely divulged the 
manner in which these had been obtained, other than by saying that RTI 
and other methods had been used. It is assumed that NGOs had mastered 
RTI procedures well enough to mainly depend on this legislation for 
information access, whereas journalists and other independents lacked 
the time, knowledge and resources for RTI requests, and therefore had 
to depend on other methods. Data collection was thus a combination 
of ethnographic work and documentary analysis aimed at understanding 
a  very fluid situation spread out across different geographical scales. 
This  combination has much to offer as a methodology to investigate 
resource contestation, especially the translation of government policy into 
project implementation (Randeria and Grunder 2011).
The existence of a multitude of planning documents, and the ability to 
access internal government communications, allowed for at least some 
insights into the meticulous work of reasonably high quality that was 
being carried out inside government departments. Although there were 
indications of rules being bent to favour project implementation, this was 
far from being a complete picture in a state with a relatively well-trained 
administration following a detailed set of regulations.
Outline of the Book
This book examines the paralysing stand-off on bauxite mining and Adivasi 
livelihoods in three parts. The first (Chapters 2–4) connects the historical 
and recent struggles for Adivasi land rights in Andhra Pradesh with the 
way that a bauxite mineral project was planned; the second (Chapters 
5–6) deals with the contestation of the project during its implementation 
phase, both at the actual project sites and across a multitude of state and 
national forums; which leads to the third part (Chapters 7–8), in which 
an explanation is sought for the experience of paralysis.
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Chapter  2 provides the historical context of longstanding struggles, at 
times of a violent nature when other means of protest have not been 
possible, to protect Adivasi land from outsiders, not only in Andhra 
Pradesh but across large parts of central India. Since the issues around land 
use and forest access for traditional inhabitants remain largely unresolved, 
opposition to the present wave of private sector–led investment in the 
bauxite industry has been heavily influenced by this historical context.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the details of how and by whom the project 
was planned, and how Adivasi livelihoods would be affected at the 
two sites chosen for it. This sets the foundation for understanding the 
way that wider concerns about social justice were addressed as part of 
the planning process. The existing land transfer legislation and the 
many actors supporting it provide a foundation for the tribal people 
to realise their land rights. There is a very stark contrast between land 
transfer laws and the Samatha judgment, on one hand, and economic 
policy in general, specifically the new mineral policy framework, with its 
emphasis on economic growth through private investment, on the other 
hand. Yet  these seemingly incompatible policies and laws continue to 
live side by side, their interaction shaped by ongoing contestations and 
the amount of pressure that various influential groups can exert in each 
particular case. The contest over bauxite mining in Andhra Pradesh is here 
seen as one instance of hundreds of similar battles currently raging across 
central India.
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the way that project implementation has been 
mediated in government processes and through civil society interventions, 
first at the local project sites and then across the wider institutional 
framework of the state. In these chapters, the mediation processes move 
away from the immediate struggles over access to, and control over, various 
natural resources, to address the unique character of the contestation that 
came to be defined by the question of who could access key information 
and then master the techno-bureaucratic language and complicated 
procedures required in order to access forums where challenges could be 
launched. State mediation processes offer opportunities to find a middle 
way between the two conflicting positions, because the state is in charge 
of ensuring that the rule of law is followed. However, the state comes 
with many internal contradictions, most clearly seen in this case in the 
role of politicians as promoters of industry and that of the judiciary as 
upholder of the law that bans the transfer of tribal land to non-tribal 
actors. Chapter 6 discusses the role of civil society in circumstances where 
government mediation has limited effects.
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Chapter 7 returns to my concern with informational problems as seen 
through the eyes of the researcher, to illustrate the difficulty of generating 
a larger, common understanding when so many fractured understandings 
exist, in government agencies as well as among groups and individuals 
in wider civil society. Finally, Chapter 8 provides an overall conclusion, 
including a discussion of the larger theoretical implications of this analysis 
for the future relationship between land, minerals and people in central 
India and beyond.
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and Dispossession
Land as a social justice concern for Adivasis has a long historical 
precedent in rebellions and struggles across central India (Arnold 1984; 
Pati 2011; Bates and Shah 2014). Claims for land rights make emotive 
demands for both the recognition of a unique identity and the material 
redistribution of resources. On paper, strong laws exist to give formal 
support to these rights, but these have never been implemented more 
than half-heartedly, and even then with much variation between states 
and even across territories within states. However, rights enshrined in 
laws remain as important mobilisation factors for movements working 
towards their actual implementation. While significant similarities exist 
across the Adivasi areas of central India, specific historical circumstances 
differ, owing, for example, to the fragmented governance of British India, 
with its many princely estates, or to cultural and ecological variations 
across regional landscapes. These factors continue to influence present-
day legislation and the possibilities that exist for different groups of people 
to be heard and to effect change. 
Movements are built on local grievances but are also influenced by outside 
events. Place-specific contexts are interrelated across regions, especially 
through the legislative centres in the state capitals and in Delhi. At times, 
certain actors have the ability to jump from one context to a completely 
different one, as was true in the Samatha case, where a national court 
was persuaded to protect local land rights. These openings across India’s 
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fragmented federal framework represent great sources of hope for 
improvement, while simultaneously creating fractures when only certain 
actors are able to operate across scales to bring about change.
This chapter presents a historical overview of land struggles in Adivasi 
India, with a specific focus on Andhra Pradesh. It shows how centuries 
of unrest over land relations have been crucial in shaping the present-
day social movements protesting against bauxite mining. And it provides 
a deeper consideration of the Samatha judgment itself, which initially 
appeared to protect all the Adivasis of central India from dispossession.
Past and Present Adivasi Land Uses
The history of land relations in tribal Andhra Pradesh, as well as in much 
of the rest of tribal central India, is one of recurring struggles against the 
transfer of farmland in the valleys to non-tribal farmers and moneylenders, 
and against the government’s claim to own forest land on and around 
the hills (Balagopal 2007a). Successive efforts have been made by state 
governments to strengthen tribal legal rights to agricultural land in the 
valleys, especially as part of attempts to restore peace after rebellions, 
but state governments have retained control of forest land, leaving many 
tribals living under insecure circumstances for generations. The Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act 2006 (otherwise known as the Forest Rights Act) provided some hope 
for change in favour of forest-dwelling communities, many of which are 
tribal communities.1 Yet threats of dispossession by development projects, 
including dams and mines, have become common in the last 50–60 years.
A special legislative area with strong land rights, still today widely known 
as ‘the Agency’, was created in the northern part of Andhra Pradesh 
as a  result  of recurrent struggles against externally driven resource 
exploitation (see Figure 1.1). This process had three distinct moments: 
the creation of the area as a separate administrative region by the British 
colonial government in 1839; the declaration of state ownership of all 
forested land in 1882; and the reservation of private agricultural land for 
tribal farmers in 1917.
1  According to one estimate, about 10.7 million people, or 14 per cent of the total population, 
in the former state of Andhra Pradesh (prior to the separation of the new state of Telangana) live in 
forested landscapes (Reddy et al. 2010).
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Land on the plains, beyond the boundaries of the Agency, was formally 
titled in the early 1800s under local intermediary landlords, known as 
zamindars, who collected revenue on behalf of the colonial government. 
The zamindars, often minor chieftains who had inherited their titles, 
had great powers within the territories assigned to them, but could be 
evicted if they did not perform according to set criteria, especially if they 
did not pay the required taxes (Saxena 1997; Rao et al. 2006). Within 
the Agency itself, a distributed system of authority developed through the 
appointment of local hill zamindars, known as muttadars, who in turn 
were subordinate to the bigger zamindars on the plains.
The muttadars were the vital links in an extended chain of authority and 
subordination stretching from the villagers in the hills to a raja in the 
plains and hence, far more hazily, to a distant suzerain in Hyderabad, 
Delhi or Madras (Arnold and Guha 1995: 101).
Baken describes the establishment of land tenures around the city 
of Vijayawada in Krishna District, south of the present Visakhapatnam 
District, during the 1840s as an arrangement that built on earlier patterns 
of ownership and use: 
[T]he land revenue arrangements prevailing in [the 1840s in] Vijayawada 
were a continuation of old local traditions in which specific (land owning) 
caste groups in each village had the exclusive right to the possession and 
yield of the soil, in return for paying taxes (Baken 2003: 121). 
Not only were upper- and middle-caste groups able to command large 
areas of land; the quality of their land, including access to water sources, 
also tended to be better than that held by members of lower castes 
(Hjejle 1988).
The former (and larger) Visakhapatnam District,2 on the very outskirts 
of British colonial rule, on the border between the Madras and Bengal 
presidencies, proved to be a difficult area to control, despite the use of 
zamindars as intermediaries, and there were frequent violent rebellions, 
especially in the hills (Arnold 1984; Atluri 1984). Without strategic 
importance or enough (known) resources to warrant the despatch 
2  Visakhapatnam District under the Madras Presidency of British India comprised what today 
are the Visakhapatnam, Srikakulam and Vizianagaram districts of Andhra Pradesh, as well as parts 
of southern Odisha (see Figure 1.1).
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of sufficient troops to control the situation, the solution adopted in 1839 
was to set aside seven-eighths of the district’s area from the normal rule 
of law through the creation of the so-called Agency.3
The provisions for the Agency included special courts of law and the 
ability to exclude or modify existing laws not deemed appropriate for 
the area. Significant powers came to be held by the District Collector 
who was the ‘Agent’ of the British Government—hence the continued 
reference to ‘the Agency’ in coastal Andhra Pradesh (Carmichael 1869). 
It was, in a sense, a practical solution for the colonial power to strengthen 
its local authority while removing some of the demands on hill zamindars 
to produce the same amounts of revenue as other zamindars in exchange 
for the return of peace in the hills. 
Despite this, the rebellions continued, and even became worse after passage 
of the Madras Forest Act 1882, which put ownership of most Agency 
land in the hands of the government as ‘reserved forest’. This included 
all land not under continuous cultivation but subject to the practice of 
shifting cultivation, known locally as podu (Saxena 1997; Rao et al. 2006). 
Another device was to declare land on hill slopes to be unsuitable for 
agriculture.4 In the hilly Visakhapatnam Agency, this process ensured that 
most of the land came to be vested in the government, leaving only the 
flatter valley land to be recognised as private land. For these reasons, the 
forest dwellers, hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers of the Agency 
were rarely included in any formal system of property rights, and this 
situation has continued to the present day (Balagopal 2007a). 
Arnold (1984) argues that the nature of the rebellions showed that the 
grievances of the people were longstanding and served to unite the many 
different groups of people who inhabited the area, often including the 
locally influential muttadars, against the outsiders. This does not mean 
that the distinction between ‘tribal’ and ‘non-tribal’ identities was 
particularly important in such movements. Some of the best known rebel 
3  This was done by means of the Ganjam and Vizagapatam Act 1839. Similar areas had been 
excluded in other parts of British-ruled India, including the Chota Nagpur area in present-day 
Jharkhand in 1833 (Maharatna 2005), and in the Godavari and Ganjam agencies in what is now 
Andhra Pradesh. The special Meriah Agency was carved out of the Visakhapatnam Agency in what 
is today southern Odisha in order to deal specifically with the perceived problem of human sacrifice 
among the Kondh people (see Padel 2009).
4  A 10 per cent slope was used as a relevant measure in parts of Odisha, which has a similar land 
settlement history (Kumar et al. 2005).
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leaders were non-tribals, such as the Hindu Alluri Sitarama Raju, from 
the Kshatriya caste, who led the 1922–24 uprising against the restrictions 
on podu and on access to forests.
The result of a century or more of frequent unrest influenced the first legal 
protection granted to private land in the Agency. The Agency Tracts Interest 
and Land Transfer Act 1917, also emanating from the Madras Presidency, 
attempted to regulate land transfers, but also to limit the prevalence 
of usurious interest rates that indirectly led to land loss when farmers 
were not able to repay their loans. Specifically, no land was allowed to 
be transferred from a person belonging to a so-called ‘hill tribe’ to an 
outsider. It was, however, possible for the Agent to grant an exemption 
from this rule, so the land alienation could continue (Sastry 2006). 
Subsequent legislation created further restrictions on land transfer, 
culminating in the passage of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land 
Transfer Regulation 1959 (hereafter called the ‘Land Transfer Regulation’). 
The seeming incapacity of such legislation to resolve the issues was 
indicated by amendments to this regulation that were made in 1970 
after the outbreak of a rebellion in Srikakulam District (Reddy 1977). 
Again, violent protest had erupted in the hills over restrictions on forest 
use imposed by the government, but it was also partly due to limited 
implementation of the 1959 regulation and the prevalence of low wages 
in the region that it covered (Dasgupta 1973).
The Land Transfer Regulation, as it currently stands, completely prohibits 
the transfer of any type of land to anyone but an Adivasi person or 
a  registered Adivasi cooperative society. This crucially includes forest 
land owned by the government. The law further presumes that all land in 
the state’s Scheduled Areas originally belonged to a tribal person, which 
means that land found in the possession of a non-tribal person should 
be restored to the original owner. Nominal tribal landholdings in which 
the real beneficiary is a non-tribal person, which are known as benami 
titles, are also prohibited (Balagopal 2007a). However, the regulation 
does not attempt to resolve issues related to ownership of, and access to, 
forest land. Nor does it propose a solution for the problems of the rural 




In comparison to the exhaustive provisions of the Land Transfer 
Regulation,  the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, the second 
legal precedent cited in the Samatha judgment, makes far less distinctive 
provisions for the protection of land rights. Instead, it leaves specific 
regulations to be determined by each state government or governor 
through repeated use of the word ‘may’. For example:
The Governor may make regulations for the peace and good government 
of any area in a state which is for the time being a Scheduled Area … such 
regulations may … prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by or among 
members of the Scheduled Tribes in such area (India 2007a: 288).
So it is not surprising that interpretations of the constitutional mandate 
to protect Adivasi landholdings have been highly variable.
Ever since the first land transfer legislation in Andhra Pradesh, the 
only amendments that have been enacted have been meant to further 
strengthen land rights. Civil society protest and electoral pressure on 
politicians has so far prevented open market reform of tribal land tenure 
in the state (Reddy 1988; Balagopal 2007a). Across tribal India, as far as is 
known, not a single land transfer act has been repealed, or even weakened, 
despite repeated attempts, such as those made in Jharkhand (Rao 2003; 
Kumar et al. 2005; Vijay Murty and Saran 2016) and also in Odisha. 
The continued formal strength of tribal land rights is quite remarkable, 
given the marginalised position of tribal people and the ongoing process 
of economic reform. 
It might be possible to see the continued existence of land transfer legislation 
alongside the government’s intent on promoting industrialisation as the 
result of the wide legal and administrative loopholes that exist in its 
implementation (Rao et al. 2006).5 One example of this is that, if a non-
tribal farmer gained possession of land before 1959, or with the consent 
of the Collector prior to the 1970 amendment, this land is allowed to stay 
in his or her possession. The most common loophole, however, is failure 
to act on the many surveys and reports that over the years have identified 
5  An especially high incidence of farmland held by non-tribals is reported for the new Telangana 
State, with more than 50 per cent land being alienated, as compared to Vizianagaram and Srikakulam 
Districts, with 0.2  per cent and 2.2  per cent of land respectively in non-tribal holdings. Land 
alienation data is not reported for Visakhapatnam District, but more than 9,000 hectares of non-tribal 
landholdings were detected in a 1997 survey of the district (Rao et al. 2006).
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particular non-tribal landholdings across the Scheduled Areas of Andhra 
Pradesh. Administrative inaction and long drawn out court procedures 
have prevented the settlement of many land issues (Balagopal 2007a).
At the time of Independence, the Agency areas were incorporated into 
India’s collection of Scheduled Areas.6 But the process of settling its borders 
excluded many of those it was meant to protect. The Srungavarapukota 
(S. Kota) Mandal, a sub-division of present-day Vizianagaram District,7 
was one such area that was declared to be ‘non-scheduled’, despite a history 
of being part of the larger colonial Visakhapatnam Agency and having 
traditionally been a forested area inhabited by tribal groups.8 The  way 
the Agency border was drawn proved absolutely crucial for possible 
locations of the alumina refinery and for the people it would displace, 
since private industry has not been allowed in the Scheduled Areas after 
the Samatha judgment.
At the non-scheduled refinery site, several tribal villages were among 
those most severely affected by land acquisition in an area that had 
been excluded from the tribal land rights legislation (see Chapter  4). 
Campaigns have been running since the 1970s to include 796 tribal 
villages across Andhra Pradesh, with a combined population of 140,186 
according to the 1981 census, within the Scheduled Areas. The number of 
non-scheduled tribal villages is especially large in the coastal districts, with 
170 villages and 45,149 people in Vizianagaram District, and 33,939 
people in neighbouring Srikakulam (Ajay Kumar n.d.). However, despite 
official recognition of the problem, there seems to be no scheduled status 
forthcoming for the land in question. Indeed, most of it is likely to have 
already fallen into non-tribal hands.
6  A clear definition of the extent of the Visakhapatnam Agency is difficult to find despite its 
importance for Scheduled Area governance. A practical definition would be the area in which the 
Andhra Pradesh Government’s Integrated Tribal Development Agency operates, that is to say, 
the mandals (or sub-divisions) known as Ananthagiri, Araku Valley, Dumbriguda, Hukumpeta, 
Pedabayalu, Munchingiputtu, Paderu, G.  Madugula, Chintapalli, G.K.  Veedhi and Koyyuru. 
The non-tribal part of Visakhapatnam then becomes the remaining 32 mandals of the district, but 
given the larger size of the mandals in the Agency, this would mean that the latter makes up roughly 
56 per cent of the total geographical area (Gopal 1996).
7  A mandal is also known as a ‘block’ or tehsil in other parts of India.
8  It is possible that S. Kota Mandal was already excluded from the Agency in 1863 when, according 
to Carmichael (1869), the Vizianagaram and Bobbili zamindars were moved into the regular area 
of the Madras Presidency. 
Landlock
36
Land and Adivasi Culture
The early history of the Agency thus revolved around rebellions in defence 
of material resources like land and forests. However, to fully understand 
the enduring support for special land provisions, it is not enough to 
merely examine the history of these material struggles. The discourse 
around tribal people and the impact of modernity upon them started to 
change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries towards a view 
of the people as ecologically benign and therefore virtually guaranteed 
not to be able to cope with social and economic change. It is this 
representation of tribal people as having a special relationship with their 
natural surroundings that continues to reinforce the protection of tribal 
land, just as much as their direct livelihood needs as farmers or forest 
dwellers. The appeal of ‘the tribal’ has been remarkably durable despite 
India’s changing economic priorities.
This modified view of tribal people, which came to be widely accepted 
from the early years of the twentieth century, was most clearly articulated 
by Verrier Elwin, a British missionary who arrived in the late colonial 
period and, after many years living in central India, became an authority 
on tribal issues, even to the point where he was appointed as an adviser 
to the Government of India (Guha 1996). In sum, Elwin argued that the 
tribal person was as much culturally as economically tied to his or her 
natural surroundings, and that tribal society was based on a special kind 
of unity and solidarity, with significant elements of fraternity and equality, 
and with a much higher status afforded to women when compared to the 
rest of India. Elwin’s characterisation of the tribes thus positioned them 
against Western modernity as well as the traditionally rigid and unequal 
Hindu caste society. According to him, ‘it was only the tribal isolated in 
the highlands who really lived; his religion characteristic and alive, his 
social organisation unimpaired, his traditions of art and dance unbroken, 
his mythology still vital’ (Guha 1996: 2378–9). From this characterisation 
came the demand to protect tribals by upholding the sanctity of the 
separate areas created by the British, wherein they would remain free from 
the influence of modernisation as well as of Hindu caste society. 
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On closer examination, however, the division between tribal and 
non-tribal peoples that is maintained in national policy is not quite so 
clear-cut. At least in central India,9 the ‘tribal’ social category comprises a 
wide range of peoples living across a number of different states, some of 
whom have their own religion, language or other customs that separate 
them from ‘mainstream’ India, while others do not, or else have adopted 
a religion, language or customs that resemble those of other, ‘non-tribal’ 
social groups (Xaxa 1999; Roy Burman 2003). To find a common 
denominator between all these groups of people is not a straightforward 
task, and most probably never was so in the past (Guha 1999). 
The designation of Adivasi is increasingly used to build a claim for 
recognition as ‘indigenous’ people, yet it is doubtful whether the groups 
now officially categorised as Scheduled Tribes can claim to be more ‘native’ 
to India than other populations, such as the Dravidians of southern 
India (Xaxa 1999). In addition, many ‘tribal’ groups have migrated to 
their present locations from elsewhere, which makes it difficult to claim 
that they are the original inhabitants of the places where they now live 
(Guha 1996; Prasad 2003). 
The supposedly egalitarian nature of Adivasi society does not seem to be 
supported by evidence from within the Agency that shows some striking 
resemblances to the caste divisions that exist on the plains. The traditional 
social order of the Agency has maintained the status of members of the 
Bagatha tribe as the main landowners, with the Valmiki tribe having 
a status similar to that of low-caste Hindu Dalits, with virtually no land 
of their own (Rajpramukh and Palkumar 2005). Similar divisions have 
been shown to exist between different sub-tribes (Reddy 1971). There is 
evidence of more freedom for women, in the form of higher female work 
participation rates, but this has not entailed a greater inclusion of women 
in decision-making forums or even in access to education, where tribal 
women still lag far behind men (India 2001a, 2001b).
9  The Scheduled Tribes of the Sixth Schedule states of northeastern India are not discussed in 
this book because of significant differences in their cultures, as well as the legal framework, when 
compared to central India.
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Figure 2.1 Adivasi village with bauxite hill in Araku Mandal.
Source: Photo by author, June 2012.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the ‘tribal’ category is instead the 
high incidence of poverty, or low levels of human development, that 
continue to plague the people within it (Kapur Mehta and Shah 2003; 
Gang et al. 2008). Despite its relatively strong overall record of poverty 
reduction, Andhra Pradesh is still worse off in comparison to other states 
with large Adivasi populations.10 Other indicators of their intense poverty 
are evident in the high incidence of malnutrition and disease.11 Nationally, 
Adivasis continue to be significantly worse off compared to India’s other 
disadvantaged communities, such as Dalits and Muslims (Guha 2007). 
10  As recently as 1990, the tribal literacy rate was as low as 7.7 per cent in the Visakhapatnam 
Agency, with a female rate of only 1.8 per cent (Gopal 1996). By 2001, 37 per cent of tribals were 
recorded as being literate, with a female rate of 26 per cent. Only Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have lower 
tribal literacy rates than Andhra Pradesh. By comparison, the Dalit literacy rate in Andhra Pradesh 
was 60.5 per cent in the same year (India 2001a, 2001b).
11  The infant mortality rate is between 120 and 150, compared to 72 for the whole of Andhra 
Pradesh. There is a 30 per cent mortality rate for under-5s, but for some tribal groups (like Savara and 
Gadaba) it is over 50 per cent. The incidence of tuberculosis is twice as high in the tribal population, 
and 75 per cent of all cases of malaria in the state are recorded in tribal areas (Reddy et al. 2006); 
65 per cent of children aged 1–5 suffer from malnutrition, and only about half of all households 
consume adequate amounts of protein and energy, according to a survey conducted in the Khammam 
District of the new state of Telangana (Laxmaiah et al. 2007).
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The Indian Constitution has recognised close to 650 different groups as 
Scheduled Tribes. These are not identified as ‘indigenous’ groups, but 
rather as being historically disadvantaged and in need of state support, 
like the Dalits. Extensive welfare programs have thus been designed 
specifically for these tribal groups and, like the Dalits, they have been 
allocated quotas in educational facilities and government jobs and reserved 
seats in elections to bodies that range from local councils all the way to 
the national parliament. Combined with state-level support for Adivasi 
land rights and other forms of protection, the legislative framework is 
significant on paper and continues to evolve.
The enduring representation of Adivasis as ‘noble savages’ in much 
academic  writing owes something to the critique of modernity in 
post-development theory and to the women-in-environment literature 
(e.g. Shiva 1988; Escobar 1995). Examples of this representation can 
also be found amongst those working to protect Adivasis from mining 
incursions (e.g. Padel and Das 2010). However, this view has been 
exposed to criticism for resting on a form of deterministic romanticism 
that presupposes the natural ability of these people to take care of the 
environment and live sustainably (Guha 1999; Prasad 2003). The tribal 
category, and the more popular term Adivasi, is here understood as one 
that was originally imposed on a wide range of hill peoples. Nowadays, 
tribal people might be seen as a collection of people who are not necessarily 
‘indigenous’, or even originally related to one another, but have a shared 
experience of marginalisation and relative isolation that has shaped their 
identities over past centuries (Xaxa 1999). 
The overwhelming majority of the 5  million Adivasis in Andhra 
Pradesh and Telangana live in the northern hilly parts bordering India’s 
main central-eastern Adivasi region. The 14 officially recognised groups 
of  the Visakhapatnam Agency live in the southern end of the Eastern 
Ghats hill range, at the junction between the Gondi-speaking peoples, 
who migrated there from the west, and Kui-speaking Kondhs to the 
north. In addition, there are a number of native Telugu-speaking 
communities like the Kondha Reddy, who possibly migrated from the 
Andhra Pradesh plains (Arnold 1984; Pingle and von Führer-Haimendorf 
1998). With such a diversity of peoples, it is perhaps not surprising that 




Nevertheless, based on both material and cultural values, strong support 
continues to exist amongst tribal peoples themselves, as well as from 
sections of civil society and the state, for continued protection of land 
rights. Ownership of agricultural land and access to forests are both seen as 
important elements of social justice. The Forest Rights Act 2006 is the most 
recent example of the way in which the image of the tribal as a caretaker of 
the environment is still very much alive, including among policymakers. 
As expressed in the Government of India’s Bhuria Committee report on 
local decision-making in the Scheduled Areas:
Tribal life and economy, in the not too distant past, bore a harmonious 
relationship with nature and its endowment. It was an example of 
sustainable development. But with the influx of outside population, 
it suffered grievous blows (India 1995: 1).
Social Movements and Bauxite Mining 
in Central India
One way to understand the changes brought about by mining is to 
examine the forms of social movement, and other forms of resistance, 
that it has created. These can be divided by between those concerned 
with exploitation (mainly of labour) and those concerned with dispossession 
(of people living above or near the mineral resources) (Bebbington et al. 
2008). Strong labour movements have historically been built around the 
first set of concerns, where the key issue has been working conditions, but 
in more recent years, new movements have been created around the issue 
of dispossession, as modern industries have tended to employ fewer people 
and have moved into remote geographical areas where local people may 
have little hope of gaining employment from industrialisation. Concerns 
over dispossession have come to embrace:
• land use changes, including the extent of the land required for mining 
and the compensation paid for it, but also the effects of pollution;
• social changes imposed on previously coherent communities; and
• resistance to people perceived as outsiders, who remove valuable resources 
from the local population instead of providing them with a greater 
share of royalties or other forms of income.
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Protests against bauxite mining in India have tended to focus on land 
use changes, with the aim of protecting local peoples from dispossession, 
mainly by preventing their displacement and pollution of the environment. 
Such protests have demanded the abandonment of mining plans in areas 
where the ensuing changes will be too great for the local people to cope 
with (Ramamurthy 1995; Reddy 2006; Amnesty International 2010; 
Padel and Das 2010; Patra and Murthy n.d.). In some cases, a demand 
for environmental conservation has also played an important role in these 
protests (Mishra 1987; Oskarsson 2013b). Alumina refineries, on the 
other hand, like other industrial facilities, have tended to create resistance 
because of their use of agricultural land and the poor employment and 
compensation benefits provided to farmers, with less concern about 
environmental conservation. In both cases, the option of demanding 
better business practices, remunerative employment and a local share 
of the profits has been eschewed in favour of an oppositional path 
of resistance to dispossession. 
The reasons for the strong opposition to dispossession are not hard to 
fathom. Though exact numbers are not available, it seems clear that 
mining is the biggest source of displacement in India after dams, with 
victims potentially numbered in millions. Very few of them have been 
resettled, and the problem has been especially acute for those displaced 
by mining. Even when a program of resettlement has been agreed, the 
implementation of land-for-land compensation policies has proved to 
be impossible. One important explanation for the lack of compensation, 
let alone full rehabilitation, is the strong connection of mining to 
forest land owned by the government. For tribal peoples, the denial of 
rights over forests has meant the denial of compensation when a tract 
of forest has been converted into a mine (Fernandes 2009). The denial 
of compensation for land also means a denial of other potential forms 
of compensation—jobs or education—that could help people to rebuild 
their livelihoods. The  development of industrial facilities tends to take 
place on flatter stretches of land with more formally recognised ownership 
rights. However, this has not prevented controversy over the acquisition 
of this type of land, which is often seen to involve a choice between 
livelihoods and food security, on one hand, and industrialisation, with 
manufacturing jobs, on the other (Fernandes 2007).
Concern over the social changes brought about by mining has occasionally 
been voiced in India, but has so far found little high-level policy support, 
despite the fact that many mining operations taking place in the 
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Scheduled Areas. Acts of resistance to the appropriation of the benefits 
by outsiders, which have been a common theme in the international 
representation of resource struggles involving indigenous peoples, have 
received remarkably little attention in India. Even when state governments 
have presented arguments to the national government for higher levels 
of compensation from mining, local tribal movements have seemingly 
refrained from making claims to mineral resources as a collective right. 
The greater threat of dispossession has apparently precluded attempts to 
secure greater local benefits from mining, despite the opening made for 
tribal cooperative mining in the Samatha judgment.
Large-scale aluminium production started under British rule in 1943, 
when Indal, a subsidiary of the Canadian firm Alcan, started operating 
in Kerala, with access to both bauxite ore and hydropower for smelting. 
A number of joint ventures followed, on a relatively small scale, but the 
discovery of larger bauxite deposits in other parts of the world made the 
Indian operations uncompetitive. Efforts to expand the industry came 
much later, in the form of a joint venture between the Hungarian and 
Indian governments, known as Balco (Bharat Aluminium Corporation), 
in the present-day state of Chhattisgarh in 1965. However, technological 
problems prevented Balco from operating properly for many years, and 
when these problems were finally overcome, the ore reserves turned out 
to be insufficient.
The Indian aluminium industry would probably have remained in this 
semi-dormant state had it not been for the discovery of the east coast 
bauxite reserves in the mid-1970s. Despite the conduct of surveys by 
British and Indian geologists for well over a century, these deposits, 
in parts of the Scheduled Areas of southern and western Odisha and 
northern Andhra Pradesh, had not previously been detected (Rao and 
Ramam 1979). The Nalco (National Aluminium Corporation) bauxite 
mine and alumina refinery complex was opened in southern Odisha, in 
cooperation with the French firm Pechiney, and with financial support 
from the French Government, in 1987. A few years later, an aluminium 
smelter was constructed in Angul, in northern Odisha, close to the coal 
mines that would provide its source of power. Nalco remains the by far 
largest bauxite miner in India, and the only one that is currently exploiting 
the vast bauxite deposits of the Eastern Ghats.
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The Indian bauxite industry’s first encounter with protest movements 
occurred in the late 1980s, when Balco’s search for additional ore reserves 
brought it to Mt Gandhamardhan in western Odisha (Mishra 1987). 
This mountain is known for its biodiversity but also as a destination 
for Hindu pilgrims. A significant opposition movement was established 
when local and national activists objected to the company’s statement 
that ‘Gandhamardhan will truly come of age with old holy temples 
of Nrusinghanath and Harishanker and modern industrial temples 
co-existing and enriching each other’ (Concerned Scholars n.d.: 2). In the 
end, it was mainly the mobilisation of local livelihood concerns that 
forced the company to abandon its plans, at a time when protests against 
displacement, especially by dam construction, were growing across India. 
The difference between the widespread protests against dams and those 
against bauxite mining at Gandhamardhan and other locations is that the 
latter have been less concerned with direct displacement, with a greater 
focus on the indirect loss of livelihoods from the disturbance of water 
and forest resources. In addition, the proposed bauxite mining areas have 
often had environmental values that justify conservation. These concerns, 
which have been voiced with growing strength since the late 1980s, have 
largely been ignored by the promoters of mining projects.
Aside from the Gandhamardhan protest, the late 1980s and early 1990s 
were relatively quiet years, in which there was little government support 
or private capacity for further expansion of the mining industry. The lack 
of interest or capacity is evident in the Andhra Pradesh five-year plan 
for 1992–97, which merely suggested a start to ‘preliminary studies for 
exploitation of the Araku group of bauxite deposits for which no other 
government agency has expressed interest’ (Andhra Pradesh 1991: 39). 
The bigger deposits of the northwestern part of the current Visakhapatnam 
District were not even mentioned as a topic worthy of study, presumably 
due to security issues in areas that were virtually under the control of the 
Naxalite ‘Peoples’ War’ group.
The interest in developing the east coast bauxite deposits increased 
dramatically in the 1990s after the Indian economy was opened to private 
investment in export industries. These changes coincided with the start of 
a period of higher mineral commodity prices in world markets and the 
loosening of control over refining and smelting technologies by a handful of 
Western companies, which allowed these technologies to be purchased on 
the open market. Among the first attempts to exploit these new opportunities 
was the Utkal Alumina project at Kashipur in Odisha in the early 1990s 
(see Figure 1.1). However, the experience of the nearby Nalco mine and 
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refinery fostered strong resistance that evolved into possibly the longest 
running protest movement against any form of industrial development in the 
state of Odisha, which culminated in the police shooting of three protesters 
in 2000. These and other human rights violations have been extensively 
documented but are still largely unresolved (PUDP 2005; Reddy 2006; 
Goodland 2007; Padel and Das 2007). While the ongoing protests caused 
the withdrawal of international investors Hydro (from Norway) and Alcan 
(from Canada), and even the Indian Tata Group, the project has continued, 
and is now wholly owned by Hindalco (part of the Birla Group), which is 
proposing to expand the operation.
Bauxite projects in Andhra Pradesh have remained secondary to those in 
Odisha, partly because the former has smaller deposits and more difficult 
terrain, but also because of the failure of attempts to establish a local 
industry with Soviet support in the early 1980s (Srinivasan et al. 1981).12 
It was not until 1999 that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, together 
with an unnamed Dubai partner, made another attempt to exploit its 
bauxite deposits, but these plans made little progress before they were 
dropped in 2003 as a result of civil society pressure based on the Samatha 
judgment’s ruling against private mining on tribal land (Prasad 2000; 
Ganjivarapu 2007). 
Privatisation and restructuring has concentrated the Indian aluminium 
industry in the hands of three companies: Nalco, Hindalco and Vedanta. 
Vedanta Resources, registered in the United Kingdom but with its 
main operations in India, is a relatively late entrant to the aluminium 
industry. It quickly grew to become a major player through the purchase 
of two former state-owned companies, Balco in Chhattisgarh and Madras 
Aluminium Company in Tamil Nadu, while also attempting to establish 
some new projects of its own, especially in Odisha.
Vedanta’s Balco compound in Chhattisgarh was large enough to 
accommodate an entirely new aluminium smelter with a dedicated coal-
based power plant, so the old Hungarian and the new Chinese-built 
smelter continue to operate on the same site. For its part, Nalco is doing 
very well financially, but as its various attempts to create new facilities 
in India have failed at the planning stage, apparently for political rather 
than technical or economic reasons, it has been forced to look abroad. 
12  These attempts were finally abandoned with the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union.
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Hindalco appears to have started mining on a small scale in Kashipur, 
in close collaboration with the state-owned Odisha Mining Corporation, 
to supply raw material for its Utkal refinery.
The key test case for this new wave of expansion has been Vedanta’s plan 
to follow a similar course of action to supply its Lanjigarh refinery in the 
same part of Odisha (see Figure 1.1). In 2003, three activists filed a case in 
the Supreme Court of India alleging that the company was making illegal use 
of forest land. After long deliberations, the mine was controversially allowed 
to proceed in August 2008 (India 2008a), but local protests continued, 
supported by national and international campaigns (India, 2007b; Norway 
2007; Amnesty International 2010,  2011). In  2010, the mine failed to 
secure an operating licence from the Ministry of Environment and Forests 
(MoEF), but this merely led to a new round of litigation and appeals to the 
MoEF’s ‘expert committee’. With no resolution in sight, Vedanta seems to 
have undertaken a six-fold expansion of its refining capacity, despite not 
having the required regulatory approvals (Orissa 2011) and without a local 
supply of raw material.
This case has received so much publicity, both nationally and 
internationally, that it is not easy to envision any form of resolution to the 
conflict. The expansion of social media networks in recent years has ensured 
that the issue is kept alive, including by means of ‘annual global days of 
action’ against Vedanta that coincide with the company’s annual general 
meetings in London (Foil Vedanta 2015). Any attempts at resolution on 
the part of state actors thus risk being seen either as disincentives for the 
investors who count as key figures in the ‘new economy’ or as attacks 
on the human rights of marginalised groups.
Unfortunately, Indian governments were unable to learn from mistakes 
already made during the long-running controversy over bauxite mining 
when they allowed AnRak Aluminium to build a refinery in Andhra 
Pradesh without having first secured their ore supplies, thus replicating the 
establishment of Vedanta’s refinery without a mine in Odisha. It was therefore 
predictable that Adivasi rights activists would protest against mining in the 
hills while investors had predicated construction of a refinery on access to ore 
that cannot easily be sourced from elsewhere (Oskarsson 2012). The AnRak 
Aluminium investment, just like the Jindal South West (JSW) project that 
is the focus of this book, had to contend with the Samatha judgment’s ban 
on private ownership or lease of land for mining in the Adivasi areas. While 
this has led companies to rely on state governments to provide them with 
Landlock
46
access to mineral resources, it has also created a susceptibility for future legal 
challenges in any case where resources from Adivasi areas look as if they are 
being used for private rather than public benefit.
The Samatha Case
The Samatha Supreme Court case in 1997, crucial to the controversies 
examined in this book, is perhaps best seen as one of the final cases of 
success during India’s phase of public interest litigation that started in 
the mid-1980s. Only a few years after the Samatha judgment, a claim for 
rehabilitation of people affected by the Sardar Sarovar dam was decided 
in favour of the industrialists, and the trend has not been reversed to date. 
There have been a few positive court verdicts for activist plaintiffs since 
then, but certainly fewer than in the past. While legal activism remains 
a popular option for social movements, it is not the main tactic that it 
once was (Epp 1998; Gustavsson et al. 2013).
Shortly before Samatha brought its case to the courts, an organisation 
called Sakti (‘Power’), with similar goals, had been litigating against 
mining companies in the same hills, close to Visakhapatnam, based on 
similar breaches in the protection of Adivasi land rights. Sakti won this 
case because the companies were deemed by the court to be ‘non-tribal’ 
and therefore ineligible to own or lease the land. The judges in Samatha’s 
initial High Court case were somehow not aware of the earlier judgment, 
so when Samatha lost this case in 1995 there was no other option but to 
appeal to the Supreme Court through public interest litigation involving 
the Government of Andhra Pradesh as well as the companies. This was 
a crucial difference because the government was supposed to operate in 
the public interest, including the interests of tribal people, as well as to 
contribute to national economic development.
The court was well aware of the conflicting issues at stake.
The object of [the] Fifth and Sixth schedules to the Constitution … is not 
only to prevent acquisition, holding or disposal of the land in Scheduled 
Areas by the non-tribals from the tribals or alienation of such land among 
non-tribals inter se but also to ensure that the tribals remain in possession 
and enjoyment of the lands in Scheduled Areas for their economic 
empowerment, social status and [the] dignity of their person. Equally 
exploitation of mineral resources [for] national wealth undoubtedly, is for 
the development of the nation. The competing rights of tribals and the 
state are required to be adjusted without defeating [the] rights of either 
(India 1997).
47
2. Adivasi Land Rights and Dispossession
According to Vagholikar and Moghe (2003: 69), the Samatha judgment 
itself can be summarised in three key points that apply specifically to the 
state of Andhra Pradesh:
1. State, forest and tribal private lands in the Scheduled Areas cannot be 
sold or leased out to non-tribal persons, including private industries, 
since this would contradict the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution 
and the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation.
2. Mining activities in the Scheduled Areas can only be undertaken 
by the Andhra Pradesh State Mineral Development Corporation or 
a tribal cooperative acting in compliance with the Forest (Conservation) 
Act 1980 and the Environment (Protection) Act 1986.
3. At least 20 per cent of the net profits from such activities, aside from 
any mandatory environmental protection costs stipulated by other 
laws, are to be set aside in a permanent fund for the improvement 
of local education, health or other social services. 
While the judgment provided improved protection from development-
induced displacement in Andhra Pradesh, it came with some difficulties. 
Adivasis, unable to obtain employment in mining projects because of 
their lack of qualifications, are likely to face overwhelming obstacles 
to the exploitation of minerals through cooperatives in a manner that 
promotes an equitable distribution of the benefits. On the other hand, 
the decision to allow the government to do the mining was motivated 
in a fairly simplistic manner by the assumption that public corporations 
act in the public interest. The court thus took the view that the mineral 
resources had to be used for the benefit of the nation, despite the risk that 
the government would cause much the same problems for tribal people 
as would private companies. Indeed, the court did not even prescribe 
any particular measures to ensure that state-owned mines would actually 
produce any public benefits.
The status of the 20 per cent of net profits that should be set aside for a local 
development fund is also uncertain. It is at present not known whether 
any company actually provides a share of its profits for this purpose in 
accordance with the judgment and, if so, who decides how it is spent. 
In Andhra Pradesh, this is particularly relevant in the case of the sizeable 
coal mining operation undertaken by Singareni Collieries, a  subsidiary 
of the national state-owned company Coal India. Furthermore, since 
the judgment does not apply to other economic sectors, state-owned 
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enterprises in the forestry, agriculture or tourism sectors can continue 
to operate in the Scheduled Areas without having to provide such local 
benefits or to involve tribal people in their management beyond the 
requirements of existing reservation policies, and have so far tended to 
include Adivasis only at lower levels of employment, if indeed at all. 
Finally, the state still has the right to undertake large-scale projects for 
the greater benefit of ‘society’ by using the powerful Land Acquisition 
Act 1894 and its various amendments up to 1998. The Samatha judgment 
does not say how the state’s right of eminent domain should be applied in 
relation to tribal land protection, and the Andhra Pradesh Government 
has thus been able to move ahead with the enormous Polavaram dam, 
which is expected to dispossess and displace more than 200,000 people, 
most of them Adivasi, which is more than the number displaced by the 
controversial Sardar Sarovar dam in Gujarat.
The immediate reaction of the Government of Andhra Pradesh, as well as 
the national government, was to appeal the Samatha judgment to a larger 
bench of the Supreme Court, but the judgment was upheld in 2000 
(India 2000a). Attempts were then made to remove the basis on which the 
judgment stood by amending either the Andhra Pradesh Land Transfer 
Regulation or the National Constitution (Balagopal 2007a). An internal 
brief from the national Ministry of Mines took the latter path:13 
The impasse created by the Samatha Judgment can perhaps be resolved only 
through an amendment of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution as opined 
by Attorney General. One way could be to add the following explanation … 
The regulations framed under paragraph 5(2) shall not prohibit or restrict 
the transfer of land by members of the Scheduled Tribe to the government 
or allotment by government of its land to a non-tribal for undertaking any 
non-agricultural operations including reconnaissance or prospecting or 
mining operations under the provisions of MMDR Act 1957 [Mines and 
Mineral (Development & Regulation) Act, 1957] (India 2000b: para. 18).
The central government’s Planning Commission was also worried about 
what the judgment would mean for future mining operations, warning 
that it would be ‘necessary to make … amendments to overcome the 
hurdle placed in the way of private mining in notified tribal areas by 
the Samatha Judgment’ (India 2001c: 44). 
13  The briefing note was widely disseminated in the Indian press (e.g. Mitta 2000).
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The national government’s plans for constitutional change bear witness to 
the powerful interests working to open up the Scheduled Areas to private 
economic activity. Nevertheless, high-level voices in favour of the Samatha 
judgment were also articulated. President K.R.  Narayanan’s Address to 
the Nation on Republic Day, 25 January 2001, included the following 
observation:
In eastern India, the exploitation of minerals like bauxite and iron ore are 
causing destruction of forests and sources of water. While the nation must 
benefit from the exploitation of these mineral resources, we will have also 
to take into consideration questions of environmental protection and the 
rights of tribals. Let it not be said by future generations that the Indian 
Republic has been built on the destruction of the green earth and the 
innocent tribals who have been living there for centuries (India 2001d).
The ‘Campaign to Prevent Amendment to the Fifth Schedule’, supported 
by civil society organisations across India, showed that it was possible to 
mobilise resistance both nationally and locally, within the state of Andhra 
Pradesh. The constitutional amendment was abandoned, and the final 
draft of the Tenth Five-Year Plan made a less controversial statement.
To enhance the indigenous mineral resources, intensive exploration 
is required. An enabling environment must be created to attract new 
investments through private sector participation with modern technical 
and managerial expertise for finding new deposits and develop them 
sustainably in the Tenth Plan (India 2002a: 742).
While the contestation over the interpretation, and possible 
implementation, of the Samatha judgment was still going on, a new 
case came to national attention as the Government of India sought to 
privatise Balco. If successful, this could be seen as a transfer of Scheduled 
Area land from the government to a private, non-tribal entity, and 
that is something that is also banned in the land transfer regulations of 
Chhattisgarh, where Balco operates. The trade union representing Balco’s 
employees took the Government of India to the Supreme Court, again 
using public interest litigation, to challenge the sale on the grounds that 
it contravened the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959, which had 
been inherited by the new state of Chhattisgarh when it was formed in 
2000. However, the court allowed the sale to proceed because ‘[t]he land 
was validly given to BALCO a number of years ago and … even with 
the change in management the land remains with BALCO to whom it 
had been validly given on lease’ (India 2001e). By stating that Balco was 
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still the same company, and thus the same user of land, even though it 
had been privatised, the judges managed to reach the conclusion that 
the case involved no transfer of land and was therefore consistent with 
existing legislation. The Balco judgment also restricted the application of 
the Samatha judgment by stating that the latter ‘is not applicable in the 
present case because the law applicable in Madhya Pradesh is not similar 
or identical to the … Regulation of Andhra Pradesh’ (India 2001e).14 
Following the Samatha judgment, the Government of Odisha set up 
a special committee to review its potential implementation in that state. 
The stakes were even higher there than they were in Andhra Pradesh, since 
the local economy relies more heavily on mining and its tribal population 
accounts for a much larger share of the total population. In 2001, shortly 
after the Balco judgment was handed down, the committee concluded 
that the Samatha judgment did not apply in Odisha (Yadav 2003). The 
most senior government official, Chief Secretary P.K. Mohanty, was cited 
as saying that ‘the law in Orissa is not the same [as in Andhra Pradesh], 
although it does ensure ample safeguards for tribals’ (cited in Mohanty 
2003).15 No further legal challenges have been made in favour of tribal 
land rights, anywhere across the Fifth Schedule states of central India, 
since the Balco judgment. Balagopal (2007a) has argued that the National 
Constitution should be sufficient to prevent mining across all of the 
Scheduled Areas, but this possibility remains untested in a court of law.
Since the Samatha and Balco cases were settled, activists working on 
mining and Adivasi land rights across India have either eschewed legal 
activism or combined it with other strategies such as mass mobilisation, 
lobbying of decision-makers and media campaigns to affect public opinion. 
Attempting to get justice from the courts is risky at the best of times, and 
when the scope of a judgment like that made in the Samatha case has been 
dramatically reduced, a preference for other strategies reduces the risk of 
this judgment being overturned completely by a new set of judges.
14  The question of how different the two laws actually were did not arise in the Balco judgment, 
nor did the validity of the provisions of the National Constitution, the second leg on which the 
Samatha judgment rested.
15  The laws cited in support were the Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property 
(Scheduled Tribes) Regulation 1956 and the Orissa Zilla Parishad (Amendment) Act 1997.
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3. The Formation of a  
Public–Private Alliance
With the Samatha judgment only making allowance for mining by public 
sector and tribal cooperatives in Andhra Pradesh, and the cancellation 
of a  bauxite project proposal by Dubai investors in the state in 2003, 
it might have been assumed that no further attempts would be made to 
exploit the state’s bauxite deposits of the state, at least for a while. But once 
the Congress Party returned to power in 2004, both nationally and in 
Andhra Pradesh, it was only a year or so before a new memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) was signed, this time with Jindal South West (JSW). 
At the time, this project was but one of many of similar size and 
importance to the state’s economy, and since measures to attract private-
sector investment had been the norm for a number of years, there was 
nothing extraordinary about the government signing an agreement with 
a private company. What was crucial, however, was the fact that this 
was a proposal for industrial development in the Scheduled Areas, and 
this was an issue that had been contested for many years, resulting in 
strong protective legislation and a vigilant civil society. From the outset, 
the MoU had to be drafted in a complicated manner to ensure that the ore 
could be exploited in collaboration with a private company that was not 
allowed to operate in, or even be seen as to benefit directly from resources 
contained within, the Scheduled Areas. If the MoU did not comply 
with the land legislation, it was obvious that civil society organisations 




The starting point for a closer examination of the conflict over the 
proposed bauxite project is to detail the way in which it was planned 
and the identity of the proponents. From there we can proceed to an 
examination of the distributional outcomes by looking at the potential 
public benefits to be derived from the agreement.
Project Formation
With the Essar, Jindal and Birla conglomerates already involved in the 
aluminium industry or planning to enter it, the Tata Group was the 
only one of the major domestic metal producers not currently pursuing 
the bauxite ores of central India (see Table 3.1). As many as 12 bauxite 
mining and refining projects were at various stages of development in 
Odisha (Reddy 2006), with three in Andhra Pradesh, but the only recently 
opened bauxite mines anywhere in India were the two with low grades 
in Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra and one with non-metallic grades in 
Gujarat. However, a number of aluminium smelters had been constructed 
in areas without bauxite deposits, and some of the older refineries had 
recently been upgraded or expanded to accommodate new technology 
without the acquisition of additional land, thereby avoiding controversies 
related to displacement. An increase in the ability and interest of mainly 
Indian big business to establish an aluminium industry was countered by 
the strengthening of resistance on the part of oppositional groups in civil 
society who were able to mobilise across geographical scales. Between these 
two positions were state and national governments that had increasingly, 
but not invariably, supported industrial interests.
Table 3.1 Alumina refineries in central India.
Operator or proponent Location Commencement
Hindalco Muri, Jharkhand 1948
Hindalco Renukoot, Uttar Pradesh 1962
Balco (Vedanta since 2001) Korba, Chhattisgarh 1965
Nalco (Government of India) Damanjodi, Odisha 1986
Utkal Alumina (Hindalco) Kashipur, Odisha 1992
JSW Aluminium S. Kota, Andhra Pradesh 2005
Vedanta Aluminium Lanjigarh, Odisha 2007
AnRak Aluminium (Penna Cement 
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Much about the way that the JSW bauxite project came into being remains 
unknown, but it must clearly have involved a significant planning effort 
due to the size of the investment and the complexity of the land situation. 
As far as is known, there was no tender process for the investment, though 
discussions were held with other potential investors, including Nalco 
(Andhra Pradesh 2005a). It would have been difficult for members of 
the state government to initiate plans just when the Congress Party had 
unexpectedly returned to power after 10 years in opposition. In any case, a 
generally poor level of state government capacity makes it harder for local 
bureaucrats to pursue plans that necessarily combine complex technical, 
economic, political and legal aspects. The Jindal Group, headquartered 
in the north Indian state of Haryana, which until now had been almost 
exclusively a steel producer, did not have any major operations in Andhra 
Pradesh, making it a somewhat unlikely investment partner. For these 
reasons, the project was seen by some parties as a central government 
initiative rather than a state one.
The project proponents and their consultants were able to plan and 
formalise their cooperation in a business agreement without engaging in 
public debate on a known issue of concern, and yet the Land Transfer 
Regulation could not be changed. Instead, the 2005 agreement explicitly 
accepts the special protection of tribal people’s land affirmed by the 
Samatha judgment. It even includes a reference to an old government 
ruling from 1975 to further justify the supply of ore by a public company 
to a private investor:
Whereas, the State of Andhra Pradesh is having rich bauxite deposits in 
Visakhapatnam and East Godavari (EG) Districts, consisting of about 
550 million tonnes of metallurgical grade. Keeping its importance in 
view, the GoAP have reserved the entire deposit bearing areas available in 
EG District and Visakhapatnam District through [Government Order] 
No. 999 … 25/10/1975 for exclusive exploitation by the public-sector 
undertaking. Further, all these areas are falling under reserve forest as well 
as notified tribal areas. As per the AP Land Transfer Regulation 1959, 
transfer of these areas to non-tribals is prohibited. Further the Hon’ble 
[sic] Supreme Court of India in Samatha vs. State of AP case gave ruling 
that the state-owned Corporation can mine these areas and in case 
state owned Corporations are involved in mining, it does not amount 
to transfer of the areas to non-tribal. Considering these facts, GoAP is 
looking after a highly competent and financially sound entrepreneur who 
can establish value-added industry to produce end-products, based on 
these valuables, mined by APMDC Ltd (Andhra Pradesh 2005b: 1).
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The MoU specified which deposits would be mined by the state-
owned Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation (APMDC) 
to produce the ore required for about 30 years of alumina refining: 
GoAP shall direct APMDC to supply bauxite from out of the areas applied 
by them in Araku (Galikonda, Raktakonda & Chittamgondi) & Sapparla 
Groups, consisting of approx. 2446 ha. and containing approximately 
240 million tonnes of bauxite ore  (Andhra Pradesh 2005b: 2–3).
The MoU also specified that the privately owned refinery must be located 
outside of the Scheduled Areas in order to comply with the Land Transfer 
Regulation. The agreement states that JSW Holding Ltd (JSWHL):
or its subsidiaries undertake to incorporate and promote a company 
… which will set up an alumina and aluminium refinery and smelter 
to produce about 2.5 lakh [250,000] tonnes of Aluminium per annum 
initially, with a provision for suitable expansion, in the State of AP. at the 
locations other than the scheduled areas mutually agreed to by the two 
parties and with a capital outlay of about Rs  9000 crores [90  billion 
rupees] (Andhra Pradesh 2005b: 2).
The proposed operations might seem to follow the law, since the 
government would be allowed to mine in the Scheduled Areas and 
the refinery would be built on non-scheduled land. However, the terms 
of the proposed cooperation between them are crucial, since the Land 
Transfer Regulation not only prohibits direct ownership of the resource 
by a non-tribal entity, but also the so-called benami operations undertaken 
in the name of a tribal entity but for the benefit of a non-tribal entity—in 
this case a private company. The MoU contained no detailed discussion of 
the benefits of the proposed project, or indeed of who would be planning, 
financing and undertaking the actual mining operations that must legally 
be confined to the public sector. But a number of passages appear to cast 
some doubt over the existence of any public benefits, or even any public 
involvement. The MoU made it clear that APMDC would not be able 
to bear the costs of mining, and might also need the expertise of JSW to 
prepare its plans, as illustrated in these extracts from the MoU:
JSWHL or its subsidiary company shall bear all the expenditure in 
preparation of mining plans, cost of afforestation, net present value being 
payable to the Forest Department, etc.) …
APMDC shall take the expertise of JSWHL or its subsidiary in preparing 
the feasibility reports, mining plans, etc. required for getting clearances 
from MoEF [Ministry of Environment and Forests], Govt of India for 
further leases …
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JSWHL/subsidiary shall provide machinery required for mining lo 
APMDC on hire basis. The hire charges shall be fixed by a [government-
appointed] Committee …
JSWHL/subsidiary shall provide cost of infrastructure required for 
development of mines as fixed by the Committee constituted by GoAP 
(Andhra Pradesh 2005b: 3–4).
Apart from allocating the ore to the private investor, the state government 
had one specific role to play in the agreement, which was to acquire land 
on behalf of the company.
JSWHL … shall identify suitable land other than the land in scheduled 
areas. The same will be acquired and handed over to JSWHL … by 
GoAP/Collector (ibid.: 3). 
Despite the legal terms of the agreement, and the anticipation of 
a  three-year implementation period, progress on the ground was very 
slow. The refinery was approved and land was acquired after two public 
environmental hearings, but the mining operation had not undergone the 
environmental clearance process by 2012. A public hearing was promised 
in October 2009 but this was later cancelled for unknown reasons.
In February 2007, a second bauxite project was announced, replicating the 
earlier arrangement with JSW. The private-sector partner in this project 
was AnRak Aluminium, a joint venture between the Government of Ras 
al-Khaimah, one of the United Arab Emirates, and Andhra Pradesh–based 
Penna Cements (see Figure 3.1). This project has not only moved much 
faster and overtaken the APMDC–JSW project, but has been openly 
described as a ‘Congress Party project’. Evidence pointing towards a local 
Congress Party connection was initially somewhat slender, since emphasis 
was placed on the foreign investor, but it turned out that Penna Cements, 
a company owned by the treasurer of the Andhra Pradesh State Congress 
Party, had made an investment in a cement plant in Ras al-Khaimah a few 
years earlier (Ras al-Khaimah 2006). Interviews conducted in 2007 and 
2008 identified the same treasurer as an investor in AnRak Aluminium 
itself, along with other Andhra Pradesh Congress politicians. In 2012, 
the AnRak Aluminium website made it clear that Penna Cements 
was the primary investor in AnRak Aluminium; and interviews at the 
almost completed refinery revealed that Penna management was mainly 
responsible for day-to-day operations (Oskarsson 2012). The importance 




Figure 3.1 Construction of AnRak Aluminium’s alumina refinery 
in Visakhapatnam District.
Source: Photo by author, July 2012.
In 2009, after many years of negotiations, Nalco was announced as the 
investor in the last remaining bauxite deposits available in Andhra Pradesh. 
However, this project has made no progress since the announcement.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh
The political component of the bauxite alliance initially involved a small 
circle of top state Congress politicians. Of paramount importance was 
Chief Minister Y.S.  Rajashekhara Reddy (‘YSR’), a powerful factional 
leader from the southern Rayalaseema region of the state, who had 
managed to unite the Congress Party and remove the seemingly unbeatable 
Chandrababu Naidu of the Telugu Desam Party in 2004 (Balagopal 
2004). Virtually all decisions of economic importance apparently needed 
his approval, and minutes or notes of meetings about the bauxite project 
confirm that he was present. Chief Minister Reddy also played a key role 
in the state government when acting as its spokesperson on economically 
important projects and lobbying for administrative approvals from the 
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national government. As one journalist put it: ‘The CM is acting like 
a public relations officer for the companies when he comes to Delhi’ 
(interview, Delhi, 2 May 2008).
While nominally belonging to the same governing party, the politicians 
seen as crucial in the formation of the bauxite alliance were of mixed 
regional, caste and class backgrounds, with the Reddy caste in a dominant 
position. For the purpose of alliance formation politicians only need 
to have a shared interest in the implementation of one major project. 
Allegations of favouritism in awarding contracts have been particularly 
common in the case of irrigation and mining projects in Andhra Pradesh. 
According to one local investigator:
All irrigation projects are [implemented] by politicians but there are 
also some TDP [Telugu Desam Party] contractors. Congress said openly 
that we are also giving you contracts so stop complaining. They will all 
cooperate on this and also did [under] earlier governments (interview, 
Hyderabad, 28 February 2008).
An investigator in Visakhapatnam agreed: 
things move only through favours and you need political support which 
is unfortunate. The CM’s son gets things done super fast (interview, 
Visakhapatnam, 7 February 2008). 
Any major investment is given preference in a state where economic 
growth is high on the agenda, but certain investors with direct links to the 
state government are given special priority. As K. Balagopal, a well-known 
commentator on politics in Andhra Pradesh, expressed it at the Southern 
Regional Strategy Meeting on Special Economic Zones held in Chennai 
in 2008:
In Andhra Pradesh all the developers are relatives of the Chief Minister. 
Tata and Jindal come second in the state.
We might thus expect that Jindal’s bauxite project would be given somewhat 
lower priority if other investors with closer personal relations to the state 
government also needed support. One such would be AnRak Aluminium.
This is related to the fact that many—if not all—of the most powerful 
politicians in Andhra Pradesh are also businessmen these days. The chief 
minister’s son, Y.S. Jagmohan Reddy, oversaw the development of a major 
business empire during the period from 2004 to 2009, which included 
a state-wide newspaper and TV news channel called Sakshi, a cement plant 
associated with a limestone mining lease, and information technology 
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parks. Meanwhile, the former treasurer of the Andhra Pradesh Congress 
Party, P.  Pratap Reddy, another relative of the chief minister, was the 
owner of Penna Cements and hence an investor in AnRak Aluminium.1 
The promise of land set out in the MoU for the Jindal project was such 
as to ensure that select members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) 
from the project area would be actively involved. For example, it was 
the housing minister from Vizianagaram District and the commercial 
taxes minister from Visakhapatnam District, rather than the mining 
or industry ministers, who were recorded as supporting the project in 
minutes of meetings about it. On the other hand, the MLA for the tribal 
reserve of S. Kota, including the proposed mining area of Araku, does 
not seem to have been involved in the decision-making process, but 
did not voice any opposition to plans that were unpopular among his 
constituents. Being part of the circle around the chief minister and in 
control of personal networks of influence at the project sites seems to 
have been more important than nominal responsibility for portfolios like 
industry, mining or tribal welfare. 
Of course, politicians are not only—or even mainly—concerned with 
making money, since they also need to maintain favour with the voters in 
order to get themselves elected or re-elected. For this purpose, a pro-poor 
image is essential since the poor make up the majority of voters. In Andhra 
Pradesh, the promotion of business is never presented as something 
opposed to poor people’s rights to land and livelihoods. However, key 
politicians from the southern parts of the state are not especially aware of 
the important role that tribal land rights legislation plays in the Scheduled 
Areas. One senior administrator, who attended a high-level meeting in 
Hyderabad during the period when the bauxite project MoU was being 
finalised, commented as follows:
YSR was talking about so-and-so much money being spent on tribals 
and I got a bit agitated. I said I wanted to speak to give a reply. I told the 
CM, ‘Look Mr Chief Minister, for heaven’s sake don’t keep talking about 
this. Because the money you spend in the tribal areas goes to contractors 
and intermediaries; it doesn’t really reach the tribals. What the tribals 
need is not money; they want their rights. The problem is that as soon 
as some officer tries to transfer land [back] to tribals you will transfer 
1  They were connected to the central government through the federal mining minister, 
T. Subbarami Reddy, who has been involved in road and dam construction through the publicly 
listed company Gayatri Cements, notionally run by his own son.
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that officer. Your government will not allow land to be restored to tribal 
people. Basically what they want is the right to be recognised. They want 
the ability to supervise their own schools, their own hospitals. Give them 
the chance to become involved. Not money.’ You know the reaction of 
the Chief Minister? I was sitting at a table with the Chief Secretary next 
to me and then the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister was whispering in 
the ear of the Chief Secretary. He was asking, ‘What is this land transfer 
regulation?’ (interview, retired Indian Administrative Service officer, 
Visakhapatnam, 20 October 2006).
An important part of the ability of top politicians to influence outcomes 
lies in their ability to exert pressure on the bureaucracy. This was 
evident in one meeting of senior state bureaucrats organised by the chief 
secretary, where the secretary of the Forest Department failed to make 
an appearance on the grounds that ‘all the decisions are made by the 
CM anyway’ (interview, retired Indian Administrative Service officer, 
Hyderabad, 26 February 2008). Since politicians could not hope to know 
the intricate details of the many procedures involved in formulation and 
implementation of the MoU, it was even more important for them to know 
the administrators would do what they were asked to do. Throughout 
the planning and implementation of the project, there were few if any 
noticeable disagreements between them, despite what appears to be a 
significant level of uncertainty about rule-bound governance, including 
a number of recent corruption scandals in the state that were related to 
mining and industrial development. 
This was how the political side of the bauxite alliance appeared to be 
configured during the period of my fieldwork, but after the elections 
of 2009, and despite the return to power of the Congress Party, both 
at state and federal levels, the bauxite alliance underwent significant 
changes. To  understand this reconfiguration, it is important to show 
how politicians might appear to be in a superior position when they are 
elected, but ultimately have to be concerned about how voters perceive 
them or else risk being voted out of power.
The project’s main promoter at the federal level, the mining minister, 
lost ministerial office despite remaining as a nominated rajya sabha 
(upper  house) MP. One of the main local spokesmen for the project 
lost his  seat in the non-tribal part of Visakhapatnam District and thus 
his position as state minister for commercial taxes, but Chief Minister 
Reddy, before his untimely death, strengthened his position after the 
2009 elections, and even managed to get his son elected to the state 
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parliament. In addition, Vizianagaram District moved even more 
firmly into the hands of housing minister Botcha Satyanarayan’s family, 
and hence the  Congress Party. Apart from his government ministry, 
they now accounted for three of the district’s seven state MLAs, while 
Mr Satyanarayan’s wife was now a federal MP. 
The most important change, however, took place in the central 
government, where the Congress MP Jairam Ramesh, who had expressed 
his concern for the future of the Araku coffee growers, became the new 
environment minister after this position had been held by the Tamil 
Nadu–based Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Party in a succession of 
previous administrations. A stronger enforcement of environmental laws 
therefore seemed to be forthcoming, most importantly with the prospect 
of no further environmental approvals for mines across the country until 
the new Forest Rights Act had been implemented (India 2009a). While 
the new minister was likely to be placed under pressure to approve the 
bauxite project by fellow party members in Andhra Pradesh, this was 
clearly not what local Congress Party representatives had expected when 
the party strengthened its grip on power after the elections (Anon. 2010a).
Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation
The state mining company, APMDC, was on the verge of being closed 
down completely in the 1990s after it had incurred mounting losses. 
Since then, it had gone through a process of drastically scaling down the 
number of its own employees while taking part in a growing number 
of major investment deals. Its own mining operations were confined to 
a black marble mine in the southern district of Kadapa. With only 230 
employees and strict limits on recruitment, the many new mining projects 
that had been proposed in its name did not indicate any actual increase 
in mining activity. 
It is the mine planning section of APMDC that has taken on a more 
important role in recent years. Given its close connections to the state’s 
Mines and Geology Department, with which it shares a managing director, 
the mine planners are in a prime position to apply for leases over new 
deposits, which are allocated on a first-come first-served basis, when these 
became available. Once a lease has been secured by APMDC it is usually 
sold on to a private company. The terms of the transaction, including the 
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selection of the buyer and price charged for the asset, are open to political 
manipulation, and this has resulted in some of the state’s biggest political 
scandals in recent years. As one Hyderabad-based journalist put it: 
APMDC invites for contracts but what we understand is that these are 
mafia style decisions. The close links between politicians and the industry 
and the pricing of ore is strategic (interview, Hyderabad, 25 February 
2008).
Another journalist summed up the situation by saying that ‘the government 
always get the contracts for own players when in power while the 
opposition protests’ (interview, Hyderabad, 25 February 2008). It seems 
clear that political priorities have a significant influence on the way that the 
APMDC conducts its business. This impression was only strengthened by 
the arrest of three key state government bureaucrats who were accused of 
not following state regulations when allocating land and mineral resources 
to the private sector.
Figure 3.2 APMDC’s office in a business centre in central Hyderabad.
Source: Photo by author, March 2008.
However, this method of allocating mining contracts to private companies 
could not be applied in tribal areas because of the ban on private investment. 
While smaller deposits have instead been auctioned on condition that 
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only tribal people can apply for leases,2 the bauxite project was deemed 
to be too large for this kind of arrangement. An authoritative source with 
insights into the operations of APMDC explained the situation as follows:
Basically due to the Land Transfer Regulation in Andhra Pradesh 
the government has to do the mining in the state. APMDC is a very 
small organisation and as a government organisation it is difficult to 
run it efficiently. There will be political interference and we cannot hire 
competent people because of various rules (interview, Hyderabad, 9 April 
2007).
This implies that APMDC is a rather empty public-sector operation 
that mainly exists on paper in order to supply private ventures like the 
JSW refinery. Or as one investigator put it: ‘Whether public or private, 
ultimately it is the contractor who will carry out the work’ (interview, 
Visakhapatnam, 7 January 2008).
Having circumvented the Samatha judgment by using APMDC as a front, 
the APMDC-AnRak Aluminium environmental impact assessment report 
for the Jerrila bauxite mine in Visakhapatnam District was confident 
enough to bypass APMDC in reserving a role in mine management for 
what for what it called the ‘mining contractor’ (ICFRE 2008: 164–70). 
This entity was not defined anywhere in the report but, given the activities 
assigned to it, could only be the company engaged to do the actual mining 
while APMDC retained responsibility for oversight. But it was still not 
clear that APMDC had the capacity to perform this function.
In the case of the JSW project, the role of the contractor would not be 
confined to the funding, planning and implementation of actual mining 
operations. The minutes of an APMDC board meeting also detail a range 
of social activities that APMDC itself planned to carry out in the proposed 
mining area with funding provided by JSW, though without any mention 
of the extent to which JSW would receive any public recognition for 
doing so.
[A]bout 200 tribal youth will be trained in the mines of the Corporation 
at Barytes Mines, Mangampet, Galaxy Granite quarries at Chimakurthy 
etc. The total expenditure for imparting training to 200 tribal youth for 
a period of 2 years would be about Rs 2 crore as estimated. Further the 
Corporation would be providing mobile clinics at an estimated cost of 
2  One example of this was the advertisement of sand mining leases in the riverbeds of tribal 
Visakhapatnam in The Hindu and Sakshi newspapers on 31 March 2008.
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Rs 10 lakhs. The Corporation will also provide the distribution of school 
uniforms to about 2000 school children by providing 2 pairs of uniforms, 
boots, and tie at an estimated cost of Rs 15.00 lakhs. The Corporation 
will also provide potable water initially for 2  villages i.e. Bisupuram 
and Nandivalasa which are near to bauxite deposits in Rakthakonda, 
Galikonda and Chittamgondi. The Corporation will also undertake 
public awareness programme by sending the public representatives to 
Nalco Project at Damanjodi, Orissa and conduct Gram Sabha [village 
assembly] and other meetings with villagers at a cost of Rs 5.00 lakhs. The 
total expenditure incurred on the above programmes will be reimbursed 
by M/s Jindal (Andhra Pradesh 2007a: 8).
One retired officer of the Indian Administrative Service confirmed that 
this was a widespread practice designed to create a public facade for 
private mining operations.3
Jindal South West
India’s big business families have confronted very different operating 
circumstances in the last two or three decades. Some have been unable to 
deal with new sources of competition while others have diversified out of 
the sectors in which they were traditionally protected (Kochanek 2007). 
It is was therefore no surprise to see JSW, a subsidiary of the Haryana-
based O.P. Jindal Group, move away from steel production, not only into 
aluminium but also to cement and power production. 
From the operation of two small pipe manufacturing plants in West 
Bengal and Haryana in 1952, the Jindal Group had expanded into steel 
production as recently as 1970, and had since grown into a US$10 billion 
conglomerate, which by 2008 had made the Jindal family as the 12th richest 
in India, with an estimated fortune of US$2.9 billion (Karmali 2008). By 
then the group had 12 steel plants in India and two more in the United 
States, but was already divided into four main sub-groups—JSW, Jindal 
Stainless, Jindal SAW and Jindal Steel and Power—each controlled by one 
of the sons of the group’s founder, O.P. Jindal. When he died in 2005, his 
wife Savitri Jindal assumed the role of group chairman.
3  The only exception may be found in the state of Gujarat, which has the only state mining 
corporation that is able to carry out large-scale mining operations on its own account.
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The four Jindal brothers had substantial political and business 
connections between them, although they kept a lower profile than the 
heads of other business groups like Reliance, Tata or Birla. Naveen Jindal, 
the head of Jindal Steel and Power, was elected as a Congress MP from 
Haryana, and was said to be part of the group of young Congress MPs 
who were close to Rahul Gandhi. The JSW chairman, Sajjan Jindal, was 
the head of the Associated Chamber of Commerce, one of the top three 
business peak bodies in India, when the bauxite project was proposed in 
Andhra Pradesh. 
JSW Steel was not only the main subsidiary of JSW, but also the biggest 
company in the entire Jindal Group, having grown to become India’s 
largest domestic steel producer, just ahead of Tata Steel. While the group’s 
headquarters were in Delhi, JSW was based in Bombay. As of 30 June 2009, 
its 8,500 employees were operating in a number of locations across India, 
with a major presence in the state of Karnataka. Two of its subsidiaries—
JSW Steel and JSW Holdings—were already listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange, with JSW Energy planning to follow suit (JSW Energy 2008). 
Two other subsidiaries—JSW Cement and JSW Aluminium—were then 
planning to start operations in Andhra Pradesh.
The company’s new projects would place considerable pressure on  its 
finances. Steel and power investments alone were expected to require 
Rs  40,000 crore (about US$8  billion). The cement division of the 
company announced it would look for a partner for its limestone 
mining and cement plant in Andhra Pradesh (Kalesh 2009). Twenty-five 
per cent of the Rs 4,000 crore required to finance the alumina refinery 
would reportedly come from internal company sources, with the balance 
supplied  by a domestic bank consortium (Rama Raju 2009), but an 
announcement of this arrangement was accompanied by another media 
statement saying that the plans would be put on hold until the market 
picked up (Joshi Saha 2009). It was not clear whether this was a strategic 
move designed to speed up the approval of the bauxite mine or whether 
the financial constraints created by an economic downturn warranted 
a greater focus on steel production and power generation, especially when 
power supplies were crucial for the company’s other operations.
The MoU with the Andhra Pradesh Government chose to emphasise the 
capabilities of JSW in general rather than its knowledge of aluminium 
production:
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The [JSW] Group has rich experience in mining, ore transportation, 
metallurgical processing, refining, smelling, rolling of metals (ferrous and 
non-ferrous), power generation, port operation and industrial gases … 
It is clear that the Jindal group has the financial capacity, the organizational 
strength and the operational experience to set up large capacity, value 
addition plants of refining and smelting of bauxite ore (Andhra Pradesh 
2005b: 2).
JSW did recruit some experienced staff, including the chief executive 
of JSW Aluminium, R.C. Swain, a former assistant vice-president with 
Vedanta Alumina, but most of the preparatory work was undertaken by 
consultants. The company even chose to operate without a permanent 
office in the area, instead using a few rooms in the housing estate built 
for employees of the Jindal Ferro-Chrome factory on the outskirts of 
Visakhapatnam city. A local consultancy undertook the land surveys for 
both the refinery and the mine, and one of its employees later became 
the site manager (and only on-site employee) at S.  Kota. The tasks of 
site preparation and plant construction were also outsourced to other 
companies.
Regardless of who actually carried out the work, JSW Aluminium was 
credited as the author of the official land acquisition map for the refinery 
(JSW Aluminium 2007a), despite this being a task that the government 
was supposed to perform under the terms of the MoU. It was likewise JSW 
that supplied copies of official government documents to the consultants 
engaged in the environmental impact assessment of the mining operation, 
as evident in the company’s office fax number on the top of each page 
(ICFRE n.d.). JSW thus appeared to function like a back office that 
processed and distributed information between government agencies and 
private consultants or suppliers engaged in various administrative tasks. 
An activist in Delhi claimed that this mode of operation was common 
practice amongst private mining and metals companies in India.
Basically all these mining companies do the same; they stay away from 
doing actual work. Vedanta has contracted an Australian company to build 
their refinery and will then subcontract the mining to smaller companies. 
They only manage the money (interview, Delhi, 11 December 2007). 
Apart from operational concerns, this poses questions about how social 
and environmental concerns could be handled properly with such limited 
experience of bauxite mining and alumina refining on the part of both 
of the main partners in the public–private partnership.
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For the opponents of the bauxite project, JSW was a name without 
a  face, a company coordinating work behind the scenes without ever 
revealing itself. The portrait of a ‘highly competent and financially sound 
entrepreneur’ in the MoU is thus of a company venturing into a new line 
of business, with limited in-house experience and a limited presence in 
the state, but an ability to mobilise the required economic, technical and 
political resources. At least that was the case until the economic crisis of 
late 2008 changed world market prices and the prospect of financing the 
project (Joshi Saha 2009; Rama Raju 2009).
Distributional Outcomes
Planning for large-scale mining and refining of bauxite ore in an 
ecologically fragile and economically poor region is a very complex 
matter that needs to take social, environmental, cultural, technical and 
economic costs and benefits into account. While the environmental and 
social impacts are discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, we can now consider the 
distributional outcomes of what was being proposed from an economic 
point of view, despite the difficulty of doing so when the proponents had 
presented broad visions rather than detailed plans. The MoU was based 
on a ‘vision to augment growth and development in the State of Andhra 
Pradesh’ (Andhra Pradesh 2005b:  1), while meeting minutes recorded 
that plans were being made ‘in the interest of development of the area and 
tribals’ (Andhra Pradesh 2005c: 2).
The project plans had to take account of material circumstances as well as 
the choices made in the creation of a business agreement. The fact that the 
bauxite ore was only present in certain locations in tribal Visakhapatnam 
District was impossible to ignore, but beyond this a range of different 
choices had to be made. An economic interest in keeping the refinery 
as close as possible to the mine in order to reduce transport costs had 
to be combined with the need to find an area of flat land on which it 
could be  built, sufficient water to process the ore, specific methods 
of transporting millions of tons of ore and alumina each year, and 
a competent production workforce.
Given the choices that were made, it seems that the proponents opted for 
a complex project design that would deliver narrow economic outcomes. 
Had the actual goals been to augment public revenues or support 
a wider process of industrialisation, other choices would have been more 
67
3. The Formation of a Public–Private Alliance
appropriate. The evidence for this is not only the low level of forecast 
revenues and employment, but also the existence of a counterfactual 
alternative in the form of the public-sector company Nalco. Had Nalco 
been allowed or encouraged to invest in the project, public revenues would 
have been higher implementation would have been more straightforward 
because a public company can own land in the Scheduled Areas. 
Meagre State Income from Mining
The first problem for public revenue is the low level of compensation 
that state governments receive directly from mining. A mineral royalty is 
levied on all forms of mining across the country, and determination of the 
royalty rate has been an ongoing issue in federal–state relations for many 
years. Although the states are recognised as the owners of what are known 
as major minerals, including bauxite, iron, coal and zinc, the royalty rates 
have been set by the national government. The state governments have 
protested, because they have to deal with the social and environmental 
costs of mining under severe budget constraints, but they have only 
been able to gain fairly modest increases in recent years (India 2006a).4 
The national government has not agree to higher increases because of its 
interest in supporting industrialisation and energy generation and, at least 
in the past, because this would reduce the profits that could be made by 
its own public-sector companies like Coal India or Nalco. While Andhra 
Pradesh has a more diversified economy than central Indian states like 
Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, and is therefore less dependent 
on revenues from mining,5 it has come up with similar responses when 
attempting to find other ways to increase such revenues.
Aside from royalties, there were three main ways for the Andhra Pradesh 
Government to raise revenues from this bauxite project: by making 
a profit on the sale of ore to the refinery; by taxing the refinery itself; 
and by imposing additional taxes and fees on the land used for mining. 
Of these, the first two were ruled out by provisions of the MoU that set 
the price of the ore as ‘the price as fixed by a committee formed by Govt of 
4  The royalty on bauxite has notionally been tied to the world market price of aluminium but was 
roughly Rs 80 (less than US$2) per tonne during the period under discussion.
5  Even though Andhra Pradesh is the second biggest mining state in India in terms of royalty 
collection, its income from this source was only Rs 865 crore (about US$190 million) in 2004/05, 
or roughly 3 per cent of the state’s total revenues. Odisha and Chhattisgarh received Rs 664 and 695 
crore respectively from the same source (Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008).
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AP, based on cost of production’ (Andhra Pradesh 2005b: 2–3), and that 
declared the refinery to be a Special Economic Zone with wide-ranging 
tax exemptions. 
Selling ore without making a profit might have necessary to attract 
JSW’s interest in the project. The problem (for the promoters) was that 
the Samatha judgment required 20  per cent of profits to be set aside 
‘so that the constitutional objectives of social, economic and human 
resource empowerment of the tribals could be achieved’ (India 1997: 
para. 114). If the profit was less than the market price for bauxite ore 
would have provided, then it could be argued that the bauxite project 
was in contravention of the judgment. A high-level committee of the 
Andhra Pradesh Government, with advice from PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
spent a significant amount of time trying to figure out how it could sell 
the ore at cost price to JSW, as promised in the MoU, while making 
it appear as if the price and the profit shared with tribal groups were 
both based on market conditions. The committee’s solution was not to 
determine a market price directly, but rather to sell the ore at 1.25 times 
the royalty rate. Since the royalty rate was based on a formula that took 
account of  the international price of aluminium on the London Metal 
Exchange, it could then be said that the ore price was based on a market 
price (Andhra Pradesh 2008a).6
The prospects for securing revenue from a land tax were unclear. 
The Andhra Pradesh Mineral Bearing Lands (CESS) Act 2005 was meant 
to yield additional state government revenue from this source, but its 
effectiveness was thrown into doubt when a steel company took the 
government to court over the proposed tax of Rs 100 per tonne of iron ore 
being levied on top of the royalty of Rs 20 per tonne (Venkateshwarlu 2007). 
The prospect of raising state revenues is not the only reason for a state 
government to encourage investment in an alumina refinery. There 
is also the prospect of investment in infrastructure, and other facilities 
that come with its construction, and the potential creation of additional 
employment. The problem for state governments is that there is no 
legal basis for demanding additional local industrial investment as 
6  This approach was first established when the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) 
gave its approval for the Jerrila bauxite mine in 2008, despite admitting that ‘the Expert Appraisal 
Committee has no idea about the reality’ of whether 20 per cent of market-based profits would be made 
available for tribal welfare (India 2008c). I am grateful to Bill Lockhart (personal communication, 
March 2009) for his insights on this issue.
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a precondition for mining. Such demands have been seen as barriers to 
trade within the country and have generally been struck down by the courts. 
Without a resolution of the federal–state conflict over how to compensate 
the resource-rich states, future deals between state governments and 
private investors are likely to continue to include combinations of mines 
and plants, despite an effort to limit such deals in the 2008 National 
Mineral Policy (India 2008d). This is all but guaranteed to cause more 
delays because of the increased complexity of planning for two projects 
instead of one and the increased risk of litigation and controversy. 
However, the separation of related projects may have some benefits for 
their promoters. In the case of bauxite, for example, where the mines are 
the focus of controversy, the establishment of a refinery can increase their 
power to bargaining for the subsequent approval of a mine (Kohli 2006). 
Another aspect of this problem is the lack of incentives for states to 
cooperate. Bauxite ore located in the northeastern corner of Andhra 
Pradesh will not be processed in nearby Odisha even if the latter has 
better railway connections to the source or more readily available water 
or energy supplies. Similarly, ore from Nalco’s Panchpatmali mine in 
southern Odisha is very unlikely to be transported across the border 
to Andhra Pradesh to avoid the need for new mines in the ecologically 
sensitive Araku Valley, no matter how technically and economically 
feasible this might be, since it would reduce Odisha’s state revenues. It is 
possible that Nalco, as a major producer and exporter of alumina, could 
have supplied alumina to several smelters in Andhra Pradesh, but no plans 
have been made along these lines (Sivaramakrishna 2007). Indeed, given 
the interest that Nalco had shown in development of the Andhra Pradesh 
bauxite deposits, before any other agreements had been signed, we might 
conclude that an increase in government revenues has not been a high 
priority for leading politicians in the Andhra Pradesh Government.
Non-Tribal Industry Excluded from the 
Scheduled Areas
The Andhra Pradesh Government insisted on a combination of mining 
and refining, but the existence of tribal land rights forced what could 
have been one bauxite and alumina refinery project in the public sector 
to become two projects. Several project components caused additional 
difficulties when it was necessary to obtain bureaucratic approvals and 
acquire land for two projects instead of one. There was also the question 
Landlock
70
of timing. The Andhra Pradesh Government would insist on the private 
investor making the first move, but the private investor would be worried 
that the mining lease or something else would not receive bureaucratic 
approval, thus creating an issue of trust between the two sides. 
What made the chosen setup especially strange is that a superior alternative 
was already available to the state government. If Nalco had been chosen 
as the partner, all the facilities could have been located in the Scheduled 
Areas, since Nalco and APMDC are both public companies.7 Nalco has 
been very profitable in recent years, operating one of the largest alumina 
refineries in the world.8 It clearly has greater knowledge of bauxite mining 
and alumina refining technology, and of the particular operational 
conditions of the tribal areas of central-eastern India, than could be 
claimed by JSW or AnRak Aluminium.
Nalco had shown an interest in the Andhra Pradesh deposits for many 
years but had never been awarded a contract, nor had a valid reason 
for this denial ever been made public. Meeting minutes reveal how the 
company was willing to invest Rs 46,000 crore (about US$9.2 billion) in 
April 2005. 
The Chairman & Managing Director, NALCO … expressed their interest 
to establish industries to produce alumina/aluminium by making use of 
quality bauxite deposits of Jerrila area. They intend to establish Alumina 
refinery at Krishnadevapeta (KD Peta) and smelter at Visakhapatnam 
(Andhra Pradesh 2005c: 1).
The minutes suggest that the state government was agreeable:
The Hon’ble [sic] Chief Minister instructed that APMDC will take 
up mining operations and supply the material to NALCO by fixing 
a reasonable price which includes cost of excavation and 20 per cent profit 
margin (ibid.: 4).
But despite these undertakings, contracts were signed with JSW and 
later (in 2007) with the government of Ras al-Khaimah. During this 
time, Nalco continued to make media statements about its intention to 
7  Several public companies operate in the Scheduled Areas of Telangana, including Singareni 
Colleries and Sponge Iron India Limited.
8  Nalco’s annual reports declared after-tax profits of Rs 24 billion (approximately US$520 million) 
in 2006/07, Rs 16 billion in 2007/08, and Rs 13 billion in 2008/09.
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invest in Andhra Pradesh, and in early 2008, the federal mining minister 
announced that Nalco would soon be awarded a contract (Anon. 2008a), 
yet none was forthcoming. 
Throughout this period, the Andhra Pradesh Government insisted that 
APMDC should be the mining vehicle, not so much because of tribal 
land transfer issues but ‘for monitoring environmental and tribal welfare 
issues effectively’ (Anon. 2006a). It was never explained why APMDC 
would be better at monitoring these things than Nalco would, given that 
Nalco was the company with actual experience of bauxite mining. Only 
in 2009 was Nalco granted mining leases over the last remaining deposits 
in the state. These are located on the border of between Visakhapatnam 
and East Godavari, making them the least accessible of all the state’s 
reserves, and with the highest risk of security threats from the Naxalites. 
So far as is known, Nalco has not since been able to secure the crucial 
environmental approvals and move towards mining these deposits.
Where Were the Public Benefits?
Although Nalco’s investment plans were frequently discussed in the media, 
and further details were available in the minutes of government meetings, 
it is possible that some unknown concern prevented an investment 
agreement. However, when seen in light of other dubious mining deals, 
the generally unfavourable position of public companies in Andhra 
Pradesh,9 and the lack of public revenues forecast from the APMDC-JSW 
project, questions about the overall public benefits of this project were 
only intensified. When these questions could not be answered, the project 
could only be explained as an example of the rent-seeking behaviour that 
has often been associated with big mining projects. 
The way the bauxite project was organised, with public-sector mining by 
a mining company that is unable to mine, and a private investor funding 
the whole project, suggests a legal arrangement designed to circumvent 
the tribal land transfer legislation that functions as a barrier to the 
bauxite industry. But a decision to circumvent rather than change the 
law could only add legitimacy to the continued demand for tribal land 
9  Another public company, Vizag Steel, was not allowed to build a port on land it had already 
acquired, despite the prospect of lower transportation costs, and the privately owned Gangavaram 
port was instead developed on the same land. Vizag Steel also lost out to the new but politically well 
connected private company, Brahmani Steels, in its bid for an iron ore mining lease.
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rights. At the same time, the legal manoeuvring seems to indicate that 
were significant limits to the power of the bauxite alliance, which would 
be open to challenge when the state proved unable to either operate or 
finance the mine. 
Another aspect of the project design was the need for a significant level 
of trust between the company and the state government. It is not entirely 
clear how this trust was established or how it was reaffirmed over several 
years of slow implementation. For example, the company had to make 
significant up-front payments for the refinery, including the land on which 
it would be built, before any progress could be made with the mine. Given 
the history of bauxite mining as a major source of political conflict, what 
could explain the investor’s confidence? Could the investment be seen 
as a way of securing future access to the ore deposit? If senior politicians 
were aware of the risk of lengthy delays, over a period in which elections 
were  to be held and potentially lost, how could immediate dividends 
have been obtained from the unproductive work of securing the MoU 
and starting the process of land acquisition? Was it possible to secure the 
benefits of patronage well before the refinery had started production?
Those hoping to prevent mining could have used the prospect of limited 
public benefits to claim that this project would not contribute to wider 
economic development, either at the local or the state level, but would only 
benefit a small number of people. The well-known need for politicians to 
spend large sums of money in order to win elections could then have 
been connected to this lack of public benefit with the implication of 
rent-seeking motives. However, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the protests 
avoided the distributional issue, as if negotiations for improved economic 
compensation would have made the discourse on the dangers of mining 
seem less sincere. If some quantum of monetary or other benefits could 
compensate for all the negative impacts on Adivasi culture, then concerns 
about these impacts might not be taken so seriously.
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The use of land for mining and refining in the Jindal South West (JSW) 
bauxite project would be in direct competition with existing livelihoods 
across two different sites and would impose other changes in surrounding 
areas. These changes would depend on the type of activities undertaken 
and the technical and other choices made as part of the planning process. 
Furthermore, open-cast bauxite mining on top of certain hills in the 
Agency would have implications that were very different from those 
of the industrial process of alumina refining on agricultural land in 
Vizianagaram District. 
The ability of land-dependent rural communities, whether tribal or not, to 
cope with external changes brought about by industrialisation depends on 
their capacity for adaptation. Successful change could entail a movement 
into industrial employment with higher incomes, but for this to occur 
a wide skills gap would have to be bridged, and this would have to be 
done in competition with many better educated people from nearby cities. 
The many displacement-inducing projects in past and present tribal India 
have been particularly problematic for tribal groups, whose members have 
not been able to make this move into new activities or adapt to a new 
setting (Fernandes 2009). 
Instead of assessing new employment opportunities, a more viable 
approach is thus to examine whether existing livelihoods could be 
maintained alongside the bauxite project, what forms of compensation 
were being offered in exchange for the loss of land and other resources, 
and whether people who were dispossessed had capabilities that would 
allow them to establish new livelihoods. There were also many people 
who depended on common property resources that might no longer be 
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accessible, and others whose livelihoods would be compromised if assets 
on which they depended were damaged by industrial pollution or water 
consumption.
Compensation for Land and Livelihoods
At the time when the project was being planned, compensation for 
land acquired for industrial projects was still based on the arcane Land 
Acquisition Act 1894 and its various amendments.1 This legislation 
empowered the government to take over land for a public purpose and pay 
compensation according to an estimated market value, which included the 
value of the land itself, buildings, crops and other assets. This legislation 
had been subject to heavy criticism for its general deficiencies, but with 
specific concerns related to the Scheduled Areas.
The valuation of land is clearly a very complicated procedure, and over 
the years much effort, including court litigation, had been dedicated to 
providing more accurate assessments. This has been further complicated in 
recent years by sharply escalating land prices across India, while officially 
recorded prices have been understated in order to avoid stamp duties. 
For industrial projects, the market value is set at the date of notification 
of land acquisition and does not therefore take account of expected price 
increases due to the industrial development and the associated influx of 
people, nor the fact that people in the surrounding area may raise the price 
of agricultural land in anticipation of growing demand. In tribal areas, 
the market value may be especially hard to assess because the existing 
market is restricted to tribal people and land is often held informally or 
illegally (Singh 1986; Herbert and Lahiri-Dutt 2004; Fernandes 2007; 
Iyer 2007; Sampat 2008). To deal with these dilemmas, companies or state 
governments frequently offer higher levels of compensation than those 
required by the law, but this happens on a case-by-case basis wherever 
the opposition is strong enough to be taken seriously (Newell  and 
Wheeler 2006).
Beyond the question of whether land valuations are fairly applied to all 
affected people, social movements across India have been built around 
the inadequacy of providing purely monetary forms of compensation. 
1  This was subsequently replaced by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013.
75
4. Livelihoods at the Two Sites
The Narmada Bachao Andolan movement has been at the forefront in 
highlighting the difficulties that people face when they are uprooted from 
the land, water and forests on which they have depended for generations 
(Baviskar 1995; D’Souza 2002). There are also important concerns of class, 
caste and gender amongst the affected groups that further shape individual 
outcomes (Lahiri-Dutt 2011). It has gradually been accepted across India 
that displacement should involve rehabilitation, including land-for-land 
compensation (Iyer 2007). The continued delay in passage of a national 
rehabilitation bill has meant that the Andhra Pradesh Rehabilitation and 
Resettlement Policy of 2005, with various amendments, has been applied 
to all large-scale land acquisitions, which means those affecting at least 
100 families in the plains or 25 families in the Scheduled Areas.
This policy importantly defines displacement as the loss of a house plot for 
those living in the plains, but shows more official concern for tribal people 
by allowing the loss of any type of land, including agricultural land, in 
the Scheduled Areas to count as a form of displacement (Andhra Pradesh 
2005d). A second important benefit for people displaced in the Scheduled 
Areas is contained in an amendment to the policy that makes land-for-
land compensation mandatory (Andhra Pradesh 2006a). For people 
on the plains, new land is only provided if government land is already 
available for this purpose. This has been an obstacle to the rehabilitation 
of those who are displaced when it means that the government would have 
to acquire new land, thus creating even more displacement (Iyer 2007; 
Nathan 2009). 
Mitigation of so-called externalities from industrial operations, including 
pollution and water consumption, is a process completely managed by 
government agencies, despite mechanisms like environmental public 
hearings that are intended to take public concerns into account. The main 
tools for mitigation are environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports 
and the mining plans included in applications for mining leases. State 
Pollution Control Boards (PCBs) exist to ensure that various prescribed 
pollution measurements remain within specific limits, while the Indian 
Bureau of Mines (IBM) monitors mining operations, so there can 
be some duplication in the monitoring of things like water pollution. 
However, PCBs and the IBM have both found it difficult to carry out 
their respective mandates due to severe shortages of staff and other 
resources (Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008). It has thus been difficult or 




The Bauxite Mineral Industry and 
Land Use Change
To understand how bauxite mining and refining is likely to affect Adivasi 
lands in Andhra Pradesh, it is possible to draw on a range of Indian and 
international studies. Much of the technology has been standardised, 
especially in the refining of alumina. However, it is necessary to 
combine a knowledge of mining, environmental management and land 
compensation practices in India with the specific environment of the 
Eastern Ghats in order to anticipate actual rather than theoretical change.
The formation of bauxite ore in central India has taken place over millions 
of years of seasonal heavy rain (1,100 to 1,900 mm per annum), followed 
by hot sun, which has exposed the hills of khondalite rock in much of 
eastern India to the phenomenon known as weathering. Minerals in the 
rock have slowly leached out to leave high concentrations of bauxite ore 
as caps on the top of particular hills in the region, including some in 
Visakhapatnam District, at elevations of 900–1,420  m. The depths of 
these bauxite deposits ranges from just a few metres up to a maximum 
of 54  m. They can be relatively small in area or up to several square 
kilometres. The east coast bauxite deposits of tribal Odisha and Andhra 
Pradesh account for 80 per cent of metal-grade bauxite ore in India, which 
explains why this region has come to be a focal point of the industry and 
its opponents (Rao and Ramam 1979).
Mining on an industrial scale in Andhra Pradesh is restricted to the 
handful of locations where sufficiently large deposits have been found 
(see Table 4.1).2 A decision on whether these can be mined will largely 
depend on the feasibility of investments in transport infrastructure such 
as railways and ports (Bunker and Ciccantell 1994). The Araku deposits 
have the advantage of proximity to existing port and railway facilities 
constructed by an Indo-Japanese iron ore project in the 1960s, but 
they could not support a mining operation for more than 10–15 years. 
Thereafter, the more remote Sapparla deposit, currently without a railway 
connection, would have to be exploited.
2  Bauxite mines in eastern India are usually planned to excavate more than 3  million tonnes 
of bauxite per annum, which is enough to feed an alumina refinery with an output of about 1 million 
tonnes per annum.
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Table 4.1 Bauxite deposits of Andhra Pradesh.
GROUP Deposit size (m.t.) Mine area (ha)
Araku
     Galikonda 14.5 61
     Raktakonda 8.6 42
     Chittamgondi 28.5 152
SUBTOTAL 51.6 255
Chintapalli
     Sapparla 186.3 1513
     Gudem 38.4 263
     Jerrila 246.0 1350
SUBTOTAL 470.7 3126
Gurtedu (East Godavari) 42.6 180
TOTAL 564.9 3561
Source: Rao and Ramam (1979).
Each of the stages in the production of aluminium has distinctive 
characteristics that determine its impact on local communities and 
environments as well as the overall cost structure of the industry 
(see Figure 4.1). The impacts on land, air and water quality are discussed 
in the EIAs undertaken for the Galikonda bauxite mine and the S. Kota 
alumina refinery, and in critical assessments of Vedanta’s nearby Lanjigarh 
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Figure 4.1 The stages of the aluminium industry and potential pollution.
Note: SO2 – sulfur dioxide; CO2 – carbon dioxide; NOx – nitrogen oxide; PFC – perfluorocarbon; 
PAH – polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon; SPL – spent pot lining.
Source: Adapted by author from EIPPCB (2001) and BS Envi Tech (2008).
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The energy required to produce aluminium metal is much greater than 
that required for other metals such as tin, copper and lead. While ore 
production accounts for between 77 and 83 per cent of the value of these 
other metals, the value of bauxite ore is less than 10 per cent of the value of 
finished aluminium (UNCTAD 2007). Since markets are usually far away 
from the deposits, and aluminium products are more difficult to transport 
than alumina, there are relatively few incentives for local aluminium 
production other than the interest of resource-owning countries to 
increase their own revenues. Aluminium smelters therefore tend to be 
located where low-cost power supplies are available, often from hydro-
electricity (Barham et al. 1994). However, a recent trend in India and 
China has been to fuel smelters by means of thermal power, necessitating 
proximity to a coal-mining area to minimise the cost of coal transport.3
Bauxite Mining and the Environment
With many minerals washed away in the leaching process that originally 
formed the bauxite deposits, and with little or no topsoil remaining, 
it is common to find that the top portions of Indian bauxite hills are 
largely without forest or other vegetation beyond grasses and shrubs, 
while the hillsides have dense forest cover. While there are other causes 
of variable forest cover, including government policies and local practices, 
this fundamental characteristic of the east coast bauxite hills is the cause 
of one of the most common disagreements about the consequences of 
mining. Those in favour of mining see a rich bauxite deposit on a bare 
hilltop with few signs of human habitation, while those against it see 
a forested hill with springs flowing down its sides throughout the year to 
provide vital livelihood support for tribal communities further downhill.4
Open-cast mining of hilltop deposits entails extensive land disturbance, 
even when there is little in the way of overburden in the form of soil 
and rocks above the deposits themselves.5 In Odisha, the flatter and more 
extensive bauxite hills make mining operations more straightforward 
3  Northern Odisha has become the favoured location for smelters in India, with two smelters 
located next to the Hirakud dam and one in Angul.
4  In Andhra Pradesh, official planning documents favour the tree-free position (BS Envi Tech 
2008; ICFRE 2008), while other observers have seen the forested hillsides (Moody 2007; Pattanaik 
et al. 2009). The national Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) lists five bauxites deposits in 
Odisha with little or no hilltop vegetation but with forested hillsides (India 2008e). See Oskarsson 
(2017) for further analysis of this controversy.
5  The overburden is rarely more than 10 m in depth, with 4 m being the average at Galikonda 
(ICFRE n.d.).
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from a technical point of view since the mining can proceed on top of the 
same hill for many years. In Andhra Pradesh, the topography is different, 
with smaller but thicker deposits on top of steeper hills. Initial steps in 
bauxite mining operations, other than the construction of the transport 
infrastructure, involve the clearance of vegetation, where necessary, 
and removal of any overburden. The actual mining typically consists of 
a combination of blasting with explosives and cutting of the rock with 
specialised machinery, followed by the use of mechanical excavators and 
human labour to load to the broken rocks onto trucks—or possibly 
a conveyor belt—for transport to a nearby railway station.
In the present case, there was a plan to mine Galikonda Hill at a rate 
of roughly 1  million tonnes per annum, which meant that operations 
would last for about 13 years. Since the refinery would need 3 million 
tonnes per annum, several other mines would have to operate at the same 
time (India 2008e). With several smaller mines operating for relatively 
short periods of time, it would be difficult to put in place long-term 
infrastructure such as conveyor belts in order to minimise the disruption 
caused by trucks transporting ore through villages (ICFRE n.d.).
The mining of Galikonda Hill would involve the excavation of 
a succession of relatively small blocks, each about 20–30 hectares in size 
(ICFRE n.d.). In this type of operation, blocks that have already been 
mined are supposed to be backfilled and revegetated, but it is doubtful if 
this has ever happened in any bauxite mining operation in India. The EIA 
report said that it was necessary to plant trees to prevent landslides and 
soil erosion but gave little detail of how, when and where this would be 
done other than to recommend the use of indigenous species of trees and 
pass responsibility to the Forest Department.
The overburden would be stored somewhere on top of the hills for later 
backfilling into the blocks that had been mined. The overburden would 
be moved at a rate of 50,000 tonnes per annum for the first five years of 
operation, much lower than the planned rate of mineral extraction. While 
this would alleviate the project’s waste storage problems, it would also 
limit the capacity to backfill the mined-out area and the availability of soil 
for the planned tree plantation program.6
6  Whether it was indeed desirable to plant trees was an issue not considered in the EIA. It might 
be that the current grasslands on top of Galikonda contain unique environmental values that ought 
to be preserved, like those in the state of Maharashtra investigated by Dixon and Watve (2015).
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Unlike many other forms of mining, bauxite mining does not involve the 
use of chemicals, but the drilling, blasting, crushing and transportation of 
the ore would generate significant amounts of dust, posing direct health 
risks to local people and potentially reducing agricultural productivity 
in the immediate surroundings. The EIA report proposed to suppress 
the dust with water sprinklers, and recommended that drains be dug to 
contain the run-off. This was likely to be a challenge in a region with as 
much as 1,900 mm of annual rainfall. 
However, the main concern for the activists was the prospect of change to 
the overall hydrology of the bauxite hills affecting the availability of water 
for Adivasi and other local farmers, but also for city dwellers in the wider 
region, since several of the rivers of coastal Andhra Pradesh originate in 
the bauxite-bearing hills. This type of impact is technically hard to assess, 
and evidence from one site might not be valid for others since ‘[b]auxite 
is a heterogeneous mineral that is difficult to define accurately. It occurs in 
many different forms, and its physical properties vary greatly, even within 
single ore beds’ (Gendron et al. 2013: 1).
Studies in Australia, the world’s biggest bauxite-mining nation, with 
a correspondingly large body of research on the social and environmental 
consequences, conclude that bauxite does not retain water (Croton and 
Reed 2007), but studies of bauxite mining in Suriname suggest that it can 
sometimes do so (Goodland 2009).
Activists in India, lacking the capacity to conduct large-scale, time-
consuming studies of the forestry, geology and hydrology of bauxite-
bearing hills and the environmental impacts of bauxite mining, have 
simply asserted that some of the best remaining forests in Odisha are 
located on the sides of the bauxite hills and these same hills are important 
watersheds for both local streams and major rivers. It has been claimed 
that Nalco’s Panchpatmali mine has caused hill streams to run dry (Patra 
and Murthy n.d.), and that the same thing has happened as a result of 
other forms of open-cast mining in the state (Kumar 2004). One Indian 
geologist has argued that bauxite mining would have this effect because 
the porous nature of the ore means that it possesses superb water retention 
capacities when compared to the underlying solid rock (Ramamurthy 
1995). Other commentators have observed that ‘[b]elow the hollow crust 
on the summits, the layer of bauxite is like clay, holding moisture, letting 
it seep out gently throughout the year through streams which form all 
around the mountain’s flank’ (Padel and Das 2010: 7). Activists thus fear 
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that if a bauxite hill is unable to retain water once it has been mined, the 
vital hill streams will run dry in the summer months, and this will result 
in severe hardship in the absence of any other sources of fresh water. 
The idea that mining transforms local watersheds has been widened to 
incorporate the negative impacts on entire river systems. The regional 
dangers of bauxite mining have been most eloquently articulated by 
Arundhati Roy:
If the flat-topped [bauxite] hills are destroyed, the forests that clothe 
them will be destroyed too. So will the rivers and streams that flow out 
of them and irrigate the plains below. So will the Dongria Kond. So will 
the hundreds of thousands of tribal people who live in the forested heart 
of India, and whose homeland is similarly under attack (Roy 2010: xii).
A counter-narrative claims that there is either no impact or the impact 
is even beneficial. According to a note released by the national Ministry 
of Environment and Forests (MoEF), bauxite mining can support the 
retention of water because blasting creates cracks into which the water 
can enter (India 2008e). This statement appears to be based on a scientific 
report by the Central Mine Planning and Design Institute at the site of 
Vedanta’s proposed Niyamgiri mine, which found that the bauxite ore 
does not have much capacity to retain water, as measured by its low 
porosity, and could not augment the groundwater underneath the hill 
because of its low permeability (CMPDI 2006). 
The Galikonda EIA report contained a contradictory account of the local 
hydrology by using arguments from both sides of the debate. According 
to the authors, some sort of water storage seems to take place in the hill, 
but this is due to the very thin—or sometimes non-existent—layer of 
soil and overburden, not to the bauxite ore itself. Since overburden can 
be stored and later replaced, mining need not therefore have a negative 
impact on water availability. In fact, mining operations combined with 
backfilling might improve the situation:
[T]he groundwater recharge potential would not be negatively affected. 
In addition, due to the loosening of top material, after mining/during 
mining the recharge of ground water would increase (ICFRE n.d.: 121).
What seems clear is that bauxite mining would remove a significant part 
of certain hilltops and this would probably have some effect on the local 
hydrology. Backfilling could not possibly return the hills to their original 
state because the amount of overburden would be so much smaller than 
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the amount of ore to be removed. The combination of high annual 
rainfall and soils that are already prone to erosion (India 2008e) suggest 
a need for careful planning and management if mining were to proceed, 
but there was little evidence that planners were taking local water needs 
seriously. The situation might be improved by reforestation, but if forest 
plantations can help to arrest soil erosion, they would also compete with 
local agriculture for the available water, as would the mining operation 
itself. The small springs around the hills provide essential water supply 
in areas with no storage infrastructure and only modest pumps or other 
means to access groundwater. The environmental impacts of mining would 
clearly not extend to the entire watershed, but there was still a desperate 
shortage of detailed studies of what they might be within the affected area. 
There was clearly a need for an integrated approach to water, forests and 
local livelihood concerns, but this was unlikely to happen because of the 
controversial nature of the topic.
Alumina Refining and the Environment
While much attention has been paid to the environmental impacts of 
bauxite mining, a number of reports suggest that refining poses the most 
significant environmental risks (Behera 2008; Nayak 2008; Amnesty 
International 2010). Refining alumina involves grinding and digesting 
the bauxite ore with the application of heat, pressure and a strongly 
alkaline solution of caustic soda. The alumina, the aluminium oxide in 
the ore, is dissolved during this process, allowing impurities like iron, 
titanium, lead and other heavy metals to be washed out. The alumina is 
then crystallized out of the liquid solution and purified at temperatures of 
up to 1,300°C. The final product is a white powder that constitutes the 
input to aluminium smelters (Bunker and Ciccantell 1994).
Modern alumina refineries are major industrial plants requiring investments 
of at least US$1 billion, with significant economies of scale, which can 
serve several aluminium smelters. One tonne of alumina typically requires 
about 2.9 tonnes of bauxite ore. Since a refinery must tailor its processes 
according to the particular chemical composition of the ore, physical 
and technological constraints encourage long-term supply agreements or 
even joint ventures between the mining and refining companies (Bunker 
1994). Locating the refinery close to the mines reduces transportation 
costs but can expose already fragile environments to further pollution. 
Furthermore, in the Indian bauxite regions, where periods of heavy 
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rainfall are interspersed with long dry seasons, water usage is more of an 
issue than in some other national contexts, and needs more attention than 
it has so far received in the international literature. 
Alumina refineries need to be located close to an assured water supply 
because:
[t]he reduction of bauxite to alumina is a wet process, requiring large 
quantities of water. This favours locations near rivers … Proximity 
of refineries to large rivers greatly increases the danger of seepage and 
pollution and the cost of controlling it (Bunker 1994: 270).
The JSW alumina refinery would be constructed on a 540-hectare site in 
Vizianagaram District, and in this case the planned annual production of 
1.4 million tonnes of alumina required a supply of about 3 million tonnes 
of ore. The refinery would need to take 8 million gallons (30,000 m3) 
of water each day from a nearby reservoir, in direct competition with 
local farmers and residents of Visakhapatnam city (see Chapter 5). 
The resulting uncertainties over water consumption did create some 
controversy (see Chapter 6), though not as much as the mining proposal.
The waste material from an alumina refinery, known as red mud, is usually 
generated at a rate of 1 to 1.5  tonnes per tonne of alumina. Red mud 
is a toxic compound whose composition varies with that of the ore but 
contains caustic soda and a range of heavy metals (Bunker and Ciccantell 
1994). If it contaminates groundwater or surface water sources it poses 
a risk to human health and that of agricultural crops. Red mud may not be 
as toxic as the waste from the processing of other metals like copper, lead 
or zinc, but the lead content alone in red mud from the Nalco alumina 
refinery was enough to prevent any form of plant growth (Rao  et  al. 
2000). Fine red mud particles are also liable to be spread by wind, which 
necessitates a well-designed dust management plan (Tingay 2010).
Containing red mud is a serious challenge because of the large quantities 
involved and its continued toxicity after many years of storage. The EIA 
report on the JSW refinery proposed that a 90-hectare section of the site be 
set aside for red mud storage, with a subsequent expansion to 120 hectares. 
The storage pond would be lined with an impermeable sheet to prevent 
seepage, and would have high walls to contain the mud. Water would be 
removed from the red mud to create a thickened slurry, which would both 
reduce the volume of waste and the risk of seepage. In addition, the report 
suggested a system of water sprinklers to contain the dust, but gave few 
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details about this would operate (Vimta Labs 2007). The report did not 
present a detailed account of existing groundwater or surface water bodies 
and how these would relate to the planned waste pond sites, which meant 
that the actual consequences of a spill were impossible to evaluate.
Current practices in the containment of red mud in India leave much to be 
desired, with deficient monitoring of the actual use of sprinkler systems in 
areas with high wind speeds and long dry summers that make it possible 
for particles to travel long distances. As much as 85 per cent of the red 
mud at the Nalco refinery was found to consist of fine particles that were 
easily spread in the locally windy conditions (Rao et al. 2000). The waste 
management system adopted at the Vedanta refinery in Lanjigarh did not 
use the thickening system for some unknown reason. This resulted in 
overflows from the storage pond, as well as ground seepage because of poor 
construction, with the consequent pollution of the interstate Vamsadhara 
River (Behera 2008; Nayak 2008; Amnesty International 2010).
Forest Livelihoods in Araku and Ananthagiri
A number of tribal groups have for generations made a precarious living in 
Araku and Ananthagiri mandals, both fully contained within the Scheduled 
Areas, on relatively unproductive land and under constant threat of eviction 
by the Forest Department. Farming with very few inputs in a rain-fed 
and densely populated area used to lead to seasonal food shortages and 
occasional cases of starvation. More recently, the food security situation 
had been improved by the provision of state government handouts and 
the diversification of agricultural activities. The practice of podu (shifting 
cultivation) used to be common, but nowadays most of the lower hill slopes 
have been converted to permanent cultivation, while the higher slopes are 
increasingly used for coffee plantations. Even so, tree felling and intensive 
podu on steep slopes, combined with a lack of soil conservation measures, 
have already resulted in severe land degradation (IFAD 1991). Forest 
products such turmeric, tamarind and jackfruit are still important for local 
livelihoods despite the generally poor condition of the forests.
Hopes for an escape from deeply entrenched poverty are linked to the 
unique climatic conditions of the Visakhapatnam Agency. The cool 
hills have proven to be highly suitable for coffee cultivation ever since 
the Andhra Pradesh Forest Department created the first plantations 
in the  1960s. Coffee yields incomes higher than any other potential 
alternative cash crop, and is grown in ways that require very little care 
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or specialised skills on the part of the farmers. In addition, the Forest 
Department had secured the benefit of increased forest cover in the form 
of shade trees, while the Tribal Welfare Department gets more funding to 
support extension of the coffee plantations. 
At the time of my fieldwork, coffee was being grown in 11 of the mandals 
in Visakhapatnam District by 60,000 farmers on 24,000  hectares of 
land. Interviews with local government officials indicated that each 
hectare could yield an annual income of Rs 8,000 for the farmer, with 
the possibility of some additional income if pepper were cultivated on 
the same plot. If the farmers could be certified as organic growers, their 
beans could be sold at a premium of 25 per cent (Naandi Foundation 
2008). No wonder then that former national environment minister and 
Congress Party MP Jairam Ramesh voiced his concern over the possible 
impact of bauxite mining on coffee production (Anon. 2008b).
Figure 4.2 Tribal village with coffee growing in the shade of trees on the 
Raktakonda hill slope.
Source: Photo by author, April 2008.
Income from tourism was also increasing, as tourists from Visakhapatnam 
and Hyderabad would arrive for weekend trips throughout the hot 
season. Most of the hotels built to accommodate the tourists were run 
by the state-owned Andhra Pradesh Tourist Development Corporation, 
and all-inclusive packages made sure that very little of the income left 
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the compounds inside which the tourists stayed and ate. Other hotels 
had tribal owners, and there was ongoing agitation, with support from 
political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to enable 
the sharing of revenues from visitors to the nearby Borra limestone caves. 
The villagers of Katiki had built a road to a nearby waterfall on the bauxite 
hill of Raktakonda, and were charging a fee for tourists to go there. Other 
villagers were looking to improve their income from coffee by selling it 
directly to the tourists from roadside stalls. 
Figure 4.3 Paddy fields irrigated by canals.
Source: Photo by author, April 2008.
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Villages in Araku and Ananthagiri mandals are mainly located in the 
valleys, where more flat land is available for the cultivation of wet rice 
(see  Figure  4.3). A satellite photo of Galikonda Hill shows terraced 
paddy fields at the bottom of the valley, where water is captured from hill 
streams, with coffee plantations grown under tree cover on the hillsides 
(Figure 4.4). The plantations of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Development 
Corporation account for most of the tree cover, with a mixture of large tree 
species, while the more orderly patches of single tree species are in more 
recent and privately held coffee plantations. A distinct lack of vegetation 
can be seen on top of the hill, with only small trees and bushes more than 
halfway up the hillsides. Nevertheless minor cultivation is possible in the 
higher gullies, where some volume of water can be collected, and coffee 
plantations were still being extended further up the slopes.
Figure 4.4 Layered resources on and around a bauxite hill.
Source: Google Earth satellite image taken 24 December 2002. Available from earth.google.com 
(accessed 1 April 2010).
Official data is scarce regarding the villages in the immediate vicinity of 
the bauxite hills since most of them have long been considered as ‘forest 
villages’—that is to say, villages that are seen as encroaching on forest 
land. This means that they are not located on ‘revenue land’ and thus 
fall outside of the administration of the Revenue Department and its 
many welfare services. One forest village that I surveyed contained a 
close-knit Nooka Dora community (with two Kondha Dora households) 
living on top of a  bauxite hill, with only walking paths as a means of 
communication with the outside world, and in a seemingly precarious 
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location (see Table  4.2). However, the setting was not as isolated as it 
might seem since the main Visakhapatnam–Araku road was relatively 
close and Ananthagiri town was within easy walking distance. There were 
close to 150 people in this community, which could seem surprising given 
the poor quality of  the land and the lack of irrigation. However, large 
areas of land close to the top of the hill were being transformed into coffee 
plantations and there was scope for some additional agricultural activity. 
While the coffee plantations were reaching maturity, people could find 
work in the state government plantations nearby, as well as other wage-
earning jobs in the area.







Main crops Farm 
animals
Literacy rate
31 --- 111 ha Coffee, rice 97 (cows + 
goats)
7 of 94 
adults
Source: Survey by author, May 2008.
None of the land used in this village for coffee plantations, or the smaller 
patches where rice and other crops were grown, had officially recognised 
land titles, although the villagers had managed to establish a school with 
classes up to Grade 6. Claims had been made for titles to the coffee 
plantations under the terms of the Forest Rights Act, and each household 
reported the maximum allowable claim over 5 acres (or 2 hectares) of land.
In 2006, an NGO called Nature conducted a survey of villages in the 
immediate vicinity of the bauxite hills in the Araku group (Raktakonda, 
Galikonda and Chittamgondi) that were to be set aside for the JSW 
project. These were all tribal villages in the Borra panchayat (village 
council) area, with populations from the Kondha Dora, Nooka Dora, 
Bagatha, Paraja, Valmiki, Kondh and Kutiya Kondh tribal groups. Only 
three of the 14 villages had any formal land titles, but all were dependent on 
forest land (Nature 2006). These findings were confirmed by a subsequent 
survey (Reddy and Mishra 2010). The absence of formal land titles was 
clearly a major obstacle to the improvement of local livelihoods, despite 
the opportunities for expanding coffee production. Perhaps surprisingly, 
this was not only a problem on the steeper hillsides, but also in the valleys 
below, where the land was still classified as ‘forest’, irrespective of whether 
any forest, or even individual trees, could be found on it.
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Agricultural Livelihoods in S. Kota7
Moving down from the hills, the Agency ends in a diffuse border with the 
plains, which seems to be largely unknown to people in the area despite its 
vital importance for questions of land tenure. Since it was located outside 
the Scheduled Areas, the proposed site of the refinery had a social context 
that was significantly different to that of the proposed mines in the hills of 
the Agency, despite their close geographical proximity. The refinery area, 
close to S. Kota town, had for some years seen an influx of outsiders who 
acquired the best land in what my informants described as a forested area 
that had been inhabited almost exclusively by tribal communities only 
a few decades previously. As one tribal villager put it:
We have been here for a long time, earlier we used to go to [the] hills and 
depend on forest products. Once this land was uncultivable, but later 
we made it cultivable. With borrowing we dug bore wells and got water 
at 50–60 feet. We are farming this land with the help of loans. These 
coconut trees were planted in my childhood and now they are giving 
us some income. It took a lot of time to make this land cultivable and 
these trees to give us some income. At this moment some people came 
and asked us to give up these lands. They want to cut down these trees 
but, if  this is done, how much time will it take to bring up new trees? 
(interview, S. Kota Mandal, 26 January 2008).
Some of the villages now about to lose land to the refinery had existed for 
generations, but for some reason were never included when the Scheduled 
Areas were demarcated, despite their inhabitants being recognised as tribal 
people and now having tribal caste certificates. Other tribal villages were 
displaced when the Tatipudi irrigation reservoir on the Goshtani River 
was built in the 1960s. At that time they were compensated with new 
houses and good (though forested) land only a few kilometres away from 
their original settlements. In 2007, this group of previously displaced 
villagers were once again facing displacement by the new refinery.
Some villages in the proposed refinery area had only tribal residents, 
while others contained a mix of people belonging to Scheduled Tribes, 
Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes. Villagers showed little 
awareness of how Scheduled Area land transfer legislation might help to 
keep more land in the hands of long-term tribal occupants or even make 
7  See Oskarsson and Nielsen (2014) for a condensed discussion of this section.
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it impossible to build the refinery. The local protest group never raised 
the issue of tribal land loss or displacement other than to highlight the 
unfairness in displacing some people for a second time.
The people who were due to lose land to the refinery officially lived in four 
‘revenue villages’ recognised as such by the Revenue Department, but the 
600 families were dispersed in roughly 15 smaller villages and hamlets.8 
A small village might contain about 100 residents, or 20 households, while 
hamlets only contained a few households. The composition of the local 
population was markedly different to that of the overall population of the 
mandal, in which tribal people are not very well represented. A survey of 
six villages by Reddy and Mishra (2010) found that 290 of the households 
to be affected by land acquisition belonged to Scheduled Tribes, 33 to 
Scheduled Castes (Dalits), 105 to Other Backward Castes, and 10 to other 
castes. By way of comparison, S. Kota Mandal as a whole had 74,500 
residents in 2001, of whom 5,749 (8 per cent) belonged to Scheduled 
Tribes and 6,629 (9 per cent) to Scheduled Castes (India 2001b).
Of particular concern was the proposed acquisition of land from several 
Gadaba tribal villages. The 36,000 Gadaba people in Andhra Pradesh 
(India 2001a) form a small and almost exclusively rural community with 
a unique language only remotely related to other Dravidian languages.9 
Three out of the seven Gadaba sub-groups are officially defined as 
primitive and traditional hunter-gatherers. How and when members of 
this group came to settle as farmers in the S. Kota area is not well known, 
but interviews indicated that 10–12 of their villages had been present in 
the area since the 1950s, prior to the arrival of the dam-displaced settlers 
in the late 1960s. Official plans for the refinery did not recognise the 
presence of this particularly vulnerable group of people.
A survey of a sample of 19 households in the four revenue villages in 2008 
showed that each household held slightly more than 1 hectare of ‘assigned 
land’ (see Table 4.3). Of the total of 23.6 hectares, less than 1 hectare had 
so far been acquired for the refinery, while another 11 hectares had been 
earmarked for acquisition.
8  Aside from the land to be acquired from the four revenue villages, 68 hectares of private land 
would also be required for the refinery, but evidence of its ownership is not available from government 
sources because negotiations were undertaken directly between JSW and the landowners.
9  They are also present in southern Chhattisgarh and Odisha.
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Main crops Farm animals Literacy rate




19 of 51 adults
Source: Survey by author, March 2008.
Official land use planning in the refinery EIA report was carried out by 
means of satellite imagery and secondary statistical sources. This analysis 
focused on the 10 km2 study area prescribed by the MoEF, and not on 
the area proposed for the actual site. The conclusion was that 25  per 
cent of the area was double-cropped and 15 per cent was single-cropped 
agricultural land, 38 per cent was forest, while 16 per cent was classified 
as wasteland (Vimta Labs 2007). 
However, the EIA report described land use on the plant site itself as 
‘waste land with agricultural activities in patches’, while declaring 
that ownership was not an issue since the ‘site near Boddavara village 
near S. Kota is selected and finalised as no Forest Land, approximately 
85 per cent of total land is government/assigned dry land and marginal 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R&R) issues are involved’ (Vimta Labs 
2007: C1–2). With little valuable agricultural land, little displacement, 
no national parks or biospheres, wildlife sanctuaries or even forest land, 
the report painted a picture of an uncomplicated project site. However, 
official Revenue Department statistics, not presented in the EIA report, 
showed significant agricultural production in the four revenue villages 
(see Table 4.4).
Table 4.4 Agricultural land in the villages of the proposed alumina 
















M.B. Vara 2,057 344 18 + 12 43 350 392
Cheedipalem 152 43 11 + 0 37 15 28
Chinakandepalli 292 72 28 + 9 76 13 0
Kiltampalem 645 368 33 + 0 782 55 0
Source: Andhra Pradesh (2008b).
Agriculture in the Godavari and Krishna river deltas in the southern part 
of the state has been subject to a major economic transformation in recent 
decades as a result of increased irrigation (Upadhya 1988; Damodaran 
2008). Something similar has occurred amongst upwardly mobile 
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communities in the S. Kota area, but to a lesser extent because of lower 
water availability. Directly east of the proposed refinery site, groundwater 
remained widely available throughout the year, largely due to the nearby 
dam and its associated irrigation canals. This made it possible to grow rice 
and sugar cane close to the dam, or to establish cashew nut plantations 
slightly further away.
Because of the way statistics are collected, it was not possible to 
distinguish the villages liable to displacement from others nearby, but 
it could be assumed that productivity would vary significantly between 
farmers depending on their ability to use various inputs. Overall, rice and 
sugar cane were the dominant cultivars in the mandal, and this pattern 
was most pronounced in Kiltampalem revenue village, indicating the 
greater availability of water (see Figure 4.4). M.B. Vara and Mushidipalli 
revenue villages had drier land, and their cashew plantations accounted for 
two-thirds of the cashew grown in the mandal. Much of the unirrigated 
land also contained mango orchards (Andhra Pradesh 2008b). M.B. Vara 
had 1,640 hectares of land classified as ‘barren and uncultivable land’, 
while the other revenue villages had little or no such land. Given that 
incomes from the drier areas, further from the irrigation dam, would be 
significantly lower, it is not surprising that people in the M.B Vara area 
were much less resistant to the prospect of land acquisition than those 
in Kiltampalem, although local social dynamics were also an important 
factor in their response.
During the course of my own fieldwork it became clear that the farmers 
were managing most of their agricultural activities without government 
support, by taking loans from private moneylenders to level the land and 
install wells, pumps and water tanks (see Figure 4.5). Indeed, they had 
never seen much of the government at all, as evident in the lack of schools, 
and several villages were without a single literate adult. They remained 
poor despite the strong potential for agricultural improvement, largely 
due to the high interest rates they had to pay on their loans,10 but were 
still self-reliant and aspired to do as well in the future as their non-tribal 
neighbours in the adjacent villages, few of whom were liable to be affected 
by acquisition of land for the refinery. 
10  In a survey of one village, it was found that each household had debts ranging from Rs 20,000 
to Rs 100,000, with interest rates from 25 to 40 per cent. The size of the debt was generally correlated 
with the size of the landholding.
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Figure 4.5 Pumps ensure that enough water is available to grow 
sugar cane in S. Kota.
Source: Photo by author, June 2012.
The non-scheduled status of this area had led many upwardly mobile 
agricultural communities to acquire land in recent decades. The cement 
houses, cars, motorcycles and agricultural vehicles present in their villages 
were in stark contrast to the assets present in the villages now due to 
lose their land, where one or two motorcycles were the sum of all capital 
goods, and only a minority of households had received any support from 
government housing programs or had received rather cramped housing as 
compensation for their earlier displacement.
In a survey of one of these villages, it was found that most people had few 
assets other than their small houses, with palm leaf extensions to provide 
a little extra space, and a few farm animals. Adult literacy rates were only 
slightly higher than in the Agency, but children and teenagers showed 
much more interest and capacity to continue their education. Despite 
their apparent poverty, local people expressed some pride in having ceased 
to be hunters who wore nothing but loincloths just a generation or two 
ago to become the landed farmers they were now. One of the benefits 
of having non-tribal communities as their neighbours had been the 
opportunity to learn from their agricultural practices, even if this entailed 
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the precarious need for large loans that could be difficult to pay back 
in case of crop failure. There was no evidence of people migrating out 
of the area, or even venturing into nearby towns and cities, despite the 
apparent opportunities to take up construction or other paid work, given 
the existence of good and affordable public transport.
Many of the people in the proposed refinery area, like those in the Agency, 
thus had reasonably good hopes of improving livelihoods based on 
agriculture despite their present poverty. But in S. Kota, formal land titles 
were universal and much larger personal investments had been made in 
agriculture. If land was to be acquired for the refinery, the holders should 
at least be able to claim compensation for it, whereas the systematic denial 
of titles in the Agency made this more problematic. 
Land Settlement and Dispossession
To understand the livelihood changes that would be caused by land 
acquisition for the bauxite project, and the potential compensation for 
those affected by it, we need to know the details of land use and tenure in 
both the proposed mining and refining locations.
Forest Land for the Bauxite Mine
Bauxite mining is associated with forest land in most parts of India 
(India 1998), but bauxite hills are not necessarily associated with good 
forests, as is evident in the lack of ‘dense’ forests in Visakhapatnam 
District (India 2005b), although detailed information about the quality 
of the forest reserves in Araku and Ananthagiri mandals is not available. 
There was also some uncertainty about the exact locations of the proposed 
mines. The official mining lease for the Galikonda mine was for an area 
of 97.5 hectares, but without precise coordinates or a map of the location 
(India 2007c). It was known that the Sunkarmetta and Ananthagiri 
reserved forests covered the whole of the proposed mining area, while 
the affected villages, agricultural fields and coffee plantations were not 
discussed in project planning documents. This is perhaps not surprising, 
given the history of these villages being labelled as ‘forest villages’, and 
their fields therefore being considered as illegal encroachments. 
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NGO activities and political mobilisation have in recent decades ensured 
that schools have been opened in these villages, and they have been 
included in programs to provide housing for the poor. The difference 
between forest and revenue and villages appeared fairly modest in practice, 
and yet forest villagers remained vulnerable to demands for bribes from 
forest officials in return for being allowed to continue cultivating the land 
(Anon. 2009a), and when rights to agricultural land are not recognised, 
there is no support from agricultural extension activities and the land 
cannot be used as security for a loan.
All land used for agriculture and other purposes in the village surveyed 
during my fieldwork was informally settled, which meant that the Forest 
Rights Act would be essential for security of tenure in the proposed mining 
area. However, recognition of new rights to forest land was uncertain, 
since the Mines and Geology Department and its business arm, Andhra 
Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation (APMDC), were aiming for 
permanent alienation, while other departments—especially the Tribal 
Welfare Department—were trying to settle it with tribal farmers. This was 
symptomatic of the complex nature of the bauxite project and the many 
uncertainties that prevented those affected from knowing what would 
actually happen to them. If other events stalled the mining plans long 
enough for private forest titles to be granted, the people of some villages 
would at least be able to stake a formal claim to some of the land. But 
while a title would surely be better than no title, even basic elements in the 
Forest Rights Act were yet to be specified, including the conditions under 
which such land could be acquired, by whom, and what compensation 
might be payable for its loss. If the mining project was not contested, then 
the land could be transferred within the state government, from the Forest 
Department to the Mines and Geology Department, or else directly to 
APMDC. This kind of transfer could give rise to internal government 
controversies, but it provides few benefits for the forest-dwelling peoples 
of Visakhapatnam.
The people in all six villages that I visited had applied for the maximum 
allocation of 2  hectares under the Forest Rights Act, with men and 
women making separate individual claims. However, no claims had been 
lodged over the much larger areas—up to several hundred hectares—that 
could have become community reserves. The unclaimed land stretched 
beyond the coffee plantations and was used for many different purposes, 
including the collection of minor forest products, as well as containing 
a shrine dedicated to the goddess of the hill. One explanation given for 
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the lack of community reserve claims was that co-management of the 
reserves would invite the Forest Department back to the area to once 
again interfere with peoples’ livelihoods. Successful forest rights claims in 
the proposed mining area would mean that the handful of hilltop villages 
would at least have a legal title to the land they were cultivating, which 
could make them eligible for compensation, but the many other villages 
below them, with hillside coffee plantations and customary usage of large 
areas beyond them, would remain outside of the mining licence and find 
it very difficult to make compensation claims.
According to its promoters, mining would lead to improved forest cover 
through mine reclamation activities on currently barren hilltops, while 
areas outside of the mining lease boundaries would be protected by 
pollution control techniques and would therefore not be affected. The 
distinct borders visualised in rehabilitation and resettlement policies were 
thus replicated in the engineered world of EIA documents, where local 
livelihood activities could persist in the valleys despite the introduction 
of excavation and blasting activities on the hilltops. Common property 
resource uses were not mentioned in the EIA report (Anon. 2006b; 
BS Envi Tech 2008), and the Galikonda mine would supposedly cause 
no displacement:
Since there is no habitation on the mining lease area thus no households 
will be required to be displaced from their existing habitation, hence no 
Rehabilitation and Resettlement plan is envisaged for the present project 
activity. However, there will be indirect impact on the nearby villages and 
thus a community developmental package is proposed (ICFRE n.d.: 192).
Perhaps the mine promoters were planning to mine around the hilltop 
villages, or perhaps the villages did not appear on the maps they were 
using because the whole area was officially reserve forest. In either case, 
the approach to land acquisition bypassed the people of the Agency, 
despite centuries of struggles for the recognition of their land rights, 
and despite the new Forest Rights Act that was supposed to settle old 
injustices. At the same time, there was an admission of other ‘indirect’ 
(and unspecified) problems for those living close to the proposed mine, 
and hence a possibility of compensation, despite the lack of recognition 
of any loss of land or other resources, including potential pollution. Yet 
the compensation would take the form of uncertain grants, with no 
information provided about who would decide on the amounts or how 
the funds would be distributed.
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Assigned Agricultural Land for Alumina Refinery
In the non-scheduled parts of the state, where land titles, as well as an 
awareness of the meaning of these titles and associated rights, are much 
more widespread than in the Agency, the bauxite alliance had to work 
out ways to acquire land without causing sufficiently strong protests to 
derail the entire process. It could do this despite significant civil society 
mobilisation and media coverage because it had control of the local 
bureaucracy and political influence through the Congress Party in all four 
of the affected panchayats in the S. Kota area. JSW was largely invisible in 
this process but provided support behind the scenes. 
The JSW refinery would require space not only for the central ore refining 
activities but also for a thermal power plant, a housing site for its office 
staff and displaced people, and a significant amount of land for its two 
waste ponds (see Table 4.5).
Table 4.5 Proposed land use for the alumina refinery.
Activity Land use (hectares)
Alumina refinery and co-generation (including storage 
and green belt)
300
Residue disposal area and ash pond 200
Township and miscellaneous 20
Railway lines 20
Total 540
Source: BS Envi Tech (2008: Figure 2.1).
The acquisition of fertile farm land, with the subsequent displacement of 
farmers, whether tribal or not, has become a very sensitive political issue, 
as well as an expensive proposition, throughout India. A few states have 
managed to avoid some of the controversy by acquiring large tracts of land 
for industrial parks, but Andhra Pradesh is not one of them. Instead, one 
method favoured by the state government is to find locations with a high 
proportion of so-called ‘assigned land’. This category of land is the result 
of extensive land distribution programs intended for the benefit of the 
landless poor. Once assigned, this land cannot be sold like private land, 
only inherited. With 1.7 million hectares of land distributed since the late 
1960s, assigned land represents a sizeable proportion of the state’s total of 
15  million hectares of cultivable land. Areas with large concentrations 
of assigned land, which on paper already belongs to the government, have 
come to be favoured as sites for industrial plants and other development 
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projects (Seethalakshmi 2009). State acquisition of government land 
seems like a straightforward process, despite its disproportionate effect on 
some of the poorest people in the state.
The choice of an industrial site seems to depend on the ease of land 
acquisition rather than more tangible criteria such as the availability of 
infrastructure, labour, water or raw materials, or indeed whether the 
project satisfies environmental or social criteria. The potential alternative 
sites identified in the refinery EIA report (Vimta Labs 2007) were nearby 
locations with large concentrations of assigned land. Sabbavaram was 
the original site proposed for the JSW refinery before the S.  Kota site 
was selected.11 A report by the Land Committee of the Andhra Pradesh 
Government acknowledged that roughly one-quarter of all assigned 
land had ended up in the hands of non-poor recipients. A legislative 
amendment made in 2006 allowed the government to take such land back 
in order to allocate it to landless farmers, but the government still retained 
the option to use it for a different public purpose. 
More assigned land becomes available for re-assignment from another 
clause in the legislation that requires land to be brought under cultivation 
within a certain timeframe. Since poor farmers often lack the equipment 
or the money to hire labour to help prepare the land for cultivation, much 
of the land assigned to them is at risk of not meeting this requirement 
(Andhra Pradesh 2006b; Balagopal 2007b). The government has claimed 
that it does not need to pay compensation for re-assigning land to a new 
public purpose, but this claim has been challenged in an ongoing court 
case. ‘In practice the government pays or does not pay according to 
the pressure the landholders are able to put up’ (K. Balagopal, personal 
communication, 2008).
Information about the actual type of land acquired for the JSW refinery 
was not readily available at the time of its acquisition. The EIA report 
failed to mention the fertile land and the mainly tribal villagers who were 
making a living from it. Of the 450 individuals who would actually lose 
land to the refinery, 257 (57  per cent) were Adivasis, 34 (8  per cent) 
were Dalits, 105 (23 per cent) belonged to Other Backward Castes, and 
54 (12 per cent) to other castes (Andhra Pradesh 2007c). In 2001, only 
11  In Visakhapatnam District, Makavarapalem is a site that was later assigned to the AnRak 
Aluminium Special Economic Zone, and Achutapuram has also been proposed as the site for such an 
entity. In Vizianagaram District, land was acquired in K.D. Peta Mandal for a glass factory that never 
became a reality.
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8 per cent of the 74,500 residents of the mandal as a whole were Adivasis, 
and another 9 per cent were Dalits. The claim made in the EIA report was 
that ‘[t]he land identified for locating the Alumina refinery of 1,350 acres 
[546  hectares] consist of about 85  per cent government land and 
15 per cent private land’ (Vimta Labs 2007: C2–3). Since displacement 
would be ‘minimal’, affecting only 30 families, land acquisition was 
portrayed as unproblematic.
The Revenue Department was more precise in its internal instruction 
to acquire 368 hectares of assigned land, which was 68 per cent of the 
total area required, at a uniform price of Rs 500,000 per hectare. Another 
84 hectares of government land was included in the same instruction, and 
this was also likely to have been cultivated since there is no vacant land 
in this intensely cultivated area. A significant but unknown part of the 
assigned land was in the hands of non-poor farmers with larger holdings, 
many of whom had already ceased farming on their own account and 
were living in nearby cities (Andhra Pradesh 2007b).12 The remaining 
68 hectares of private land, located in pockets between the assigned and 
government land, was acquired directly by the company, and there are no 
public records that identify the owners of this land or the compensation 
they would receive. Several of my own sources indicated that they would 
be compensated at significantly higher rates than the holders of assigned 
land, but the company suggested a smaller disparity in newspaper articles 
(Rama Raju 2009).
A detailed map showed that the refinery layout was split between three 
locations, with the main plant site and the two waste ponds separated 
from each other (JSW Aluminium 2007a). This was a peculiar choice, 
since the huge volumes of waste created by the refinery would clearly have 
been easier to dispose of if there had been one contiguous site. One reason 
for this design becomes apparent with the inclusion of nearby villages that 
did not appear on any official land acquisition maps. The locations of 
villages along the borders of the proposed site created the impression that 
project planners were attempting to cause a minimal level of displacement 
by acquiring agricultural land but not house sites. Another reason was 
that villages tend to be located close to water storage tanks that cannot 
12  Land acquisition documents show that two relatives of the principal local politician, a major 
landowner in the area, had titles to assigned land.
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legally be subject to compulsory acquisition. While 30 households would 
lose their house sites, which meant that they would be officially displaced, 
about 600 would lose agricultural land, and this type of loss would not be 
covered by the state government’s rehabilitation policy.
A number of amendments were made to the land acquisition map, 
sometimes because it was found that ex-servicemen owned land parcels, 
though there does not seem to be any law prohibiting the acquisition of 
such land, or at other times because the land was found to contain or 
was adjoining a water tank (Andhra Pradesh 2008c). At yet other times, 
official documents simply stated that the land was either part of the 
refinery site or else excluded from it without giving any reasons (Andhra 
Pradesh 2008d, 2008e). If details of the planned land use were never 
clearly presented in the first instance, the many changes made with scant 
explanation only added to already significant levels of uncertainty.
Since proposed land acquisitions are meant to be advertised by notices 
placed in the local panchayat offices (see Figure 4.6), each change to the 
proposal risked spreading information that could create more awareness 
of what was being planned, and if people know what is being planned 
they can organise protests. In this case, the notices for the initial round 
of acquisition were never posted for public display to the villagers, and 
bureaucrats tried to conceal subsequent changes in the face of media 
and other pressure. This was done in early 2008 by amending the earlier 
government instruction for the land acquisition rather than issuing a new 
instruction that would require public notification (Andhra Pradesh 2008c). 
When local journalists found out and reported it in the local press, this 
did not result in more transparent government behaviour but an official 
government order, made a few weeks later, to make the changes more 
legitimate through compliance with various administrative procedures 
(Andhra Pradesh 2008d). Further delays meant that acquisition letters 
for the new land were only sent out a few months later (Andhra Pradesh 
2008f ) and, since no payments followed, the land portions were probably 
never acquired (Andhra Pradesh 2009a). 
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Figure 4.6 A deserted panchayat office close to the proposed 
refinery site.
Source: Photo by author, March 2008.
Some of the changes were linked to allegations of corruption. Local 
newspaper reports stated that the real reason for excluding some portions 
was not to exempt them from acquisition but to re-label them as areas of 
private land for which higher rates of compensation could be negotiated 
directly with JSW (Rama Raju n.d.).13 But other changes did take some of 
the concerns of the poorest residents into account. A concession was made 
to one of the main demands of the refinery’s opponents when 14 hectares 
of assigned land was excluded from the site because it belonged to tribal 
people who had previously been displaced (Andhra Pradesh 2008e).
The lack of clear information and the frequent changes made to the 
proposal kept many people on and around the site guessing whether 
their land was going to be acquired and, if so, what they might receive 
as compensation. Group discussions about the land acquisition map did 
not resolve the uncertainty. In one affected village, people felt that the 
government could make and change its plans at will: 




They can do anything. What they do today may not be valid for tomorrow. 
Today’s collector will go tomorrow and most of the officials are transferred 
within a year. The new officers and the government are coming up with new 
schemes and procedures (interview, S. Kota Mandal, 26 January 2008).
The confusion over what was actually being planned made it difficult to 
create a mass movement that could put pressure on the bauxite alliance. 
But several people in the village that I surveyed indicated they had joined 
the protest group specifically because of the lack of information. They 
were protesting since they expected that their land, like that of their 
neighbours and relatives, would soon be acquired despite being excluded 
from the first two rounds of acquisition notices. Table 4.6 shows the losses 
projected at the time of my survey in March 2008.
Table 4.6 Projected land loss in a S. Kota village.
Number Landholdings (ha) Projected loss
Households losing all land 2 0.81 0.81
Households losing some land 10 13.18 11.00
Households losing no land 7 9.64 --
Total 19 23.63 11.81
Source: Survey by author, March 2008.
Documents obtained more than a year later through the Right to 
Information Act showed that a total of 75 families were due to be displaced 
by the refinery, which was more than double the number indicated in the 
original planning documents (Andhra Pradesh 2007c). The reason for this 
discrepancy was not explained in any government document.
Compensation
JSW announced a special ‘compensation package’ for its refinery in addition 
to what the Andhra Pradesh resettlement and rehabilitation would have 
required. It offered one job for suitably qualified individuals from each of 
the estimated 600 families affected, irrespective of the type of land they 
would lose, or a one-off payment of Rs 300,000. Those displaced through 
loss of their houses, still estimated to be 30 families, would each receive 
a new house, a new cattle shed (valued at Rs 3,000) and transportation 
costs (up to Rs 5,000). So-called encroachers who could prove that they 
had been present in the area for more than five years would receive the 
same amount of compensation as those with valid land titles, but would 
not be entitled to employment on the project (Andhra Pradesh 2007d). 
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The kind of land compensation people could claim depended on the 
type of land they were cultivating and whether it appeared in the official 
records. The main strategies available for different types of land-losers are 






a)   Try to become recognised by the government
      for compensation
b)   Resist acquistion
a)   Accept compensation offered
b)   Negotiate to share compensation with other
      claimant or try to approach the government before
      other claims are made*
c)   Resist acquisition
Negotiate directly with the company for compensation
Figure 4.7 Typology of land compensation for the JSW refinery in S. Kota.
* Other potential strategies for particularly powerful individuals with assigned land were to try to 
get it excluded from acquisition completely or else to get it included in the private land negotiations 
for improved compensation.
Best off were those few landholders, less than 10 per cent of the total, 
who had private land titles, and who could negotiate directly with the 
company because they had the right to refuse to sell. Those cultivating 
or holding titles to assigned land could be fairly certain of receiving 
compensation, though the final amount paid would depend not only on 
whether their papers were in complete order, but also on whether they 
were aware of their rights under the proposed package.
Commissions could be extracted from illiterate people with faulty 
paperwork. Collaboration between bureaucrats and panchayat members 
across the four revenue villages, together with the local domination of the 
Congress Party, led to the suspicion that people higher up were demanding 
a share of such commissions. One of the prospective losers described the 
process as follows:
They are offering 200,500 rupees per acre land. But they are cutting 
Rs 2,000 as land tax dues, they said we have not paid the land tax so 
far. Again they are cutting Rs 15,000 while drawing money. Altogether 
we are going to have loss of Rs 25,000 per acre land out of the offered 
compensation of 2 lakh so we will be paid only 1 lakh 75 thousand rupees 
(interview, S. Kota Mandal, 26 January 2008).
If the assigned land titleholder was not the actual cultivator, the two parties 
would have to informally determine how to share the compensation 
since the government would only base payments on the official records. 
According to a local journalist, this placed the titleholder in a better 
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position than the cultivator, who had no legal way of contesting the 
payment or even of finding the actual titleholder (interview, S. Kota 
Mandal, 27 March 2008). The bargaining power of individuals was key 
to a settlement. A common proposal was to share the compensation 
equally between the titleholder and the cultivator, but some of the better 
off (non-tribal) farmers, who were able to access information about the 
land acquisition process, argued for a two-thirds share for themselves, 
leaving one-third for the titleholder. The cultivator of government land 
was in a similar position to the assigned land cultivator, since the lack of 
proper paperwork might completely exclude him or her from the receipt 
of compensation.
A sliding scale for compensation was thus created during the process of 
land acquisition for the refinery, from those with clear entitlements on 
paper and with knowledge of their rights, to those with unclear status or 
less knowledge of the government’s rules, and finally to those who were 
paperless, landless and uninformed.
Many people were unhappy about the way the refinery had been imposed 
on them. As one older villager remarked: ‘First they [the government] 
sold the land to Jindal. Next they will sell us.’ To which a younger villager 
jokingly responded: ‘Who would want to buy you? Land is useful but 
you are not’ (group discussion, S. Kota Mandal, 26 January 2008). 
People’s reactions varied between parts of the refinery site since there was 
little difference in the valuation of dry land (Rs 500,000 per hectare) as 
compared to irrigated land (Rs 560,000 per hectare). As a result, there was 
less resistance from the northwestern section of the proposed site, with its 
unirrigated land planted with cashew nuts. As one village head remarked: 
‘Earlier we got 10,000 per year from our lands and now we get 7 lakh in 
one go. Don’t you think this is a good deal?’ (interview, S. Kota Mandal, 
19 March 2008).
Farmers without titles on government or assigned land were some of the 
strongest opponents of the project, since they were least likely to benefit 
from employment in the refinery. In a 2009 survey of the affected villages, 
it was found that half of the adults eligible for compensation had got 
temporary jobs on the minimum wage of Rs  2,200 per month, one-
quarter was still hoping for employment, while the remaining quarter 
had decided to accept the cash payment of Rs 300,000 (Andhra Pradesh 
2009b; Reddy and Mishra 2010).
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Beyond making payment for the land being acquired, the company’s 
efforts to ‘develop this backward area’ were quite ambitious (telephone 
interview, JSW employee, Visakhapatnam, 5 April 2008). The company 
aimed to transform farmers with no formal education into industrial 
workers in the course of one year spent in an industrial training centre. 
Even more implausible was a plan mentioned in an interview with one 
JSW employee to develop a call centre at one of JSW’s subsidiaries in 
S.  Kota town, where female farm labourers and housewives would be 
trained to become office workers with a salaries of at least Rs 20,000 per 
month. The company did not seem to be interested in helping people to 
continue the farming practices with which they were already familiar. The 
cash compensation on offer would be insufficient for anyone to rebuild 
an agricultural livelihood, since it was not enough to purchase land in the 
surrounding area.
Land Users out of Bounds
As has been shown, the direct compensation policies were tied to 
formal house and land ownership. However, the majority of people in 
the refinery area, as well as everyone in the mining area, were in the 
official ‘project affected family’ category, whose status was unclear. These 
included the many families in S. Kota Mandal who supported themselves 
as agricultural labourers, minor forest product collectors and livestock 
herders, or who were simply making a living just outside of the proposed 
refinery boundaries. In the poorly defined mining area, the situation was 
even more difficult because official documents did not acknowledge the 
existence of people living or using land within the proposed mining leases, 
despite the existence of fields, plantations and a few hilltop villages. As in 
the case of the refinery, being outside of the boundaries precluded any 
direct compensation claims. 
What remained in terms of compensation at the mine site was general 
area support, such as the Samatha judgment’s suggested investment of 
a share of the profits in a local development fund. The memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) stated that a ‘minimum of 0.5 per cent of revenue 
[from the mining operations] shall be spent on the health, training, social 
infrastructure and welfare of tribals’ (Andhra Pradesh 2005b:  4). No 
further details were provided, nor was it clear how much money would be 
available, given that most of the profits would come from the refinery, not 
from the mining operations. Only in the EIA report for the Galikonda 
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mine was it proposed that Rs 58.7 million would be committed to a list 
of ‘community development initiatives’ that included entrepreneurship 
training, scholarships and general infrastructural improvements (ICFRE 
n.d.). Highly mechanised bauxite mining operations do not create many 
jobs (Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008), and first preference for jobs at the 
refinery would be given to those losing land in the S. Kota area. 
Conclusion
In the two locations proposed for the bauxite industry, Adivasi villagers 
had long sustained themselves with marginal farming practices, but with 
a significant degree of self-reliance and some hopes for future improvement, 
either because of access to bore water for irrigated agriculture or through 
the establishment of coffee plantations. The limits to tribal land rights were 
acutely felt in both cases, since the proposed mine area was defined as forest, 
despite having many villages on the tops and sides of the bauxite hills, while 
the refinery area had been placed outside of the Scheduled Areas where 
tribal land legislation is applicable. Despite significant differences in the 
local contexts and the nature of the undertakings, very similar outcomes 
could be predicted when only cash compensation was offered to the few 
people who had formal land titles, excluding everyone in the proposed 
mining area and the many agricultural labourers and those depending on 
common property resources at the site of the proposed refinery. 
In both cases, local people were left uninformed about what was 
being planned for the land and resources on which they depended for 
their livelihoods. At the proposed mine sites, people had virtually no 
information other than what they had been told by activists or journalists. 
At the refinery site, many remained uninformed about the extent of land 
acquisition, even while the land of their neighbours was being forcefully 
acquired. This was a sad result after decades of struggle, not only for land 
rights but also for the right to rehabilitation and participation in decisions 
about natural resource development. It seems Iyer (2007) is correct in 
stating that displacement policy in India has been returning to the earlier 
practice of only providing monetary compensation instead of attempting 
to make displaced people the beneficiaries of development.
While the framing of land tenure was found to be the main reason for 
inadequate compensation, the way planning was carried out further 
strengthened this tendency. Land acquisition took priority over social 
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justice. The land tenure, compensation and mitigation policies were 
assembled by creative planners in such a way as to leave most people 
beyond their scope, or with only minimal compensation. In this manner, 
assigned land in the refinery area that was being cultivated by poor, mainly 
Adivasi farmers was reframed as government waste land of little value, 
while the proposed mining area was framed as uninhabited forest land, 
though not with actual forest on it, since that would have made it harder 
to obtain environmental approvals.
Additional land acquisition would be required for the planting of forests 
once the mining leases had been acquired, which raised the possibility 
of further dispossession. One forest plantation established to compensate 
for coal mining in the Scheduled Areas of Khammam District in Andhra 
Pradesh involved the acquisition of 10,000 hectares of land inhabited by 
Kondha Reddi tribals in West Godavari District, creating a form of double 
displacement (Sarin 2009). Likewise, 306 hectares of land for new forest 
plantations was allotted in Visakhapatnam and Narsipatnam districts to 
offset the operation of the Araku mines, and the prior use of this land was 
left unspecified in official documents (Andhra Pradesh 2005e). 
There is no evidence that particular groups of people were targeted by 
ethnic or other criteria in the acquisition of land for the mine and refinery. 
The aim was simply to acquire land without creating protests that could 
completely derail the project plans. However, the distributional outcomes 
of this mode of planning are a matter of concern because the poorest of 
the poor were disproportionately affected. At the same time, there were 
instances where additional compensation was proposed, beyond what 
would have been strictly necessary according to government policies.
Unfortunately, several features of this process reflect the experience of other 
projects in central-eastern India. The layout of the alumina refinery for 
Vedanta Aluminium in Lanjigarh, Odisha, also left a number of villagers 
without their fields but living just beyond the boundary of the plant site, 
where they would face severe pollution (Amnesty International 2010). 
The land allocated to the nearby bauxite mine was likewise defined as 
forest land without any actual forest growth, leaving local people without 
compensation (Amnesty International 2011). Although mining project 
mitigation and reclamation are not very well studied in India, the risks 
created by the aluminium industry are not new, nor are those in charge 
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of project planning unaware of them.14 The problems created by outsiders 
coming to benefit from the natural resources of the Scheduled Areas are 
also well known (Vyasulu 1981; Singh 1986). The only new factor might 
thus be the opportunity for those affected to object to the plans.
14  See, for example, the debate between Srinivasan and others (1981) and Subrahmanyam (1982) 
on the establishment of Nalco, or the environmental survey of the aluminium industry by the 
Government of Odisha (Orissa 1996).
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5. Government Mediation 
or Facilitation?
We have seen that concerns with Adivasi rights were relatively weak in 
the design of the bauxite project. Economic benefits would mainly be 
directed to the private investor, while Adivasi farmers would lose land to 
the project with only marginal compensation. While initial conditions 
thus looked unfavourable, implementation processes were still important. 
The way that the state government handled its multiple and often 
contradictory commitments, ensuring that due legal process was followed 
while facilitating project approvals and promoting private investment, 
became crucial in determining actual outcomes. The company itself was 
rarely visible in these processes, except at high-level meetings in Delhi 
or Hyderabad, but this was how the bauxite alliance had been formed. 
The  state government was not expected to contribute any significant 
financial, technical or human resources to the actual establishment and 
operation of the project. Mediation is what the government, and especially 
top politicians, would do to justify a role in the alliance. 
Mediation processes on the part of state and national government 
agencies determined the way in which the many existing concerns over 
what should happen to people, land, water, forests and minerals would 
be translated into actual outcomes. These took place in the complex 
system of regulatory control over investment approvals across national, 
state and local decision-making forums. At issue, though often couched 
in apolitical technical language, were power struggles over who should 
make decisions and who should benefit. The struggles over representation 
were not settled merely—or even mainly—in legal texts and policies, 
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or even in the memorandum of understanding (MoU), but in these 
regulatory processes. This chapter therefore examines the extent to which 
democratically elected local bodies were able to make their voices heard, 
especially with respect to environmental issues.1 If the mining and refining 
of bauxite ore were presented in technical reports as activities that would 
directly or indirectly affect local livelihoods, this could determine people’s 
ability to demand inclusion in the decision-making process or their right 
to demand compensation from the result. 
Recent Reform in the Approvals Regime 
across Federal India 
India’s federal government structure largely dictates the location of decision-
making power with respect to mining investments. Since the Constitution 
says that land, water and minerals are all state matters, state governments 
should be firmly in charge. However, this has not generally been the 
case because the central government has had various ways of ensuring its 
own influence, initially through control of administrative licensing and 
funding approvals, and more recently through environmental and forest 
policy measures, as well as by virtue of its stronger financial position. 
In recent years, India’s economic reform program has also involved 
significant changes to industrial and trade policies, with new openings for 
international trade and investment. This particular bauxite project would 
not have been possible without such policy reform, given its reliance on 
imported technology, some international funding and global markets for 
the end product.
Much attention has been paid in recent years to the transformation of 
India’s interventionist state into a regulatory state (Rudolph and Rudolph 
2001b). This has involved the setting up of independent regulatory bodies 
in sectors such as electricity or telecommunications in an attempt to 
avoid political interference. In other sectors, expert committees have been 
created to provide rule-based and ‘scientific’ forms of decision-making. 
The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) exemplifies this second 
form of regulation.
1  See Oskarsson (2015) for a previous version of this discussion.
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The key government approvals for investment in mining and mineral-
processing operations are those related to the environment, to forests 
and to land acquisition (India 2002c), as well the grant of actual mining 
leases (India 2006a:  2). Environmental impact assessment (EIA) was 
made mandatory for certain activities, including large-scale mining, in 
1994 under the terms of the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 and its 
subsequent amendments (India 2008f ). Changes in the use of ‘forest 
land’ have to be approved by the central government under the Forest 
(Conservation) Act 1980, and proposals covering more than 40 hectares 
are examined by the Forest Advisory Committee under the MoEF (India 
2008f ). Licences to exploit ‘major minerals’, including bauxite, are covered 
by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 and the 
National Mineral Policy of 2008 (which replaced an earlier policy from 
1993). These three types of approval affect state government decisions to 
approve land acquisition, which may involve the exclusion of an industrial 
site from limits already placed on the extent of such acquisition, the re-
zoning of land from agricultural to industrial use, or the removal of an 
industrial township from the jurisdiction of the local panchayat.
Examination of these approval processes in the present case suggests 
that the process of government mediation has limited utility. For all the 
plans and other documents that are produced, there is little mitigation 
of actual negative consequences for local people or their environments. 
Independent analysis of the issues is only really possible when activists 
pursue court cases or in those (rare) cases when media reports trigger 
further investigations. State government procedures are especially opaque 
and hard to follow.
Despite the economic reforms, the bureaucracy surrounding investment 
decisions has retained its complexity. In 2002, it was found that a typical 
mining project required 37 separate approvals at the central government 
level and 47 at the state government level (India 2002b). Existing 
regulations have been seen as major obstacles to investment and economic 
growth, even in official circles. A committee was already established 
under the Ministry of Commerce in 2002 with a view to speeding up 
the process and ‘ensuring that scarce resources are deployed effectively’ 
(India 2002c: 1). It was noted that ‘while overall policy has been liberalised, 
reforms in institutional mechanism and procedural simplification to 
translate policy liberalisation into ease of doing business have generally 
lagged behind’ (India 2002d: 7). Forestry and environmental approvals 
were found to be major stumbling blocks. The approval process might 
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normally take about six months, but in some cases would take up to three 
or four years, which suggested a lack of procedural clarity and a case-by-
case approach to regulation. The committee concluded that ‘in order to 
simplify the procedures for grant of approvals, reduce delays and simplify 
regulation of projects during their operational phase, re-engineering of 
the regulatory processes … is an immediate necessity’ (India 2002d: 15).
Over-regulation was also identified as the main problem to be addressed in 
the new National Mineral Policy, which could explain why ‘the [mining] 
sector is unable to contribute to growth of the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of the country in any significant way, let alone up to its potential’ 
(India 2006a: 12). The delays in procedures for granting reconnaissance 
permits, prospecting licences and mining leases under the Mines and 
Minerals Act became the main focus of the mineral policy committee, 
but this committee also stressed the need for the forest and environmental 
approvals to be ‘speeded up’ (ibid.: 2). 
Nevertheless, much of the delay in the grant of mining leases was blamed 
on perceived state government interference. The federal mining minister, 
T.  Subbarami Reddy, made this point at a conference of the Mining 
Engineers Association in Hyderabad in April 2007:
Today it takes too much time to get all the licences you need for operations. 
There are too many clearances that act as hindrances. State governments 
have demanded value addition within their borders for granting of leases 
and this we want to limit. They will still be allowed to put up conditions 
but there will be time limits to how long this can go on before mining 
is freed.
Actual approval rates remained quite high during the period of national 
policy reform between 2006 and 2008. None of the 952 industrial projects, 
and only 10 out of 587 proposed mines, were rejected on environmental 
grounds (Dutta 2009). From 1998 to 2005, the MoEF had approved an 
average of 125 mines, involving 3,500 hectares forest land, each year, and 
the rate was now increasing (Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008). It would 
thus seem that delays in central government approvals were already having 
less of an impact on the development of new mineral projects. However, 
the push for reform was maintained in further committee reports (India 
2008f ), as well as in the 2012 proposal to set up a National Investment 
Board to ensure faster processing of especially large projects.
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A closer reading of the actual legislation makes the regulatory changes 
seem less dramatic than the statistics on project approvals might indicate. 
The 2006 amendments to the Environment Act actually increased the 
scope and detail of the EIA regulations applied to the mining industry 
(India 2006b; Amnesty International 2011). This suggests that outcomes 
may have more to do with the changing priorities of decision-makers than 
with actual policy reform. Further evidence in this regard is the marked 
difference in the implementation of environmental regulations after the 
Congress Party’s Jairam Ramesh became the responsible minister in 2009 
and issued a note on the need to implement the Forest Rights Act of 2006 
before any forest land could be used for industrial purposes (India 2009a). 
This had not been a concern for the previous minister, who had granted 
approvals for mining without regard to this legislation.
The terms of reference for the policy reform committees were not greatly 
concerned with the need to improve the quality of environmental 
regulation or take more account of the concerns of affected people. 
Nevertheless, the new mineral policy did include statements on the 
importance of sustainable development and support for Adivasi people:
[A] framework of sustainable development will be designed which takes 
care of bio diversity issues and to ensure that mining activity takes place 
along with suitable measures for restoration of the ecological balance. 
Special care will be taken to protect the interest of host and indigenous 
(tribal) populations through developing models of stakeholder interest 
based on international best practice (India 2008d, para. 2.3).
State-level reform has proceeded with less debate in recent years, but 
along similar lines to the national process. For example, a ‘single window 
clearance’ office has been created for all investment applications in 
the Industry Department in Hyderabad, although this is only a case 
management office since approvals are still granted by each of the relevant 
departments. One informant told me that the main innovation consisted 
in the introduction of timelines and regular meetings to keep information 
flows moving between departments in order to prevent delays.
Despite the efforts of successive reform committees, central government 
legislation and regulations were still being added or amended at a fairly 
high rate, and the Forest Rights Act was one example that had a particular 
impact on the mining industry. State governments were operating in 
much the same manner, by amending existing policies and laws with 
‘government orders’, such as those applied to compensation for land 
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acquisition for the Jindal South West (JSW) bauxite project. Not only is it 
difficult to understand the overall policy intent of some of these changes, 
but frequent amendments at central and state levels have created a lot 
of uncertainty about what the law actually says. Civil society has shown 
some capacity to demand greater transparency in central government 
amendments, but changes at the state level have received less attention.
The uncertainty surrounding environmental regulations was compounded 
by legislative amendments in 2006 and 2008, additional ministry circulars, 
requirements contained in project-specific terms of reference documents, 
and the outcomes of court cases or the findings of special reports. For 
example, the controversial Lanjigarh alumina refinery and Niyamgiri 
bauxite mine in southern Odisha were together subject to at least seven 
special reports made on the initiative of the Supreme Court or the MoEF 
(India 2005a, 2007b; CMPDI 2006; WII 2006a, 2006b; Ramanathan 
2010; Saxena et al. 2010). Additional reports on the JSW project included 
a watershed report (not made public) and a wildlife report (Azeez et al. 
2008). As controversy has continued to follow bauxite projects in Adivasi 
parts of India, governments have typically responded by adding more and 
more information on which to base regulatory decisions, thus adding 
further complexity and opening opportunities for new challenges.
Public Consultation in the Approval Process
The only mandatory public consultation in the investment approval 
process is the environmental public hearing. This hearing, held at or 
close to the proposed project site, deals with information provided in the 
EIA report, but is only a source of advice to the ministry’s grant of an 
environmental permit. However, wider public representation in matters 
of local natural land and resource use is possible under the panchayat raj 
legislation, with its vision of democratically elected local councils being 
part of a move towards greater decentralisation and self-governance. 
Although panchayats have been established in Andhra Pradesh since 1957 
(Srinivasulu 2002), 73rd Constitutional Amendment of 1993 formalised 
the institution of panchayat raj as a mechanism of local governance in 
rural areas across the whole of India. 
Panchayats operate in a three-tier system, from the village-level (gram 
panchayat) to the sub-district (panchayat samithi, known as mandal parishad 
in Andhra Pradesh) and the district-level (zilla parishad ). At the village 
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level, direct elections every five years hold panchayat members to account, 
but there are also village assemblies (gram sabha), comprising all eligible 
voters, that are intended to work as public forums for the maintenance of 
transparency and accountability (Johnson et al. 2003). Some panchayat 
seats are reserved for members of Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes and 
Other Backward Castes, depending on their proportions amongst the 
local population, and 33 per cent of all seats are reserved for women.
Three main criticisms have been made of panchayat institutions over the 
years: states have been unwilling to devolve significant power to them; 
a resistant bureaucracy has limited their actual effectiveness; and local 
elites have influenced the outcomes (Srinivasulu 2002; Johnson 2003). 
In Andhra Pradesh, in recent years, the panchayats have often been bypassed 
in the allocation of development funds through the creation of a number 
of other institutions such as water user associations, self-help groups and 
joint forest management committees, while much of the actual control 
over development programs has remained with the bureaucracy. This 
was most noticeable during the rule of the Telugu Desam Party because 
the panchayats have traditionally been dominated by the Congress Party 
(Johnson et al. 2003).
The right of panchayats to be consulted over land acquisition was 
established in Andhra Pradesh after much protest and litigation, leading 
to a situation in which the gram panchayat and the gram sabha both had 
to provide their consent. However, once the right of consultation 
had been secured by litigation, the underpinning of the judgment could 
still be removed by changing the law, as happened in the High Court case 
over the construction of the Surampalem dam. According to Samatha 
activist Ravi Rebbapragada, the Andhra Pradesh Government introduced 
a resettlement policy that invalidated the earlier regulations.2 In the case 
of the JSW alumina refinery, it was only thought necessary to consult the 
gram panchayat. Demands for the right of consultation have proven to be 
an ongoing struggle in which pressure has to be continually re-asserted.
The Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas Act 1996 (PESA) was meant to 
establish panchayats in all of India’s Scheduled Areas. The federal version 
of PESA gave priority to the gram sabha over the smaller gram panchayat, 
and empowered it to prevent land alienation, to be consulted on land 
2  This assertion was made at a public meeting in Visakhapatnam on 26 March 2010.
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acquisition, to have ownership rights over minor forest products, and the 
power to control local resource development plans and the grant of minor 
mineral leases. Section 4(i) of the Act stated:
the gram sabha or the panchayats at the appropriate level shall be 
consulted before making the acquisition of land in the Scheduled Areas 
for development projects and before resettling or rehabilitating persons 
affected by such projects in the Scheduled Areas. 
These provisions were stronger than those pertaining to land acquisition 
in non-scheduled areas, although the national legislation did not fully 
specify whether consultation actually meant seeking consent or simply an 
opinion from the gram sabha.
Actual implementation of the PESA has been weakened and varies by 
the requirement that specific legislation be passed by each of the states. 
The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Amendment) Act 1998 locates the 
process of consultation and planning at higher levels than the gram 
sabha. Consultation is supposed to take place at the sub-district level 
in the mandal parishad, while the actual planning and implementation 
of projects is coordinated at the state level. Decisions about the use of 
forests, water, land and minerals have never been fully devolved to the 
panchayats.3 
Even this weaker Andhra Pradesh version of the PESA had questionable 
force, since the regulations required for it to come into effect were not 
published for more than 10 years (Dandekar and Choudhury 2010; Reddy 
and Mishra 2010). This legal technicality was not well known to members 
of the public who could see that panchayats exist, were participating in 
elections in the Scheduled Areas and were aware of the potential impact of 
the legislation.4 The PESA regulations were finally made public in 2011, 
but by then the bauxite project plans had already been stalled for other 
reasons.
3  For example, the exploitation of minor forest products is still monopolised by the state 
government’s Girijan Cooperative Corporation, with profit sharing but no real decision-making role 
for the panchayats (Reddy et al. 2004).
4  This type of technical delay is a tactic that had already been used in Andhra Pradesh, as it was with 
the Land Transfer Regulation of 1959, at least until a rebellion broke out in 1970 (Balagopal 1989).
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The PESA legislation has not been implemented uniformly across central 
India. In Jharkhand and Odisha, panchayats are routinely ignored or 
else forced to agree to major land acquisitions by the presence of police 
(Bhaduri 2007). Saxena concludes that the legislation:
has almost been forgotten and has not become part of mainstream political 
or policy discourse. … The implementation of the law has been severely 
hampered by the reluctance of most state governments to make laws and 
rules that conform to the spirit of the law. Weak-kneed political will has 
usually led to bureaucratic creativity in minimalistic interpretations of the 
law (Saxena 2005: 25–6). 
The reluctance of the nine states with Scheduled Areas to implement the 
PESA has been explained by a former Madhya Pradesh chief minister, 
who said that ‘[i]ts implementation would put an end to mining projects’ 
(Dandekar and Choudhury 2010:  18). However, such laws cannot be 
completely removed from the policy framework because of electoral 
pressure, and they remain as potential tools in political struggles to secure 
better representation for the poor.
Inter-Agency Disputes
While environmental public hearings have involved local people to some 
extent, the grant of forest clearance and mining permits has historically 
been the exclusive preserve of governments. However, this has not 
prevented contention between different levels of government or different 
agencies within them. As state governments have been given more 
freedom and responsibility to pursue their own economic development 
programs, disputes with the centre seem to have reduced in intensity, 
but they have not completely disappeared, as was evident in conflict over 
implementation of the new mineral policy. 
A high-level meeting of key Andhra Pradesh state government departments 
was convened on 2  July 2005, the day after the bauxite project MoU 
with JSW had been signed. Attending this meeting were ministers and 
bureaucrats representing the Revenue, Forest and Environment, and 
Mines and Geology departments. Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development 
Corporation (APMDC) was also present and was given a key role in 
coordinating all activities to ensure that the necessary approvals would 
be forthcoming. This was important because of the record of previous 
conflict between the different agencies. The Forest Department had 
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opposed plans to exploit the bauxite deposits ever since they were initiated 
in the 1980s, and had reiterated its opposition as recently as 2001 on the 
grounds that ‘local people/NGOs [non-governmental organisations] were 
against plans; the proposed area is in notified tribal area; and the forest 
area is rich in flora and fauna’ (Andhra Pradesh 2005c: 3). However, at 
this latest meeting, their minister reversed this position:
The Hon’ble Minister for Forest informed that the mining of Bauxite will 
help in industrial growth of the nation and as bauxite capping is devoid 
of any forest, the Forest officials will immediately take steps for giving 
necessary clearances from the state government (ibid.: 4).
As tends to be the case with official documents, and despite explicit 
reference being made to the earlier conflict, no detailed reasons were 
provided for this reversal. Local people and NGOs were still opposed to 
the plans, it was still a notified tribal area, and it was unlikely that that any 
significant change to the local flora and fauna could have occurred since 
2001. Nevertheless, the minutes of the meeting record that:
It is decided that the Forest Department shall go through the proposals 
of APMDC submitted for forest clearance for Araku group of areas 
and accord clearance for the said areas and submit the proposals to the 
Government of India under Section-2 of the Forest Conservation Act 
1980. If at all there are any procedural hurdles, the same shall be sorted 
out by way of direct interaction with the APMDC (Andhra Pradesh 
2005c: 3).
An important element in the reduction of conflict between forestry 
and mining departments across India has been the principle of 
‘compensatory afforestation’ established through the intervention of the 
Supreme Court. Application of this principle involves the payment 
of a calculated net present value for the existing forest and the planting of 
new forest elsewhere. Despite the many uncertainties surrounding its 
implementation, companies have seemingly been willing to pay the 
significant sums of money involved in order to allow their projects to 
move ahead, and forestry departments have been willing to exchange 
currently held land for new land somewhere else.
If forest clearance for the bauxite project mining had ceased to be issue 
within the state government, it became a problem when JSW was asked 
to pay for the net present value of the forest at the proposed mine sites. 
Two new MoUs were signed in 2007, two years after the initial agreement, 
to deal with this issue. The first required that the money should be paid 
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‘upfront’ (Andhra Pradesh 2007e), but the second, signed three months 
later, omitted the whole clause on forest compensation without further 
explanation (Andhra Pradesh 2007f ). It is not clear whether the Andhra 
Pradesh Government had agreed to pay the costs itself, or whether 
JSW had agreed to pay on condition that there was no official record 
of its agreement. The payments could not simply be ignored or waived 
because the Supreme Court was monitoring the implementation of the 
compensatory afforestation principle.
In any case, the project come to a halt, from which it has not recovered, 
when the rare Blewitt’s Owl (also known as the Forest Owlet) was 
reportedly sighted in the proposed mining area. As tends to be the case, 
a new study was commissioned by the government to find out whether 
the bird was indeed present and, if so, what could be done to mitigate the 
impact of mining on its habitat. The year-long study failed to find this 
owl, but 11 other species of owl were found instead (Azeez et al. 2008).
The most interesting aspect of this study was its limited frame of reference. 
For some unknown reason, it was restricted to the Araku Valley and the 
JSW project area, and paid no attention to the AnRak Aluminium project 
area, despite clear indications that the same owls might be present there.
The Orissa Bird and Bio-cultural survey have undertaken an ornithological 
survey of the Eastern Ghats and … rediscovered the highly endangered 
bird ‘Blewitt’s owl’ near Araku and proposed to designate the entire belt 
covering Sileru to Lammasingi, Paderu to Araku and Ananthagiri, etc. as 
an ‘Important Bird Area’ (IBA) of the country (Andhra Pradesh 2007g: 2).
The area designated in the Forest Department’s terms of reference covered 
all the bauxite ore deposits, which implied that the new study should 
cover the whole of the Agency. The omission of the Jerrila area could have 
been due to some oversight, but the implications were significant. Since 
they were not covered by the new study, AnRak Aluminium’s Jerrila mines 
were quickly granted their environmental permits in May 2009. The 
timing of this approval turned out to be crucial, just ahead of elections 
that enabled a new environment minister to take charge, with a more 
stringent interpretation of the law.5 However, it has since seemed unlikely 
that the Jerrila mines would gain final approval for forest clearance.
5  This also occurred at a time when Vedanta’s controversial Niyamgiri bauxite was making 
headlines nationally and internationally (Kumar 2014).
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The Exclusion of Local Decision-Making
The opportunities for local deliberation over the JSW project came to 
focus on the proposed refinery rather than the mining proposals. That 
was partly because the Andhra Pradesh version of the PESA had not been 
made effective at the time, and partly because no environmental public 
hearings had yet been held for the mining proposals.
Land Acquisition and Panchayat Raj
As we have seen, the land required for the alumina refinery was spread over 
five panchayats in S. Kota Mandal and thus required separate decisions 
to be made for each one. Despite being named as a single village council, 
each of the panchayats in S. Kota consists of a number of independent 
villages and hamlets, none having more than a few hundred inhabitants 
and sometimes only a few families. Within each of the panchayats there 
was only a relatively small amount of land to be acquired, which meant 
that many of the panchayat members would neither be losing their own 
land nor be resident in the affected villages. Since the S. Kota area is non-
scheduled, the elected panchayat members included a mixture of tribal 
and non-tribal people. The five panchayat heads (sarpanches), though not 
especially wealthy, were significantly better off than most other residents 
and were somewhat isolated from the demands of the villagers threatened 
with the loss of land. Perhaps more crucially, all five were non-tribal 
people aligned with the Congress Party, even though they were not meant 
to be affiliated with any political party, while many of the project’s key 
opponents were supporters of the main opposition party, Telugu Desam.
Panchayat approvals were provided soon after the refinery site had been 
chosen. The first step was an administrative order that directed the 
relevant  local government employees to organise panchayat meetings 
before the end of December 2006 (Andhra Pradesh 2006c). According to 
interviews I conducted in March 2008, the five panchayat heads presented 
almost identical resolutions to the five meetings, which had been drafted 
‘in consultation with’ an influential Congress politician on the zilla 
parishad. The only difference between them consisted of the details of the 
land parcels to be acquired (KGP 2006; MGP 2006).
A tribal panchayat member from the village I surveyed during my 
fieldwork, who appeared to be drunk most of the time, said that he knew 
nothing of these plans, but admitted that (being illiterate) he usually put 
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his thumbprint on any document with which he was presented. I was 
not able to find any signed and verified copies of the panchayat and gram 
sabha resolutions, and I am sure that none of the affected villagers had 
ever seen them either. One can only assume that the resolutions were 
adopted because the process of land acquisition and environmental 
approval actually moved ahead. 
The long reach of the bauxite alliance into the refinery site had its roots in 
the control it exercised over local political institutions. The exact nature 
of this control is difficult to grasp but it involved the distribution of 
money and power and a measure of control over the local bureaucracy. 
The  influence of the Congress politician on the district council was 
not only derived from his elected position but also from the fact that 
his family were the biggest landowners in the area. His influence in the 
district was closely linked to his relationship to the regional ‘strongman’, 
a Congress politician and state government minister at the time, who had 
direct access to the chief minister.
Had it not been possible to secure the panchayat approvals quickly and 
then conceal them from public view, a local opposition movement could 
have gained in strength. An interview with an agricultural extension 
worker, who was frequently sent out to undertake surveys for land 
acquisitions in the area, confirmed the way that these approvals were 
handled. Administrators normally keep out of the way while party 
workers and politicians figure out ways to deal with potential opponents. 
The  prevention of meaningful deliberations over land acquisition is 
consistent with the broader Indian experience in which ‘decentralisation 
has failed to prevent a local (and primarily landed) elite from controlling 
the local bodies’ (Johnson et al. 2003: 2).
Bureaucratic interventions in land acquisition in Andhra Pradesh have 
thus tended to favour displacement with a minimum of local deliberation. 
The process of land acquisition for ‘special economic zones’ in Andhra 
Pradesh has been described as follows:
The role of local revenue administration … is crucial in making or rather 
pressurizing farmers to concede without resistance to the establishment 
of an SEZ. Using their connections with the local pyravikaars [fixers] and 
the Panchayat raj functionaries, the subaltern bureaucracy of the Revenue 
Department could successfully spread the message that there was no point 
in resisting land acquisition as the government has supreme power to 
acquire ‘any land, any where, any time’ (Srinivasulu 2010: 13).
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The author of this observation does not say whether the administrators 
were operating on their own initiative or at the direction of people 
above them, but in the case of the JSW refinery, local bureaucrats were 
rewarded for work that was controlled by politicians at higher levels who 
would make phone calls to various departments to make sure that land 
acquisition tasks were completed.
While it was possible for JSW to swiftly secure panchayat and gram sabha 
approvals through Congress Party connections that reached all the way 
to the proposed refinery site, much energy was also spent on avoiding 
the same procedures for the proposed mines in the Agency. It is not clear 
why it would have been more difficult to get the desired decisions in a 
similar manner for the mines, given that I found the Araku panchayats 
to be politicised in much the same way. Perhaps it was due to earlier 
difficulties encountered in attempts to convince members of the Tribal 
Advisory Council of the benefits of bauxite mining (Prasad 2000), or 
else because the uncertain status of panchayat regulations in the Agency 
created greater risk of messy discussions or negative newspaper coverage.
On several occasions, APMDC expressed the view that there was no need 
to consult panchayats before mining could be approved in the Agency, but 
gave different reasons on different occasions. At one point, the argument 
was that ‘major minerals’ like bauxite do not require consultation as the 
PESA only grants local decision-making rights over minor minerals (Anon. 
2008c; HRF 2008a). A subsequent argument was that the environmental 
public hearing would be sufficient as a form of consultation. One unnamed 
‘senior officer’ from APMDC was quoted as saying that ‘[a]s per the Mines 
and Minerals Regulations the outcome of the public hearing is construed 
as the consent of the people’ (Anon. 2009b). These occasional statements 
from APMDC could be easily countered in the media by arguments that 
the PESA also grants decision-making rights over forest products and water 
bodies clearly affected by mining, while the environmental public hearing 
is based on legislation entirely distinct from the Mines and Minerals 
Act and the PESA. However, arguments made in the press did not lead 
to greater inclusion in the decision-making process, and so the protests 
continued (see Chapter 6).
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Environmental Public Hearings
Since the refinery was seen as something that would pave the way for the 
more controversial mines, much of the discussion at the public hearing 
in S. Kota was about the mining proposal rather than pollution control 
measures at the refinery itself. About 1,000 people attended the hearing that 
was held on 4 June 2007, including party activists, NGO representatives 
and some of the affected people. The JSW representative gave a detailed 
explanation of the benefits to the government, to construction contractors 
and to local people, concluding with an assertion that ‘there will not 
be any adverse environmental impacts in the surroundings due to the 
proposed industry’ (Andhra Pradesh 2007h). The minutes of the meeting 
record that some 40 people spoke, and 96 per cent of those attending were 
opposed to the project.
The environmental public hearing has only a consultative status, so there 
is no requirement for its recommendations to be implemented. However, 
it was not possible to completely ignore such a level of opposition. Further 
discussions on the environmental approval took place at a meeting of the 
Expert Committee of the MoEF in Delhi’s central administrative district 
in October 2007. Representatives of the Andhra Pradesh Government 
and JSW had been invited to respond to questions about why people were 
opposing the project. According to the minutes of this meeting:
Representatives of the Government of A.P. informed the Committee 
[that] [m]ost of the persons [who] attended the Public Hearing were 
outsiders and not the real stake holders and directly affected parties … 
[A]ll the local authorities concerned with the project whose consent is 
necessary and all the Sarpanches/Panchayats/Hamlets have supported the 
project without any reservation (India 2007d).
Once blame had been laid at the feet of protesters who were outsiders, 
the signatures of the local Congress Party sarpanches would be sufficient 
to verify that the real project-affected people were indeed in favour of the 
refinery. This was seemingly sufficient to satisfy the MoEF experts and the 
refinery was thus approved six months after the stormy public hearing 
(India 2007e). 
Neither activists nor those losing land had any knowledge of such high-
level meetings in faraway Delhi. Agendas for such meetings are usually 
posted in advance on the MoEF website, for those who can access it, 
but the minutes would at that time not normally be available until 
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more than a month after the meeting had actually taken place. This 
gave the planners a significant time advantage. Land acquisition actually 
commenced only a few days after the environmental permit was issued on 
18 December 2007.
No public hearing was held for the proposed mines during the course of 
2007 or 2008, but indications of how it would proceed could be inferred 
from the hearing that took place in October 2008, in Chintapalli town, 
for AnRak Aluminium’s proposed Jerrila mine. A large gathering of 
protestors arrived at the site of the hearing, but so did a large contingent 
of police, who stopped and checked all approaching vehicles for suspected 
Maoists. No discussions under the terms of the PESA had so far been held 
in that area, and although titles had been claimed under the Forest Rights 
Act, none had so far been granted. The distance of the hearing from the 
proposed mine site, combined with the obstacles placed in the way of 
people’s attendance, resulted in a walkout by opponents who were present. 
That left the APMDC representatives and one university professor from 
Visakhapatnam. The hearing was seen to have been completed, and the 
environmental permit was subsequently approved in May 2009. 
The environmental public hearing remains the only mandatory forum 
for public information and debate about major project proposals despite 
its inadequacies. In some cases, it has at least provided information 
about forthcoming land acquisitions that represents a risk for project 
proponents in case opposition builds. To avoid this ‘risk’, the Andhra 
Pradesh Government was able to acquire land for the AnRak Aluminium 
refinery without a public hearing by declaring the site to be part of an 
industrial park that would count as a ‘special economic zone’, where a 
number of companies would have to commit to an investment before 
its environmental impact could be assessed. In this case, it turned out 
that there was only one company in the park, but by the time that the 
hearing was held, all the required land was already in the hands of the 
government. The result was that there was really very little left to discuss 
at the hearing, other than the amount of money that local people should 
receive by way of compensation, and the environmental permit was 
granted in August 2008.
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Water for the Refinery or for Visakhapatnam City?
Even the municipal councillors of Visakhapatnam city, the second largest 
city in the formerly undivided state of Andhra Pradesh, have found it 
difficult to withstand the influence of the chief minister over access to 
vital local resources. Water access is a very sensitive topic in this city 
because of frequent scarcity in the dry summer season. The JSW refinery 
would be located right next to the Tatipudi reservoir and would need as 
much as 30 million litres of water per day (see Figure 5.1). The water in 
this reservoir had so far been used for domestic consumption and local 
agriculture. The EIA report on the refinery did not clearly state how its 
water requirements would be met. It said that the water might be obtained 
from the Raivada reservoir, which was somewhat further away, ‘or from 
such other sources or from any existing water reservoir with approval of 
Govt of Andhra Pradesh which have no impact on local environment’ 
(Vimta Labs 2007: C2–3).
Figure 5.1 The Tatipudi reservoir next to the proposed JSW 
alumina refinery.
Source: Photo by author, January 2008.
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On 28 May 2007, one week before the public hearing, JSW issued a press 
release stating that the water would be derived from a pipeline controlled 
by the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation (GVMC), and 
not from the Raivada reservoir, ‘in view of apprehensions expressed by 
some sections of people in the media’ (JSW Aluminium 2007b). Meeting 
minutes from the chief minister’s office reveal that this change of plan had 
been made at a high-level meeting in that had just been held in Hyderabad 
(Andhra Pradesh 2007i, 2007j).
This proposal would not be popular with the residents of a rapidly growing 
city that was already short of water. The water in question would have 
to be derived from the giant Polavaram dam across the Godavari River, 
but construction of this dam had been blocked by litigation for several 
years and, in any case, water from this source had already been promised 
to farmers who given up part of their share in water from the Raivada 
reservoir when its water was diverted to Visakhapatnam city in 1997 
(Andhra Pradesh 2007k). Furthermore, existing sources were already 
insufficient for the future needs of Visakhapatnam city, whose domestic 
requirements were projected to grow dramatically from 304 million litres 
per day in 2007 to 614 million in 2021, while industrial requirements 
were expected to reach 1,151  million litres per day in the same year. 
In 2007, the daily supply was down to 54 million litres because of recent 
drought conditions. The Godavari water would add another 810 million 
litres per day, but this was a long way short of meeting the projected 
requirements (Andhra Pradesh 2007l).
Nevertheless, a water supply contract was signed with the Visakhapatnam 
Industrial Water Supply Corporation (VIWSC), a joint venture between 
GVMC, the central government company Vizag Steel and the private 
company Larsen and Toubro, with GVMC holding a 51 per cent majority 
stake. Newspaper accounts in the month following the public hearing 
revealed intense debate about the terms of the water supply agreement 
amongst the city councillors, which initially led them to revoke it 
(Anon.  2007a). Subsequent articles indicated that they were pressured 
to approve it after all, but did not indicate the nature of this pressure or 
who was exerting it (Anon. 2007b, 2007c; Patnaik 2007). A few weeks 
later, the mayor declared that the approval had been given (Anon. 2007d), 
but once again there was no explanation of this change of mind nor any 
account of how GVMC would manage to supply its different customers 
in future. One activist told me in an interview that the ‘city council is just 
following what the [chief minister] wants whether there is enough water 
or not’(29 March 2008).
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There was a further twist to this story when the MoEF’s letter of approval 
for the refinery, written in December 2007, specified the Tatipudi 
reservoir as its water source. According to this document, the ‘[t]otal water 
requirement from Canal/Tatipudi reservoir will be 8 MGD (1400 m3/h) 
and permission is accorded by the Greater Visakhapatnam Municipal 
Corporation (GVMC) [via] letter dated 28th May, 2007’ (India 2007e: 2). 
To make matters even more confusing, both the JSW press release and the 
MoEF letter referred to the same GVMC letter to support their different 
versions of the project plan. The GVMC letter actually did specify the 
Godavari River as the source (Andhra Pradesh 2007m), but the MoEF 
letter appeared to have more authority than a corporate press release, so 
the uncertainty persisted in a new round of media debate (Anon. 2008d; 
Patnaik 2008). While the contract to supply Godavari water to JSW was 
technically still in place, the VIWSC allocated a further 38 million litres 
per day to the AnRak Aluminium refinery, further deepening the water 
supply conundrum (Andhra Pradesh 2008g). 
This simply intensified the level of public protest. In 2008, the Telugu 
Desam Party, now in opposition, organised a major strike (mahadharna) 
over the issue, while activists resorted to litigation in 2009 (Anon. 2008e, 
2009c). Meanwhile, the state government took no action, at least in 
public, to resolve the issue. Whether and how water would be provided 
to Visakhapatnam city, to local farmers or to the JSW refinery would 
seemingly depend on how much, if any, would be available from the 
Godavari River, and then on the balance of power between different 
groups of potential consumers at some point in the not so distant future. 
If the recent past was any guide to the outcome, it would most likely be 
the farmers who would lose out, while the elected politicians would find 
somebody else to blame for their own decisions or lack of decisions to deal 
with the problem of water scarcity.6
6  When water was diverted from the Raivada reservoir to Visakhapatnam city residents in 1997, 
then Congress Party opposition politician Konathala Ramakrishna went on a hunger strike on behalf 
of the farmers. In the period from 2004 to 2009, he was the most powerful state government minister 
from Visakhapatnam District and a strong supporter of the bauxite project. In 2008, Telugu Desam 
Party politicians were keen to highlight this paradox, but remained silent about the fact that, when in 
government, they were the ones who had originally decided on the diversion (Anon. 2007e).
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Bringing People Back In
The story so far is one of state government attempts to curtail debate 
about land use and water access. However, this does not represent the 
whole picture, since there are different opinions on what should be done 
in the different arms of the government at both state and federal levels. 
Ongoing negotiations about public participation in decision-making 
show that new opportunities might emerge as soon as old ones are found 
to be blocked by vested interests that want to limit the debate. 
The existence of internal disagreements in the state government became 
apparent when the Tribal Welfare Department was encouraging people in 
Araku to claim land titles under the Forest Rights Act (Andhra Pradesh 
2007n), while the Mines and Geology Department was attempting to 
alienate the same land. Biodiversity conservation concerns focused on the 
endangered Blewitt’s Owl suddenly halted the mining project in Araku 
and Ananthagiri mandals and offered another chance to settle the forest 
rights, but many uncertainties remained even if that process could be 
completed. What legal protection would exist against the acquisition of 
such forest rights as compared to private land titles, to what extent would 
people be consulted before such acquisitions took place, and how would 
compensation be calculated? The Forest Rights Act is silent on these issues, 
so it was likely that future litigation would have to decide the outcomes.
The most recent of the often bewildering changes taking place in the battle 
over local representation was the MoEF circular that required gram sabhas 
across India to be consulted before any land claimed under the Forest 
Rights Act could be used for other purposes, and also required a majority 
of members to approve the proposal and the compensation arrangements 
(India 2009a). The new federal minister’s support for the legislation 
also appeared to support the implementation of the Samatha judgment. 
However, the fractured openings in an ever-changing and contradictory 
regulatory system mean that only some of those who might benefit 
from such openings would actually be able to take advantage of them. 
Making use of these openings would depend on their ability to access 
information about their potential rights and then find an appropriate way 
to approach the government, directly or indirectly, in order to exercise 
them. The people of the Agency were unlikely to be able to do this on 
their own, but since tribal welfare and mining issues are pursued by some 
of the most capable civil society actors in the state, they might end up in 
a better position than the tribal people on the plains of S. Kota. 
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Technical Exclusions in EIA Reports
Aside from the bureaucratic procedures that constrain panchayat 
deliberations, a technical approach to the avoidance of any public 
deliberation is to frame EIA reports in ways that render people invisible, 
and thus make all environmental mitigation efforts a matter of scientific 
rather than community concern. If people and their lives are seen to be 
affected, either directly from a loss of land or other resources, or indirectly 
by pollution from a proposed industrial project, this can trigger the 
application of various legal protections. But if such impacts are concealed, 
the affected people must first make themselves visible before they can 
fight for their rights.
EIA reports on bauxite mining in India have tended to discuss pollution 
as a matter for technical measurement and mitigation practices that are 
equally applicable in all locations, rather than something that needs to 
take local livelihoods and environments into consideration (Tingay 2010). 
Despite these deficiencies, EIA reports have long been the only detailed 
public documents dealing with this issue, and have therefore received 
much attention from activists across India, despite their lack of reference 
to local circumstances (Bedi 2013). While social concerns might be more 
usefully addressed in a separate social impact assessment, there was no 
legal requirement for such a process for many years. By 2006, the MoEF 
guidelines only contained a few clauses relating to social concerns, with 
a primary focus on the use of agricultural and forest land (India 2006b). 
Even then, detailed land use information was routinely absent from 
bauxite project EIA reports (Vimta Labs 2006; BS Envi Tech 2008; 
Global Experts 2008; ICFRE 2008), but this did not prevent regulators 
from granting environmental permits.
The task of the EIA process has mainly been confined to measuring 
existing levels of pollution in a given area, detailing the pollution control 
techniques to be implemented by project proponents, and then estimating 
the future pollution levels once the project has started. So long as the 
future pollution load is within the national limits for all the measurement 
locations within a 10  km radius of the proposed site, there are few 
regulatory options for withholding approval. But even with this narrow 
frame of reference, there have still been reasons to question the technical 
validity of the reports (Vimta Labs 2006; Bhushan and Zeya Hazra 2008; 
BS Envi Tech 2008; ICFRE 2008; Dutta 2009; Amnesty International 
2011). These include the way in which general statistics are provided for 
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the whole of the ‘study area’ rather than for the smaller area that is to be 
acquired and used. In addition, the discrepancy between planning and 
implementation is known to be a major issue (Behera 2008; Nayak 2008; 
Amnesty International 2010). 
Refinery Impact Assessment
There were several ways in which plans for the JSW refinery planning 
rendered local people invisible, and the land acquisition process left 
them more vulnerable to pollution than was necessary. The 10 km radius 
study area contained a potentially affected population of 65,155, but as 
we have seen, there was a much higher concentration of tribal people 
in the area immediately adjacent to the site (Table 4.6), and this point 
was overlooked in all the official plans (Vimta Labs 2007). Furthermore, 
the stated goal of minimising the level of official displacement was really 
just an effort to circumvent house sites, leaving hundreds of people in 
the immediate vicinity of several potential sources of pollution without 
significant buffer zones. The waste ponds could spread pollution in three 
ways: as dust in the event of strong winds, as water overflowing the waste 
pond walls in the event of a flood, or as leakage into the groundwater if 
the ponds were not properly sealed. Living in close proximity to the waste 
ponds was thus likely to be a major health risk. Air pollution from the 
processing plant and the thermal power plant was also a major issue, and 
local livelihoods were indirectly threated by a reduction in the productivity 
of agricultural land.
Water and air samples were collected as part of the EIA process, but the 
chosen locations had no clear rationale from the point of view of pollution 
prevention or health risks to the local population. Groundwater samples 
were likewise collected at locations other than those of the proposed 
waste ponds. When the report stated all emissions would be within the 
prescribed limits, it was assumed that there would be no risks to human 
health and safety or to plants and water sources (Vimta Labs 2007).
The report did not even mention the fishing pond located between the 
main plant site and the red mud waste pond, nor the Chilikalagedda 
stream running along the border of the proposed fly ash pond. There 
was no mention of existing groundwater levels, which were likely to be 
shallow because of the site’s proximity to the Tatipudi irrigation reservoir. 
No hydrological maps were included to indicate the location of other 
water bodies and their flows. It was therefore impossible to evaluate the 
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risks involved in a potential spill from one of the waste ponds. The report 
gave the general impression that on all accounts the refinery was an 
opportunity for economic development with only minor risks:
The proposed alumina refinery has certain level of marginal impacts 
on the local environment. However, development of this project has 
certain beneficial impact/effects in terms of providing the employment 
opportunities that the same will create during the course of its setting 
up and as well as during operational phase of the project (Vimta Labs 
2007: C9–1).
Mining Impact Assessment
The Galikonda EIA report described an operation area for the mine 
where no displacement would take place (ICFRE n.d.). No mention was 
made of the one village that did exist on top of the hill and whose site 
would seemingly have to be acquired. By denying the existence of any 
displacement or compensation issues for local people, the report could 
be safely framed in terms of compensating the relevant government 
agency for any forest loss. The exact boundaries of the mining areas were 
not clearly presented in the EIA report, nor did the report consider the 
precarious locations of many villages in the valleys below the proposed 
mine site. Little consideration was given to the potential impacts of dust 
pollution, water runoff, falling boulders and other debris on agricultural 
productivity. It simply promised that pollution levels would fall within 
the prescribed norms. 
While the report denied the existence of any measurable risks, it 
nevertheless stated that ‘local people have the apprehension that their 
coffee plantation[s] may be disturbed’ and they ‘perceived that the water 
requirement for the Mines may reduce their water availability’ (ICFRE 
n.d.: 192), but it did not provide a scientific assessment of these concerns. 
Instead, it proposed ‘[c]ompensation of local people for their disturbance 
of agriculture/plantation lands, and deterioration of soil quality due to 
soil erosion, landslides, flooding, loss of fertility etc.’ and ‘[c]ompensation 
in terms of loss of agricultural crop/coffee plantations’ (ibid.:  151). 
It seems as if the environmental experts were not willing or able to side 
with those who might suffer negative consequences, but were finding 
ways to recommend some remedies without acknowledging whether local 
people’s concerns were justified or not. Compensation thus appeared as 
a form of local welfare rather than a right. Other mining projects might 




Given the closed nature of government (and company) operations, the 
examination of mediation in this chapter has had to rely almost exclusively 
on public documents complemented by interviews with outside 
commentators. This certainly created challenges in determining the nature 
of top-level government interventions, but could not hide a pattern of 
political influence over state and federal government decision. The 
outcome was a pattern of facilitation that almost exclusively interpreted 
policies and framed interventions in favour of project implementation. 
It is clear that, given the many social clauses in relevant legislation, it took 
a fair amount of effort for the bauxite alliance to facilitate the required 
investment approvals and avoid responding to outside voices that would 
not have approved of their plans. This facilitation took place in an 
extremely dispersed authority structure because of the federal nature of 
governance in India. Key leaders of the Andhra Pradesh Government were 
certainly influential within relevant state agencies and were a key part of 
the national coalition government, but their influence was not unlimited. 
When chief minister Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy died in a helicopter accident 
in 2009, project implementation ground to a halt, since he was the one 
politician who could possibly have exerted sufficient high-level influence 
to untangle the complex web of investment approvals.
These complicated procedures did not themselves serve to allay concerns 
relating to displacement, environmental degradation and water use, and 
yet the fact that so many protective laws exist, and more continue to be 
added, indicate opportunities for wider concerns to be raised. There is thus 
a strong tension between the political efforts to facilitate investment on 
one hand, and the continued existence of policies that attempt to improve 
social justice on the other. And government action that mainly worked to 
facilitate private investment in this project generated a lot of opposition 
against what was perceived as the planning of unjust outcomes. The next 
chapter examines the formation of this opposition.
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the Fringes
Despite the pessimistic findings of the previous chapter, where government 
mediation overall showed little concern for upholding the social and 
environmental legislation intended to protect Adivasis, there were many 
actors who worked towards a broader and more inclusive perspective. Over 
the years, a large number of individuals and organisations have protested 
against bauxite mining plans on the grounds of a need to protect Adivasi 
land and the impossibility of properly compensating those who would be 
affected. For opposition to the Jindal South West (JSW) bauxite project 
to have a significant impact, it would have to open the government to 
engagement outside of the private sphere of policymaking and project 
implementation where issues were being addressed with select business 
interests. Meaningful mediation depends not so much on government 
capacity but on the amount of pressure civil society actors are able to exert.
The first challenge for opponents of the JSW bauxite project was to 
find enough grassroots support to allow for large-scale mobilisation at 
the proposed project sites. If large numbers turned out, this would give 
increased legitimacy to oppositional activities, but given their severe lack 
of resources, poor people in the remote hills of the Agency would find it 
very difficult to create and sustain an opposition movement. Nevertheless, 
tribal social movements have at times been very strong in Andhra 
Pradesh as well as in many other parts of India. For example, local people 
protested strongly against the proposed bauxite project in Kashipur, in the 
neighbouring state of Odisha. As one activist commented:
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Kakinada is the one place in Andhra Pradesh where there is a strong local 
movement against a project. People tend to look down on Orissa for being 
backward and say that in AP we have so many movements but this is not 
really true on the ground. In Andhra Pradesh there is not the same type 
of grassroots resistance … (interview, Visakhapatnam, 3 January 2008).
On the other hand, the weakness of local resistance in Andhra Pradesh 
was perceived as a sign of maturity by another activist:
There is not the same strength of movements in Andhra Pradesh but also 
not the same domination by outside middle class leaders as in north India. 
You have to show you are giving real benefits rather than go on talking 
about the same old thing, whether this is the Samatha judgment or the 
Forest Rights Act (interview, Hyderabad, 22 February 2008).
A better explanation instead for the relatively low level of local opposition 
to the JSW bauxite project was the small size of the directly affected 
population. If the government had proposed to change land rights 
legislation across Andhra Pradesh, then a much larger opposition would 
have been expected. A representative of the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist) (CPM) in Visakhapatnam District recalled:
TDP [the Telugu Desam Party] was outright trying to change the 1/70 
Act [the 1970 Land Transfer Regulation] which was against the interest 
of all tribals and got massive protests until the deal was cancelled. The 
Congress says it is upholding the 1/70 but does mining. In this way, 
mining has become a local issue with less protests compared to earlier 
(interview, Araku, 8 May 2008). 
There were also special challenges facing any potential social protest 
in the Agency. The continuous Naxalite presence since the 1960s had 
resulted in significant security operations by the state government, often 
restricting the scope for public activity. Encounter killings of suspected 
militants used to be rampant as part of the state government’s attempts 
to combat the Maoists (Balagopal 2006). Naxalite activity in the Agency 
had declined over the previous decade, largely due to the presence of the 
special Greyhound police force. Nevertheless, people associated with the 
government, including some who expressed support for bauxite mining, 
had still been killed by the Naxalites (Anon. 2007f, 2007g, 2008f; 
Sreenivas 2009). Even a limited Maoist presence made it more difficult for 
political parties and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to operate 
in the Agency, while enabling the government to frame opponents as 
Maoists. On the other hand, while local members of the (mainstream) 
Communist Party of India (CPI) were jailed for agitating against bauxite 
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mining during the period of my fieldwork, mainstream parties did not 
seem to be overly restricted in their abilities to organise public meetings or 
move between villages. A former Naxalite supporter had even been elected 
as member of the legislative assembly (MLA) for Paderu, the constituency 
next to the proposed Araku mines in the Agency. 
Only one example was found of an independently organised local group 
opposed to the bauxite industry. This was the Adivasi Vimukti Sangathan 
(Adivasi Liberation Organisation), also based in Paderu. Its members were 
young people from the first generation of educated Adivasis, who had 
chosen to stay in the smaller towns of the Agency rather than migrate 
in search of better job opportunities on the plains. Other groups called 
themselves ‘community-based organisations’, but were actually dependent 
on external funding from larger NGOs or were related to an established 
political party. One example would be the Andhra Pradesh Girijan 
Sangham (Tribal Organisation/Movement), which was the local wing of 
the CPM. When money gives voice, the voice is ultimately that of non-
tribal people.
The village leaders1 whom I encountered in the Agency were largely 
non-committal on whether they would join a bauxite mining protest 
movement or not. Since no activity was evident on the ground at the 
time, they had seemingly adopted a wait-and-see strategy. People in one 
village indicated their willingness to send a few people to protest rallies, 
despite their recognition of the importance of Congress Party contacts. 
Another village had seen internal strife when a few educated villagers 
argued against the village head’s support of the mining project. Yet other 
village leaders around the same bauxite hill already had roles as members of 
parties and/or NGOs who were strongly opposed to the project. Despite 
the ambivalence shown in my interviews, the general sentiment against 
the mining proposal was sufficiently widespread to make government 
officials warn us against venturing into the villages.
It appeared that the lack of local mobilisation was a cause of some 
concern amongst the activists who had been making good use of the 
courts. One said that the project ‘will come through [move forward] but 
1  Responses to my questions indicated that the village head’s traditional authority is rarely 
questioned, but the extent of this authority is likely to vary between villages.
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right now the tribals of Vishakhapatnam are resisting. It is ultimately the 
physical resistance which counts. When the bulldozers come, are you 
going to remain standing?’ (interview, Hyderabad, 7 March 2007).
The low level of mobilisation did not necessarily mean that local people 
were passive. They just did not have the means to voice their opinions, 
so waited until a tangible target presented itself. As one said:
They [JSW] did not ask to give our land to them. They did not know 
people’s opinion, there is no agreement with [the] gram sabha. All this 
was done in [a] secret manner. They are working [surveying the land] 
when we are away from the fields. When we see these people working 
on our land, we catch them and beat them and give the information to 
newspaper reporters. We have done this two to three times (interview, 
S. Kota Mandal, 26 January 2008).
I found no evidence of government workers or surveyors being beaten 
up, some people were able to display survey equipment that they had 
confiscated, and newspaper reports had certainly been written.
People in the Agency, like those in the S. Kota area before them, would 
use ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985), such as acts of sabotage or other 
disruptive activities, against any visible targets. These were the only 
means available to them when most of the project planning took place 
in inaccessible government and business offices far from their place of 
residence. It was also clear that more violent action could result in people 
getting arrested when the government could claim to have followed 
the law.
The Opposition to the Bauxite Project
When the level of local mobilisation was limited, campaigning by 
non-tribal organisations and parties took on crucial importance. 
A  number of NGOs2 and left-wing parties formed the core of the 
opposition. The Bharatiya Janata Party and the Telangana Rashtra Samithi 
Party have virtually no presence in coastal Andhra Pradesh, so have never 
taken a position on the issue. All other parties opposed to the Congress 
2  The idea that NGOs constitute a kind of financial enterprise has created a situation in which 
many activists refuse to apply this label to their own organisations, but the term is used here to signify 
a wide range of organisations working on social issues, including those that would reject this label.
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Party were also opposed to the JSW project, though with varying levels 
of intensity. Several communist parties had campaigned strongly against 
bauxite mining for many years.
Although opposition to the project was not particularly well coordinated, 
opponents were still able to highlight the immediate threat of displacement 
for tribal people, and shared a wider concern over what would happen 
to natural resources and livelihoods if mining started. There was a tacit 
agreement among this diverse set of actors that the risks were too great 
and so the project had to be stopped. Since they were based mainly outside 
of the Agency, they had greater freedom to operate, better resources and 
education, and better access to media and the courts than local tribal 
actors.
Many of the organisations had been engaged with the issue for more than 
a decade, which meant that there was ready support for a new campaign 
as soon as the bauxite project was announced in 2005. A set of strategies 
that had proven successful in blocking previous projects could be 
deployed again. Agitation against bauxite mining had become sufficiently 
widespread to attract interest from mainstream political parties, which 
came with its own opportunities as well as risks. Certainly, the opposition 
was not a grassroots movement with a local base, so most of its activities 
were directed to raising public opinion and using the courts as an 
alternative to the political system represented by the state assembly or the 
national parliament. 
Opposing Organisations
The opposition was very active during the period of my fieldwork, both in 
the Agency and in parts of coastal Andhra Pradesh. Many of the media and 
policy activities took place in Visakhapatnam city, while mass meetings and 
other outreach activities centred on the proposed project sites. The ‘legal’ 
activities shown in Table 6.1 involve filing cases in various courts of law, but 
occasionally also trying to make use of various government institutions such 
as the Andhra Pradesh Human Rights Commission or the Central Vigilance 
Commission in order to highlight certain kinds of injustice. ‘Media’ activities 
involve writing articles or providing information to journalists to raise 
public awareness. ‘Grassroots’ work includes public meetings, production 
of information leaflets and booklets, and the organisation of foot marches 
(padyatras) that are a common way for politicians and party workers in 
Andhra Pradesh to disseminate messages by walking like common people. 
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For political parties, ‘political’ work involves raising questions in the 
state assembly or national parliament or otherwise engaging democratic 
political institutions, while for NGOs it involves making representations to 
politicians who might support their cause.
Table 6.1 Main organisations in opposition to bauxite mining.
Organisation Strategy Collaboration
NGOs
Samatha Legal, media, political CPM
Sakti Legal, grassroots None
Human Rights Forum Legal, media, grassroots CPI, CPM, CPIND
Political parties
CPI Grassroots, political CPM (state-level)
CPM Grassroots, political CPI (state-level), Human 
Rights Forum, Samatha
CPIND Grassroots, political Human Rights Forum
Revolutionary
Naxalites Violence, media None*
Note: * Collaboration with the Naxalites is illegal.
The three most active NGOs opposing the bauxite project all had histories 
of working on social issues in the area that dated back to the 1980s. Sakti 
and Samatha could both be said to have mining and tribal rights as part of 
their core agendas. It was therefore rather strange to discover the absence of 
collaboration between these three organisations, despite the fact that they 
were familiar with each other’s work and shared a common goal. The left-
wing parties opposing the project included the two parliamentary parties 
already mentioned, the CPI and the CPM, and a ‘semi-parliamentary’ 
party, the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) New Democracy (CPIND), as well 
as the revolutionary Naxalites. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP) is not 
shown as an opponent in Table 6.1 because its earlier history while in 
government made opposition to the project seem more like a populist 
ploy than an act of genuine conviction. However, there was occasional 
collaboration between the left-wing parties and the TDP in order for the 
former to make use of the latter’s superior resources.
Samatha was founded in the late 1980s, and was being led by a couple, 
Ravi Rebbapragada and K. Bhanumathi. It was able to expand significantly 
after winning the Supreme Court judgment in 1997. Like other NGOs, 
it grew by establishing a set of offices and employing regular staff, and 
winning national or international grants to work on tribal welfare, mining 
and related issues. A number of smaller NGOs in the coastal Andhra 
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Pradesh region were receiving most or all of their own funding through 
Samatha, even though they otherwise operated independently. From time 
to time, Samatha headed the national network known as ‘mines, minerals 
& People’ (mm&P), which meant coordinating the work of NGOs and 
activists on mining issues at a national level. The organisation was thus 
able to act at local, state and federal levels.
Sakti was being run by Dr Sivaramakrishna, an academic with knowledge 
of tribal folklore and an understanding of the many injustices faced by 
tribal peoples. Years of fieldwork, especially in East and West Godavari 
districts, has made him an expert on settlement patterns of land and the 
means of engaging with the government and the courts. However, he 
also held office in the right-wing World Hindu Council (Vishwa Hindu 
Parishad), which made him a controversial figure for the left wingers in 
the opposition. Sakti had been active in the advocacy of tribal rights since 
the early 1980s. Like Samatha, it had been taking court action against 
mining and other non-tribal commercial activities in the Scheduled 
Areas of the state, whether these were sponsored by the government or by 
private companies. 
The loosely left-wing Human Rights Forum (HRF) was an offshoot of 
the civil rights movement, specifically the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties 
Committee. It was a self-financed group of middle-class activists operating 
in both of the Telugu-speaking states, Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. 
Its members had regular salaried jobs, many being lawyers, teachers 
or journalists. A core concern of the HRF was to ensure that the state 
government followed the law, including the use of fair trials rather than 
violence when dealing with the Naxalites, while urging the latter to stop 
using violent tactics themselves. The HRF had got involved with bauxite 
mining proposals as part of a widening agenda on economic and social 
rights. The organisation was headed by K.  Balagopal, a human rights 
lawyer and prolific writer on social issues, until his untimely death in 
October 2009.
The CPM, like the other left-wing parties, did not have a uniform 
presence in the tribal areas of Visakhapatnam, but worked in a few places 
where it did have a local support base, mainly in the Araku Valley. District 
and mandal party officials were very active in staging protests known as 
dharnas, speaking at public hearings and conducting padyatras. At the 
time of my fieldwork, the CPM had been subject to a lot of criticism 
because of the way that the Left Front Government of West Bengal had 
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forcefully acquired land and injured a lot of farmers in the process of 
developing industrial projects in Singur and Nandigram (both of which 
were later cancelled). Since West Bengal was the home state of all the 
senior national CPM leaders, it was very difficult for the Andhra Pradesh 
branch to distance itself from what was going on there. The party was able 
to take a clear stand against mining in defence of tribal rights, but did 
nothing in the proposed refinery area other than object to the refinery’s 
encouragement of mining. 
The CPI worked in similar ways to the CPM, but was focused on the 
western parts of Visakhapatnam District, where the AnRak Aluminium 
project had been making strong headway. I did not encounter CPI 
members as often as CPM members during the course of my own 
fieldwork.
The CPIND is one of several ‘Marxist-Leninist’ parties active in coastal 
Andhra Pradesh, as well as in other (relatively small) areas across India. 
These parties have abandoned the cause of revolution, at least temporarily, 
in order to join in electoral democratic politics. As such, they are 
ideologically close to the Naxalites, with little faith in parliamentary 
democracy, but still participate in elections and retain a legal status, with 
no known organisational connections to Maoist groups. CPIND members 
had been active in trade union work but became engaged with the issue of 
displacement by the JSW refinery when other opposition groups focused 
on the mining proposals. 
The history of the Naxalite movement in India can be formally traced back 
to the rebellion in Naxalbari, West Bengal, in the late 1960s, from which 
its name derives. However, this coincided with the Srikakulam rebellion in 
coastal Andhra Pradesh in 1969, which points to the established presence 
of violent left-wing insurgency groups in the Scheduled Areas of the state 
(Reddy 1977). The Naxalites became a single force through the merger of 
the Andhra Pradesh-based Peoples’ War group and the Jharkhand-based 
Maoist Communist Centre in 2004. This meant that they had a presence 
across tribal central India, as well as in a few other parts of the country. It is 
estimated that Naxalites were present in 160 districts by 2005 (Banerjee 
2006), but this did not necessarily mean control of actual territory.
The Visakhapatnam Agency used to be a core area of operation for 
the Peoples’ War group, but its presence had since been much reduced 
(Balagopal 2006). A number of potential support organisations had 
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to distance themselves from the Naxalites after the organisation was 
outlawed. Nevertheless, the Naxalites continued to make their presence 
felt in Andhra Pradesh from their bases in Odisha and Chhattisgarh, 
and had attacked a number of local politicians in the proposed bauxite 
mining areas. These attacks usually took place at night, with few traces 
left behind, but were reported in the local news as a result of pamphlets 
left behind after the attacks (Anon. 2007f, 2009d, 2010b; Narasimha Rao 
2010; Rao 2010). 
A number of other actors and smaller NGOs were also involved in protest 
activities. Foremost amongst them were journalists, especially those writing 
for the local Telugu-language press, but also those writing for the urban 
English-language newspapers. The so-called electronic media and mobile 
24-hour TV news teams were also increasing their coverage. The influence 
of the media was sometimes hard to separate from formal politics, especially 
since the two most widely read Telugu-language newspapers, Eenadu and 
Andhra Jyoti, had a distinct TDP flavour, while the new one, Sakshi, with 
a related TV station, was established as a Congress Party counterweight, 
directly owned by chief minister Y. Rajasekhara Reddy and his family.
Claims Made by the Opposition
The issues presented in the previous two chapters, on tribal livelihoods 
(Chapter 4) and bureaucratic approvals (Chapter 5), became the basis for 
agitation against the bauxite project. On the other hand, claims about 
rent-seeking behaviour on the part of members of the bauxite alliance 
(discussed in Chapter 3) were largely absent. It seemed that any suggestion 
of giving a greater share of project benefits to local people would indicate 
approval of the project itself and point to the possibility of mitigating 
its negative effects. In other words, this would look like a sell-out when 
more important issues were at stake. The opponents whom I interviewed 
seemed to take corruption among top decision-makers for granted but 
believed that it was generally impossible to prove. As one opposition 
politician said about the chief minister and his suspected connections to 
the mining company Gimpex: ‘They mix like water and milk. I can give 
information which leads to suspicions but not direct evidence against 
Gimpex’ (interview, Hyderabad, 29 February 2007).
A CPM poster illustrates the type of claims being made by the opposition 
and also shows how the Agency and its people were viewed (Figure 6.1). 
The poster places a tribal man far up on the hill surrounded by nature, 
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holding a spear that makes him appear somewhat primitive. The hill is 
covered in greenery, but it is not clear how anyone could make a living from 
these steep slopes with their degraded forest. A TDP poster represented 
tribal people in a similar light (Figure 6.2). 
Figure 6.1 Anti-bauxite mining poster produced by the CPM.
Source: Photo by author, May 2008.
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Figure 6.2 Anti-bauxite mining poster produced by the TDP.
Source: Photo by author, May 2008.
Chief Minister Reddy is placed at the centre of the CPM poster to signify 
his centrality in what was being planned, but also to make it clear that the 
poster is talking to the government when declaring that ‘we will not sell 
our lands for bauxite’. The chief minister is equipped with devil’s horns, 
possibly because he was a Christian, but more likely just to represent the 
sinister nature of his plans. Foreign-looking company representatives 
from JSW and AnRak Aluminium are placed at the bottom of the poster.
The impacts of mining on water availability were among the top concerns 
of the project’s opponents. Claims on this subject were sufficiently 
widespread to be accepted as true by opposition members, despite not 
being recognised at all by the project’s promoters. The HRF considered 
that ‘[i]t is a well established fact that the hills containing bauxite deposits 
have a good capacity for retention of water, which will be lost forever if 
the hills are opened up for mining’ (HRF 2008b). While the loss of water 
would obviously have a negative effect on Adivasi farmers, the project’s 
opponents could also present this as the reason for a wider audience, 
including the residents of coastal towns, to be worried about mining. 
The threat was described as follows at a meeting in Visakhapatnam:
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The rich forests of the Eastern Ghats in north coastal Andhra Pradesh, 
are the birthplace of many … blessed water resources that include rivers, 
springs, streams and ponds. It is these water bodies that have ensured 
that the region from time immemorial has remained rich and fertile with 
verdant forests, lush agriculture and a history of prosperity. It is these 
water resources that provided livelihood to diverse traditional occupations 
and gave bountiful water supply for the millions of people for drinking, 
irrigation and other uses … Now, there is a serious threat to the people of 
the region and their very survival as this life giving source is not only being 
tampered with, but also brutally destroyed by the very policy makers and 
the government whose primary duty it is to protect them as custodians of 
the resource under the Constitution of India (CGNAP 2007).3
A map made by Samatha illustrates the risk to water across northern coastal 
Andhra Pradesh if mining were to go ahead (Figure 6.3). It suggests that 
the rivers as a whole would be at risk if their watersheds were mined for 
bauxite. Since the rivers provide water to all the irrigation reservoirs along 
the coast, none would remain in the dry season, which would be bad for 
coastal farmers and city residents alike.
Samatha’s watershed analysis was supported by Sakti, whose members 
also claimed that the loss of forest to bauxite mining would affect water 
availability in reservoirs: ‘The hill streams originating from these forest 
ranges feed Eleru, Tandava, Varaha, Raiwada and Tatipudi reservoirs. 
These streams will be very adversely affected’ (Sivaramakrishna n.d.).
The lack of authoritative information gave rise to a fair amount of rumour. 
One journalist I interviewed suggested that mining waste would fall 
down from the mountain and block the rivulets in the valleys, thereby 
depriving nearby coastal districts of water. The widespread agreement 
within the opposition on the dangers posed to water supplies can seem 
a little peculiar, given that there was only one bauxite mine operating 
in the region, which was Nalco’s Damanjodi mine in southern Odisha. 
Even the impacts of this mine had never been studied in any great detail, 
although visitors and newspaper reports did frequently mention reduced 
water availability for farmers (Patra and Murthy n.d.). Even government 
reports on other proposed bauxite mines in the region tended to agree 
that risks to water were particularly serious and could not be mitigated 
(India 2005a; WII 2006a). 
3  Signatories to this statement included representatives of Samatha, the TDP, the CPI and the 
CPM, but not Sakti or the HRF.
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Figure 6.3 Map of bauxite mining and rivers in coastal Andhra Pradesh.
Source: Prepared as part of Samatha’s campaign ‘Health of the Hills is the Wealth of the Plains’.
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Figure 6.4 Stream coming from Galikonda hill in Visakhapatnam District.
Source: Photo by author, April 2008.
In coastal Andhra Pradesh, the narrow strip of land between the Eastern 
Ghats hill range and the Bay of Bengal does not contain any major rivers. 
Instead, water flows down from the adjacent hills of the Agency area, 
which potentially makes the local rivers more vulnerable to drought 
because each has a relatively small catchment area. It is not clear how 
mining would change the availability and flow of river water across 
the region, given that the bauxite hills are only a small part of the total 
catchment (see Chapter 4).
The water loss narrative depended on changes to the hydrology of the 
hills to be mined, which would reduce their capacity to retain water in 
the wet season and slowly release it during the rest of the year. From this 
point of view, mining would not reduce the overall availability of water 
throughout the year, but would lessen the flow from mountain springs 
during the dry summer season. This narrative was not part of the original 
concerns about mining that were expressed in the 1980s and 1990s, but 
had become a concern of civil society by the 2000s.
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Forest risks were described as equally serious to water risks in a poster 
produced by Sakti that included the following statement:
Bauxite will be exploited by strip mining. A power shovel bites into the 
forests, soils, Laterite and Bauxite, piling up rows of soil and Laterite on 
one hand and Bauxite ore on the other hand. In this process the Eastern 
Ghats forest land will be laid bare (Sakti n.d.).
However, the same poster said that ‘[t]he bald hilltops indicate the Bauxite 
mineral reserves’, making it less clear which actual area of forest would 
be cut down for mining. In one interview, a high-level member of the 
Andhra Pradesh branch of the CPM agreed that forests would be lost to 
mining, impacting the ‘32 rivulets [that] travel through the hills’, but was 
more concerned that mining would open up one of the few remaining 
parts of the Scheduled Areas that were still predominantly tribal, since an 
influx of outsiders would create social problems and would drive tribal 
people off their land (interview, Hyderabad, 9 March 2007).
During the period of my fieldwork, activists in Araku were demanding to 
be heard through their panchayats, unaware that their state government 
had actually failed to implement the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled 
Areas Act 1996 (PESA). One Hyderabad-based activist said that the Act 
‘has not been notified in AP so [the] Panchayat is not valid. The AP 
government says 20 households is too small so a proper decision cannot 
be made. It is sad we only learned this as of late’ (interview, Hyderabad, 
22 February 2008).
Some made a connection between livelihood risks and democratic deficits 
because common property resources such as water sources and forest land 
would be affected. This led to a legalistic argument in favour of local 
decision-making by the HRF:
Under Sec 4 (d) [of the PESA], the power to safeguard and preserve the 
community resources, which is another name for common property 
resources, shall be with the Gram Sabha. Though the land being leased 
to APMDC [Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation] for 
mining is forest land, undertaking mining in that land will affect the 
water resources of the neighbouring hamlets since the water retained by 
the bauxite hills is the source of the rivulets and subsoil water that the 
people depend upon … The land proposed to be mined is also a source 
of minor forest produce such as thatching and dry twigs. It is a source 
Landlock
148
of grazing for animals. The ownership of such minor forest produce is 
conferred on the Gram Sabha by Sec 4 (m) (ii) … and that right cannot 
be unilaterally taken away (HRF 2008b).
With all this attention given to the social and environmental impacts of 
mining in the Agency, it is interesting to see what links were being made 
to the proposed refinery. The CPM was of the opinion that ‘the tribals are 
made to suffer in the hills for the mine and they are also made to suffer 
on the plains for the factory’ (interview, Hyderabad, 9 March 2007). The 
CPIND’s Bauxite Vyathirekha Porata Committee (Struggle Committee 
Against Bauxite) made the connection as follows:
It is not the Boddavara [S. Kota] area that will be destroyed due to bauxite 
mining and Jindal refinery. In the 15-km radius from refineries, the land, 
water and the climate will be polluted due to poisonous drainage from 
the refinery. In the future, the rivers like Goshtani and Sarada which are 
providing irrigation water to Tatipudi and Raivada reservoirs, may be 
dried-up so the farmers depending on these reservoirs lose their land and 
livelihood. If the rivers [stop their] flow through Araku hills and valley, 
a number of reservoirs in Vizianagaram will be dried-up. Visakhapatnam 
city and Vizianagaram town will face drinking water problem. Therefore 
we have to resist bauxite mining which is questioning the sustainability of 
the human life (BTVPC 2008).
Sakti was likewise arguing that the application for an environmental 
permit for the refinery was premature, given the lack of clearances for the 
mine on which it would depend: 
As per the agreement, [the] factory is dependent on the ore to be 
supplied by APMDC. Since the APMDC did not so far get the necessary 
permissions, the attempts to push proposals on factory are premature. 
So I request you to stop further steps on the proposals on the factory 
forthwith (Sivaramakrishna 2006).
The HRF made a similar connection between the two project components:
There is no independent and comprehensive EIA [environmental impact 
assessment] of the project that examines the bauxite mine, refinery, 
smelter, power plant and other components in a holistic manner. An 
alumina refinery cannot be run without bauxite. However, the project 
promoters and the state government are deliberately bifurcating the 
bauxite mining and refining portion. Instead of discussing the combined 
impact of all these projects, the promoters and the government have split 
the project into small parts where each is to be evaluated on its own, 
making it impossible to understand the overall impact. What is even more 
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of a concern is that if the refinery is approved it will be used to blackmail 
a clearance for the bauxite mines in the Visakhapatnam Scheduled area 
(HRF 2008a).
Despite these connections being made, the main demand in relation to 
the refinery was for those losing land to be fairly compensated, while 
mining had to be stopped altogether.
From this discussion, it seems reasonable to say that opposition to the 
bauxite project was mainly based on social justice concerns, especially 
when environmental impacts were regarded as impacts on tribal people 
that could not be mitigated. The potential conservation values of the 
Agency were not such a major issue, even if they could be mentioned 
as another reason to protect the area. To improve the chances of wider 
public mobilisation, attempts were instead made to extend the size of the 
potentially affected area. The prospect of mine-related water scarcity in 
the coastal zone served this purpose, while refinery issues could not raise 
the same level of public concern. The concern with social justice did not 
extend to any discussion of the potential benefits of the project for tribal 
people because the opposition assumed that there were bound to be more 
losers than winners.
Competitive Mobilisation
The different messages of the opposition were promulgated through 
a form of competitive mobilisation. Ravi Rebbapragada, head of Samatha, 
explained this as follows:
There only used to be us and the Birla case [that gave rise to the Samatha 
judgment]. We were there on the ground and could see what was 
happening. If the government passed an order we could see what was 
happening and make it become implemented. Nobody used to understand 
why we worked on these mining issues. Since [19]97 everyone talks about 
these things (interview, Visakhapatnam, 28 March 2008).
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During the course of my fieldwork, padyatras to protest against mining 
were being organised by various political parties almost every week.4 
Frequent meetings were also held, sometimes with speakers invited from 
a cross-section of parties and NGOs. The CPM organised a meeting in 
the Araku Valley in early January 2008 that was reportedly attended by 
more than 10,000 people. This was a follow-up to a meeting held in the 
same area in November 2007 that was advertised with a banner declaring 
‘Let us fight against the government on bauxite’, with central CPM party 
member and national MP Brinda Karat as the special guest.
The number of my informants who claimed to have taken ‘the people’, 
by which they presumably meant some of those who would be directly 
affected, on informational trips to the nearby Nalco bauxite complex in 
Odisha, made it seem as if most of their time was being devoted to such 
study tours. A number of people belonging to different organisations 
likewise claimed to have been responsible for ensuring that a share of 
the income derived from tourists visiting the Borra caves was distributed 
between the local villages. While taking credit for this benefit, those 
interviewed would uniformly fail to mention any of the others who had 
been part of the same campaign.
The bauxite alliance initially attempted to counter the intensity of 
oppositional activity. When the NGO Nature, based in Araku, produced 
a critical (Telugu-language) booklet entitled ‘Bauxite for Whom?’ in 
2006, APMDC responded with a pamphlet titled ‘Bauxite for You’. 
Samatha’s documentary on mining was likewise countered by an APMDC 
documentary. JSW Foundation, the corporate social responsibility arm 
of JSW, made a sudden appearance in Araku, conducting health camps 
and donating ambulances (Anon. 2007h). Given the financial resources 
available to the bauxite alliance, it might have been expected to outspend 
the opposition, but a source with insights into APMDC’s operations 
said that its outreach activities were quite insignificant because ‘we don’t 
have the budget for this’ (interview, 9 April 2007). The reasons for this 
4  The TDP held an ‘Anti Bauxite Excavation Pada Yatra’ in Araku and Ananthagiri mandals that 
started on 22 April 2008. The CPM held at least three padyatras during this period. One lasted from 
19 February to 2 March, also in Araku and Ananthagiri, where many activists reportedly fell ill due 
to the poor water and food they were consuming. Two previous padyatras had been conducted in 
the Araku and Sapparla mining areas respectively. The CPI conducted one in AnRak Aluminium’s 
proposed mining area between December 2007 and January 2008.
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limitation are unclear, but no public promotion of the project came to my 
attention in 2009–10. The publicity contest was overwhelmingly won by 
the opposition groups. 
The strength of the opposition was especially evident in the Agency, 
where surveyors or any other people associated with the project would 
be threatened on sight. One CPM representative explained this activity 
as follows:
Surveys by Jindal and Al Khaimah are going on secretly. Nobody has 
seen them but they are ongoing. We saw some people in helicopter and 
opposed them. Other people came as tourists and under cover did survey 
two months ago. They were from SSSC [apparently a social science research 
institute] in Calcutta. They were warned and were never seen again. For the 
last year they have seen others come and go to secretly do surveys (interview, 
Araku, 8 May 2008).
Even air surveys were hard to undertake since helicopters would be 
chased away if they attempted to make a landing (Narasimha Rao 2008). 
There were similar limits on what the government or JSW could do at 
the S.  Kota refinery site, despite their acquisition of most of the land 
and receipt of the environmental permit. Survey instruments and other 
tools had repeatedly been removed by local villagers who refused to hand 
them back. Both of the proposed sites were thus close to being no-go 
areas for the bauxite alliance, even while work proceeded on securing final 
approvals for the mine or making adjustments to the land acquisition 
for the refinery. It was as if the project’s opponents, when not allowed to 
make their voices heard, believed that they could prevent the project from 
moving ahead simply by blocking its access to information about realities 
on the ground.
Despite the level of opposition to the project, it was evidently making 
some progress, albeit at a very slow pace. That the local opposition was 
even able to delay the project is noteworthy, given the lack of coordination 
of strategies or sharing of information by those involved. The NGOs had 
core ideological differences that obstructed any form of cooperation. 
Samatha could be characterised as apolitical since it did not subscribe to 
any particular ideology, at least when compared to the right-wing Sakti 
and the left-wing HRF. Sakti was difficult for others to engage because 
of its association with right-wing Hindu groups, even while it shared the 
HRF’s goal of tribal empowerment and learning. The HRF and Sakti 
both criticised Samatha for receiving larger amounts of funding, and 
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this perspective was shared by other project opponents. One activist who 
had no relationship to the HRF or Sakti referred to Samatha as one of 
the ‘NGOs [that] have no resource constraints and so they corrupt local 
people’ (interview, Hyderabad, 18 October 2006). Meanwhile, Samatha’s 
members seemed to view the other organisations as intellectuals with too 
many ideals to be able to get real work done.
The fact that Sakti and Samatha had been pursuing separate court 
cases before the Samatha judgment was another issue hindering their 
collaboration. One activist complained that ‘today PIL [Public Interest 
Litigation] has too many petitioners and this confuses the issue’ 
(interview, Hyderabad, 12 October 2006). Another even thought that 
‘the government won the [Samatha] case since government corporations 
were allowed to do mining’ (interview, Hyderabad, 12 October 2006). 
The receipt of recognition for success was one of the sources of division 
between the NGOs:
The Samatha judgment gives credit to the organisation but we want tribal 
people to be in control. We want tribal youth to be our cadre for their 
own village and work for their own benefit (interview, activist, Araku, 
9 May 2008).
Despite their differences, the NGOs had come to similar conclusions 
about the livelihood risks and social injustice that the project posed for 
Adivasis. None of my NGO informants doubted that the other NGOs 
were sincerely attempting to stop the project from going ahead. The 
political parties, on the other hand, were known to make periodic radical 
about-turns in their policy positions, typically when they moved from 
being in opposition to being in government. Nevertheless, the left-wing 
parties did a better job of working together than the NGOs, possibly 
because they already had to do this in the state assembly to combine the 
power of their few MLAs. Even so, it was also important for each party 
to be separately recognised for organising certain activities on the ground, 
depending on where each party had a supporter base.
The educational qualifications of the NGO activists and the local 
mobilisational reach of the political parties were sometimes a solid 
basis for cooperation between them. The NGOs had the ability to 
access information and make use of it in courts and in the media. They 
communicated in both English and Telugu, and often shared their 
communications with the political parties that were also engaged in 
protests against bauxite mining, to facilitate the spread of information 
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to local villages. The parties had a greater capacity to organise meetings 
and demonstrations, with written material confined to brief pamphlets 
or posters that were sometimes reproduced in the newspapers 
(see Figure 6.5).5 But while the parties and the NGOs were both able 
to recruit local Adivasis, the latter were commonly subordinated to 
non-tribal members in the decision-making process, which replicated the 
hierarchical nature of the wider society.
Figure 6.5 Public meeting on the S. Kota refinery proposal held 
in Vizianagaram.
Source: Photo by author, January 2008.
The larger membership of the parties meant that they could do more 
to reach out to villages in the Agency. One activist said that the CPM:
did an excellent job in the tribal areas when conducting padyatras. They 
went to the different areas and spent a week in each proposed group [of 
bauxite hills]. After the padyatra they had provided so much information 
in the hills that even your average person who was not even particularly 
5  The banner in Figure 6.5 reads: ‘Do not build Jindal Factory that contaminates irrigation water 
and drinking water. Signed Telugu Desam, CPM, CPI and Samatha.’
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politicised was writing slogans on the walls against the project. They could 
have done something similar [at the refinery] in the plains (interview, 
Visakhapatnam, 13 March 2007).
Instead, the CPIND was inspired to leave its traditional base in 
Visakhapatnam city and take up the cause of those affected by the 
land acquisition for the refinery. This was a small group, seriously short 
of resources, and although it was supported by the combination of 
larger opposition parties, it did not make an appearance until after the 
environmental public hearing had already been held, and had insufficient 
knowledge about what was being planned to seriously hamper the land 
acquisition process. The environmental approval coincided with a dharna 
protest at the local revenue office that was aimed at getting some kind of 
clarity on the land acquisition and compensation plans. The subsequent 
arrest of 42 protestors in S. Kota town was widely covered in the press but 
had no real effect on the plans. By the time the protesters were released on 
bail in January 2008, dozens of hectares of cashew plantations had already 
been acquired and cut down, and there was no prospect of securing 
compensation beyond the uniform rate calculated by the government. 
Arguments on this score ran counter to the widespread political support for 
programs of modernisation and industrialisation outside of the Scheduled 
Areas, which was why the opposition focused on the prospective mines, 
and not on a refinery that was seen as just another industrial project on 
the plains (Oskarsson and Nielsen 2014).
Limited Resources Force a Turn to 
Mainstream Politics
When frequent public meetings and newspaper articles failed to have 
an impact on the project, the NGOs resorted to the courts, while the 
left-wing parties were more inclined to associate themselves with the 
mainstream parties—especially the TDP, but sometimes local Congress 
Party members—in order to get a result. Formal politics thus captured 
most of the space for protest. Those opponents who made the turn to 
mainstream politics could increase the visibility of their demands by 
holding bigger demonstrations, but the demands themselves were diluted 
by the need to deal with strong caste and class interests, so were more likely 
to be demands for better compensation than for outright cancellation 
of the project.
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The TDP was by far the largest and most resourceful opposition party 
in Andhra Pradesh, but was not widely trusted because of the years it 
spent trying to implement bauxite mining projects when it was in power. 
Its enormous party office in the posh Jubilee Hills area of Hyderabad had 
a whole floor equipped with library and computer facilities that could 
not be matched by all the other opposition groups combined. During 
my fieldwork at the proposed project sites, it became clear that some of 
the most prominent activists had at some point been associated with the 
TDP. One sarpanch who had both TDP and NGO connections claimed, 
in typical fashion, that ‘the party is nothing and people are important’, yet 
it was unlikely that all activists would quit the party if it again proposed 
to open new mines (interview, Araku, April 2008). TDP members were 
clearly better off and better educated than those from other opposition 
parties, and some tried to explain the party’s new approach to the issue. 
A local party worker from Vizianagaram District claimed in an interview 
that this was part of its efforts to reconnect with the masses once it was out 
of power. And one of the party’s national MPs was tracking mining deals 
in what he claimed to be a fight against corruption rather than a change 
in party policy.
TDP mobilisation was sometimes large-scale and sometimes non-existent. 
There were somewhat surreal highlights, as when the former chief minister, 
Chandrababu Naidu, the so-called CEO of Andhra Pradesh (Suri 2005), 
rode in a bullock cart during one campaign against the AnRak Aluminium 
refinery. However, the capacity of formal politics to defend affected 
populations has repeatedly proven hollow, with the norm being populism 
in opposition and money politics in government. Some of the top TDP 
politicians attempting to lead the opposition were thought to have funded 
their own political careers from mining ventures. In some cases, like the 
AnRak Aluminium refinery, TDP politicians would only speak on behalf 
of the big landowners, and would renounce their opposition once these 
claims had been settled. In an increasingly competitive political system, 
the tension between bold promises and radical policy backflips is getting 
harder to manage because of the media coverage that makes it more visible.
There were very few opportunities for public debate between the 
project’s proponents and opponents. The opponents had to seize such 
opportunities on the rare occasions when they were presented, such as 
when CPM activists stormed the stage in Araku Valley, the main city in 
Araku Mandal, when high-level state Congress politicians were holding 
a public meeting, or at a conference on bauxite mining organised by 
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Andhra University in Visakhapatnam city, when NGO members engaged 
in a heated argument with the head of APMDC (Anon. 2009e). These 
arguments produced as much (or as little) mutual understanding as the 
frequent stormy scenes in the state assembly, which was the only regular 
state forum for authoritative debate on the issue. On several occasions 
over the years, the opposition parties created turmoil in the assembly 
over the mining issue, with loud and extended arguments, sometimes 
complemented by walkouts or dharnas (inside or outside of the assembly 
hall), or by other forms of obstruction (Anon. 2008g, 2009f, 2010c). 
But despite their hard work, they seemed to lack the key informational 
resources that would enable them to support their accusations against the 
government. Even the well-documented evidence of corruption in 
the development of AnRak Aluminium’s Jerrila mine only resulted in the 
promise of a central government investigation.
One typical response by Chief Minister Reddy was to declare that 
‘TDP leaders are indulging in mudslinging as they are jealous, shaken 
and perturbed over the rapid strides made by the Congress regime on 
all fronts, particularly [the] industrial sector’ (Anon. 2008c). A more 
nuanced discussion of the distribution of costs and benefits was seemingly 
impossible so long as the chief minister could claim that industrialisation 
was proceeding along the lines proposed by the previous TDP Government.
NGOs and Legal Activism
The Samatha judgment shows that legal activism can be a successful 
strategy for mining activists in Andhra Pradesh. This strategy was 
supported by the increased role of the judiciary as an instrument of 
governance since the 1980s, and further encouraged by the introduction 
of public interest litigation by the Supreme Court in the 1990s. Active 
intervention by courts has been described as a ‘massive expansion of civil, 
political, economic, and social rights as the court increasingly supported 
citizens’ rights against arbitrary encroachments by the state’ (Hardgrave 
and Kochanek 2000: 108). However, access to justice has been severely 
limited by cumbersome procedures and a massive backlog of cases waiting 
to be heard (Galanter and Krishnan 2003). 
One serious problem with using the courts as instruments of social 
justice is the broad scope for interpretation afforded by the Indian legal 
framework:
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Indian laws are a labyrinth of contradictory ideologies existing 
simultaneously … Given sufficient ingenuity, the country’s jurists 
can protect their laws in favour of justice; there is sufficient elasticity 
to interpret them in ways leading to fairness. But it also demonstrates 
that the very fluidity can spell disaster for these laws; it can allow vested 
interests to alter them in favour of injustice (Singh 1986: vii–ix).
Those seeking to defend Adivasi land rights could thus find many legal 
provisions in support of their case, but so could those intent on promoting 
industrialisation. One retired officer of the Indian Administrative Service 
commented on the politicised nature of the courts:
There is no solution in India to evaluate different claims in a clear and 
critical manner. All statements become political and then it is difficult to 
evaluate the truth of claims. The courts are the only place where disputes 
are settled but they are the least equipped and do not have the time to 
study issues properly (interview, Hyderabad, 29 March 2007).
But some activists were more optimistic:
The Supreme Court is leading the economic reforms in our country since 
the politicians need the vote to get re-elected. Judges don’t need votes. 
Since 1990 when the structural adjustment started the parliament has not 
amended a single law to suit globalisation. All the necessary declarations 
of law have come from the Supreme Court definitions (interview, 
Hyderabad, 7 March 2007).
Allegations about the bribery of judges were common, but comments were 
also made about the way that some judges had bought into the corporate 
conception of development and were free to follow this conviction in 
ways the politicians were not. At a public meeting in Delhi, the well 
known lawyer Prashant Bhushan stated:
the time may soon come when we completely will have to write off the 
judiciary as a means of getting justice. Still we may not have reached this 
stage but soon we may (20 December 2007).
All the NGOs contesting the bauxite project had the capacity to pursue 
court cases within the state, but only Samatha had the connections in 
Delhi that were required to challenge central government decisions. Once 
a case is accepted by the courts, it is virtually guaranteed to last for several 
years. Aside from attempting to reach a positive verdict, activists have 
several avenues of appeal that, irrespective of initial judgments, guarantee 
further delays. A case was initially lodged against the Polavaram dam in 
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2005 and was still being heard by courts of appeal until 2010. Similarly, 
the Niyamgiri bauxite mine in Odisha was held up in a Supreme Court 
case from 2004 to 2008.
Political parties have rarely filed court cases, possibly because the slow 
process of resolution entails the risk of taking on an issue that may not 
give them any clear electoral advantages. It is also possible that years spent 
in court might be wasted in case of a policy backflip in the transition 
from opposition to government. The CPM was exceptional in launching 
a  court case against the environmental approval of the Jerrila bauxite 
mine, although this case was later taken over by the more experienced 
NGO Samatha.
Court Cases Related to Bauxite Projects
Cases against the JSW bauxite project, including appeals against 
environmental approvals, were launched at almost every possible 
opportunity. At times, there were even cases independently filed in the 
same court on the same subject by different actors (see Table 6.2). This is 
testament to very active vigilance and an almost completely disorganised 
approach to litigation.
Table 6.2 Court cases against bauxite projects in Andhra Pradesh.
Court Petitioner Respondent(s) Issue(s)
AP High 
Court




Four tribal MLAs Nine including MoEF, 




Environmental hearings held 
without first consulting the 
AP Tribes Advisory Council. 




Samatha and Forum 
for a Better Visakha













Environmental permit for 
AnRak Aluminium/APMDC 
mine.
Source: Andhra Pradesh (2009c).
The route taken by ordinary cases is through the lower courts to the 
High Court at the state level, and then on to the Supreme Court at 
the national level. For environmental matters, it was possible to appeal 
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decisions by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) to the 
National Environmental Appellate Authority (NEAA), also based in 
Delhi. This somewhat dysfunctional one-man entity operated for several 
years as plans for a new National Green Tribunal were being worked 
out.6 Creative lawyers realised that decisions of the NEAA could also 
be appealed to the Delhi High Court, which has jurisdiction over the 
functioning of central government offices, and that is what happened in 
the case of AnRak Aluminium bauxite mine. 
A case was launched by the NGO Sakti in the Andhra Pradesh High Court 
shortly after plans for the JSW project became public knowledge in 2006. 
The key issue in the case was whether the agreement between the state 
government and a private company violated the provisions of the tribal 
land rights legislation that only allow mining in Scheduled Areas to be 
undertaken by state-owned entities. After only four months deliberation, 
the case was dismissed on the grounds that the agreement could not come 
into effect until the central government had granted an environmental 
permit (Andhra Pradesh 2006d: 2). It appeared that the judges wanted 
to avoid taking a stand on this sensitive issue until the approval process 
had been completed, but by that time it would most likely be too late to 
obtain a different judgment, since the investment already made in the 
project would be used by the proponents as the basis for an argument that 
it should be allowed to proceed. 
A subsequent case was launched against the JSW and AnRak Aluminium 
projects by the state tribal MLAs in August 2008 on the grounds of a 
lack of consultation with the Tribes Advisory Council. The government 
responded by saying that it had held such consultations in 2000. The 
council had already approved the Polavaram dam, which threatened to 
become a much more significant source of displacement than bauxite 
mining. I was unable to discover further information on how this case 
proceeded. The case over water allocation for the JSW alumina refinery, 
also lodged in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, moved very slowly 
because the NGO activists who launched it felt that the judges were 
unsympathetic, so they relied on various procedural technicalities to 
delay the proceedings. Sooner or later the judges would either retire or 
be transferred elsewhere, and this might create an opportunity to secure a 
more positive outcome. 
6  This tribunal was eventually established in 2010.
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In March 2009, the CPM filed a case with the NEAA, appealing against 
the decision to grant an environmental permit of AnRak Aluminium’s 
bauxite mine (Patnaik 2009). This was a routine procedure, but such 
appeals had almost as routinely been rejected.7 The grounds of this appeal 
were that the public hearing did not ensure widest possible participation, 
the EIA report is faulty, and the environmental clearance will negatively 
affect the local environment. Six hearings were held before the appeal 
was rejected in August 2009 (India 2009b), and that is what prompted a 
further appeal to the Delhi High Court. 
The CPM’s argument about public participation included a point about 
the views expressed by the local gram panchayats, and thus invoked the 
provisions of the PESA: 
The Gram Panchayat[s] of G.K. Veedhi and Galikonda Mandal Parishad 
of Chintapalli have passed resolutions opposing the proposed activities of 
mining and transmitted those resolutions to the collector Visakhapatnam 
and to the member secretary AP Pollution Control Board (India 2009c: 4).
Although the environmental regulations do not require consultation with 
the panchayats, the APMDC responded by saying that it had indeed taken 
their views into account in the 2000, during the period of the earlier TDP 
government:
The resolution dt. 19.02.2000, duly signed by 130 people, passed by 
the Jerrila Gram Panchayati conclusively expresses the intent of the local 
body in favour of the proposed bauxite mining. The said Gram Panchayat 
after considering the proposal made by this respondent [APMDC] passed 
another resolution dt. 02.10.2008 affirming its earlier resolution dt. 
19.02.2000 (India 2009d: 5).
The record of the 2000 meeting contained a long list of names, 
accompanied by fingerprints, that was barely legible because of the poor 
quality of the photocopy. This was supplemented by a 2008 statement that 
purported to verify the earlier resolution. It is not clear how the NEAA in 
Delhi evaluated the relative validity of the local resolutions presented to 
it by the CPM and the APMDC, but evidently chose to believe the latter 
(India 2009b). At least this established a precedent for any subsequent 
7  The NEAA had only supported the appellants in one of the cases brought before it, and that was 
an appeal against the permit for the Polavaram dam that was brought by the same activists who were 
now appealing against the bauxite mine, which suggests that they had learnt something from their 
experience.
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case against the JSW project, since it seemed to establish some need 
for the gram sabha’s views to be taken into account, whether or not 
environmental approval procedures or the state’s panchayat regulations 
actually require this to be done.
Since the JSW project was stalled even before it could reach the critical 
environmental clearance stage, the process of appealing such an approval 
had yet to be explored by activists. A case could also be launched under the 
Forest Rights Act, since forest land was apparently being diverted to mining 
before the settlement process according to this Act has been completed, 
or even under the older Andhra Pradesh State Forest Act of 1967, since 
another court judgment had ordered a fresh process of determining land 
rights in the Agency’s forest land under the terms of this legislation.
Given the number of current and potential future cases, the most 
appropriate description of the litigation strategy pursued against the JSW 
bauxite project would be that it consisted of a flood of cases pursued in as 
many courts as possible, in the hope that some at least would get support 
from the judges, or would otherwise lead to time-consuming deliberations 
that would slow down the rate project of implementation.
The Search for Procedural Errors
While legal loopholes have given policymakers some assurance that they can 
work their way around inconvenient legislation, the difficulty of following 
complex administrative procedures has also created additional opportunities 
for opponents to stall government projects. The entire field of land 
acquisition is filled with opportunities to question the consistency of land 
records, to ask whether proper surveys have been undertaken, or whether 
correct information in the prescribed bureaucratic format was presented to 
the public at the right time and in the right location. Further opportunities 
arise when forest land is involved, even if the forest only exists in outdated 
official records. Mistakes made in bureaucratic procedures have long been 
a very rewarding arena for litigation by activists, but success has often been 
tied to the timeliness with which information can be obtained. No court is 
likely to undo a process of land acquisition once it has been completed, even 
if errors can be proven after the event. The Right to Information process, 
which has its own lengthy appeal procedure, is therefore less helpful for this 
kind of litigation than information leaked by insiders.
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In the case of the JSW project, a search for procedural errors could have 
seemed preferable to demands for better compensation for affected people, 
since the latter would seem more like a way of agreeing to the project. 
On the other hand, attempts to stall the project on technicalities, instead 
of seeking better compensation for displaced people or a chance for them 
to be heard through the panchayats, could encourage the proponents 
to argue that the activists were simply engaged in ‘anti-developmental’ 
activities. It was this kind of argument that was already reducing their 
opportunity to be heard in new policy forums where business associations 
are now normally included.
Uncoordinated Legal Activism
Legal activism was interpreted by a retired officer of the Indian 
Administrative Service as a large-scale failure to communicate:
When I was working we did not have all these acts so basically litigation 
was not an option. People would come to us and we would listen to their 
complaints. Then we would look at the other side and see what truths 
there were in that initial statement. We wanted the projects to move on so 
would seek a solution that could take as many claims into consideration 
as possible. Today when you go to court you might win the case but the 
losing side who is forced to do a certain thing will feel let down and will 
only grudgingly implement the order and that too do as little as possible. 
There are serious problems with how this is done in India today however 
and it is only getting worse. People just do not listen to one another. 
The media tells one-sided stories and the courts cannot settle disputes it 
has no experience or time in dealing with (interview, Hyderabad, 6 April 
2007). 
The proliferation of courts in which to lodge appeals, and the ever-
expanding number of laws on which they could be based, did seem 
to reduce the need for agreement among activists, or even a collective 
approach to the search for justice. However, it is not clear whether 
the older, and still popular, practice of seeking out top bureaucrats or 
politicians for favours rather than seeking to gain these things as a right 
by means of litigation would be preferable, given all the rent-seeking 
behaviour induced by the older practice over the years.
It has been shown that legal activism on social issues requires coordination 
and sharing of information in order to be effective (Epp  1998). The 
bauxite cases documented here suggest limitations on the resources or 
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the willpower required to make legal activism a viable strategy to achieve 
long-term change, despite the hard and sincere efforts of many public 
interest lawyers and activists. Instead of working on coordinated strategies 
to deal with core issues, activists could be dismissed as opponents of 
‘development’ because of the way that they had been using the courts 
to delay projects, by taking advantage of the poor flow of information 
between government departments. The ability of a handful of activists 
and lawyers working on mining and tribal rights was certainly impressive, 
but if it had been possible to focus on only a few cases, and if activists 
had campaigned jointly to put pressure on government agencies, as well 
as judges, there would have been a greater chance of achieving positive 
outcomes. It would also have helped if more information had been shared 
with directly affected groups at a local level. 
Legal activism still offers the best opportunity to get the government to 
respond to allegations, since each party to a legal case is forced to submit 
verified documents in support of their respective positions. Court records 
with attached documents are far superior to newspaper articles or attempts 
to obtain government documents through the Right to Information 
process. In court, it is not possible for the government to  deny that 
certain kinds of information exist, since the court can demand that it be 
submitted or, if it really does not exist, that it be created. Legal activists 
and litigants who can access information that allows for an initial court 
challenge can thus use the courts to produce additional information that 
may well allow for further challenges.
Missed Opportunities
Delays to implementation of the JSW bauxite project were only partially 
due to the activities of the project’s political opponents. There were also 
planning failures, larger changes in political conditions and the sheer 
complexity of implementation issues. The refinery was delayed for 
more than a year by the selection of a new site, most likely based on the 
high price of land in the original location. The concerns over wildlife 
conservation delayed the environmental approval process for the mining 
operation. Once that got going again, a new central government minister 
was demanding greater compliance with environmental laws and forestry 
legislation before approval could be granted. 
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Two major opportunities did exist for the opposition to permanently halt 
the progress of the project, but a lack of strategic coordination seemingly 
prevented both from being taken. The first was to block land acquisition 
for the refinery since it was clearly linked to the viability of the mine 
and therefore should not have been treated as if it was a separate project. 
Had  this acquisition not happened, the company would most likely 
not have been willing to spend more time and money to get the mine 
approved. Clear statements by NGOs to make the connection, combined 
with on-site demonstration by political party and other activists under the 
watchful eyes of journalists, might well have been sufficient to prevent 
the refinery from moving ahead. So far as is known, this strategy was never 
considered.
The second opportunity lay in the provisions of the Forest Rights Act 
that enabled large community reserves to be established in the proposed 
mining areas. Not only do community forest reserves give land rights to 
people who have been denied them for centuries; they also give them 
a right to representation, since the MoEF has made gram sabha decisions 
mandatory before any land claimed under this legislation is used for other 
purposes such as mining. It was more of a challenge to take this second 
opportunity because of the hurried introduction of the Act in 2007 
and 2008, and hence the lack of information about what was required 
in order to make different claims. Furthermore, the MoEF circular that 
made gram sabha deliberations mandatory was only published in 2009. 
The implementation of forest rights land titles is still under contestation, 
which means it is technically not too late to demand community reserves 
in the areas proposed for mining, as is apparent by the Niyamgiri bauxite 
mine being denied its approvals in 2014. 
Civil society attempts to mediate the implementation of the bauxite 
project focused on delaying or completely stopping it rather than 
mitigating or compensating for some of its effects. Civil society pressure 
certainly contributed to the government’s production of additional reports 
on various matters of concern and seems to have also influenced stricter 
adherence to bureaucratic procedures, but the project’s opponents made 
few if any claims about alternative actions or initiatives that would enable 
tribal people to escape their current situation of desperate poverty. At least 
the bauxite alliance had a plan of action, however flawed, that could instil 
some hope for a better future. The oppositional groups, by contrast, were 
content to simply oppose the plans.
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Even when demands for local democratic representation were being 
raised, the main goal appeared to be to stop the project from being 
implemented rather than to promote an alternative form of development 
in which natural resources are utilised to improve the living conditions of 
tribal people. The existence of so many public forums where challenges 
could be made appeared to contribute to a lack of focus in the efforts of 
the opposition. This was particularly evident in the pursuit of alternative 
forms of litigation made possible by continual legislative amendments 
and the creation of special purpose courts. When a group like the bauxite 
alliance does not wish to engage in serious public debate, making noise 
might be the only strategy that remains. And yet there is:
an irony to the noise of public controversy. Though it may be loud 
enough to set public agendas in the press and legislative bodies, it always 
carries the capacity to turn away those who hear no music in democratic 
disagreement and news-based social conflict (Simonson 2001: 407).
There is, then, a risk that conflictual opposition further reduces the 
likelihood of arguments for social justice being heard in the elite 
government–business forums where most decisions on development in 




The previous chapters identified a number of information problems that 
have had an impact on the capacity of different actors to understand and 
take appropriate action related to the Jindal South West (JSW) bauxite 
project. The problems have ranged from the project’s original conception, 
when an agreement was signed with no prior public debate and doubtful 
public benefit (Chapter 3), to the lack of information provided to affected 
people about what was being planned and how they would be affected 
(Chapter 4), to the government procedures that worked to exclude people 
from being seen as affected and from taking part in deliberations over 
the project (Chapter 5), and to the populist rhetoric and mass litigation 
produced by the project’s opponents, which largely drowned out a 
discussion of genuine grievances (Chapter 6). This discussion has shown 
that people were simply talking past one another, leading them to occupy 
entrenched positions in oppositional discourses.
This chapter continues this discussion by detailing the information 
access and availability issues that I encountered during my fieldwork. 
The strategies used to uncover information further illustrate the depth 
and nature of the problems that prevented the creation of any common 
ground between the opposing discourses. Information is here seen not 
only as a vital resource to which access is determined by sheer power, 
but also as being uncertain, complex, full of contradictions and coded in 
languages that determine who can and who cannot access and make use 
of it. By situating the researcher as an active participant in the story, the 
importance of power dynamics and the partial nature of the informational 
resources available to any individual actor are also illuminated.
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Accessing Information from the Government
It was not possible for me to contact the politicians and industrialists who 
signed the original agreement to obtain their comments on the project. 
Bureaucrats were easier to approach, as they are required to be in their 
offices, at least for some part of the working week, but bureaucrats do 
not like to provide information since that poses a risk to their work and 
their careers. One strategy to navigate this problem was to depoliticise 
the request by asking for official statistics and publications of a general 
nature rather than information more directly related to the project. 
In that process, I discovered an apparent ground rule that states even 
ostensibly simple statistical information was always available somewhere 
other than in the office where I happened to be searching for it. The 
Land Information Office in Hyderabad advised me to approach the 
joint collector of the project district, followed by the local head of the 
Revenue Department (the tehsildar), in order to obtain the relevant land 
records. At the tehsildar’s office in the Visakhapatnam Agency, I was 
told that population statistics were available for all the mandals in the 
Visakhapatnam city office, but this advice was never tested, since another 
option was suggested by the head of one local revenue office: approach 
a local non-governmental organisation (NGO) and they will be able 
to provide you with the information you are looking for.
I spent quite a lot of time travelling between government entities 
in Hyderabad, talking to the planners in the Mines and Geology 
Department, the miners in the Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development 
Corporation (APMDC) and the MoU signatories in the Industry and 
Commerce Department, all seemingly part of the scheme, and ended up 
with only a few brief notes and a suggestion that I look for a copy of the 
documentary that APMDC had made to promote the bauxite project. 
I could find no library that even collected the gazettes where government 
orders are published. The availability of information seemed to depend 
on the status of the person seeking it, or of the organisation to which that 
person belonged, as well as the willingness of bureaucrats to part with it, 
and thus resembled a type of patron–client relationship.
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There are indications of very limited information flows even between 
different branches of the same government.1 It was not necessarily 
a simple matter for the state government’s Industry Department to access 
information about land from the Revenue Department. On a number of 
occasions, JSW had to step in to ensure that information kept flowing 
from one department to the next, as shown by some of the fax messages 
that JSW sent to the environmental consultant producing the project’s 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) report for APMDC (BS Envi 
Tech 2008). Otherwise, it seemed that the flow of information around 
industrial projects of special importance, like this bauxite project, was not 
even controlled by high-level bureaucrats in the relevant agencies, but by 
the chief minister and a small set of locally powerful ministers who were 
not necessarily connected to these agencies.
When I told a retired officer of the Indian Administrative Service how 
I  had  been struggling to get information from the government, and 
how I felt that everyone should have a right to access basic information 
about what was being planned, the otherwise forthcoming former 
bureaucrat suddenly became angry, exclaiming, ‘Who are you to get 
information? Who are you?’ His argument against access to information 
was apparently based on the risk that people could misuse it to create all 
sorts of trouble. Instead, he seemed to feel that a ‘good’ administrator 
should only be magnanimous enough to deliver information to people 
who were found to have ‘genuine intentions’. Although he was aware 
that this attitude could lead to other problems, including an increased 
risk of corruption, this former official thought that such problems should 
be addressed by reforming the education of elite bureaucrats rather than 
opening up the flow of information. Another former official took a very 
different line by advising me to ‘say in your report that nothing of the 
information you have was given by the government voluntarily’.
Despite the intense secrecy, the quality of the government’s information 
production must still be questioned. How could government employees be 
expected to produce accurate information when they are working in early 
twentieth-century facilities with no proper equipment, and seemingly 
little relevant training in the use of modern technologies? And what kind 
of quality can be assured when government departments are making 
drastic staff reductions, as was the case with the Agriculture Department, 
1  This is a crucial element in Chibber’s (2003) explanation of the federal Planning Commission’s 
inability to design appropriate plans ever since its inception.
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which at times during my fieldwork seemed to work mainly as a land 
acquisition compensation assessment department, rather than providing 
support to help farmers produce better harvests?
Accessing Expert Knowledge
When interactions with politicians and bureaucrats proved largely futile, 
I sought to engage with outside experts to see if there were specific studies 
that could provide a better understanding of the aluminium industry 
and the local conditions in the area where the bauxite project was being 
proposed. General information of this sort was almost as difficult to find 
as the more contentious material directly related to the project, even 
though the experts were not under direct government control and worked 
in an environment where there was supposedly freedom of speech.
A professor at one local university denied the existence of any studies 
relating to the locations where mining was proposed, even though his 
colleagues at this same university had discovered the bauxite ore body in 
the 1970s. According to this professor, no one studied the area these days, 
and the university had no maps or any older material that was in any way 
relevant to my study, whether it related to biodiversity, forests, agriculture 
or any other topic. I was advised to use Google Earth to find satellite 
images if I wanted to know about forest cover, and to ask the NGO 
Samatha for additional information. Only later did I discover that this 
same professor had spent a lot of time working on forestry and wildlife 
issues in Visakhapatnam District, and had taken a number of relevant 
books and reports into his office at the university and, for some unknown 
reason, was unwilling to grant access to myself or to his own colleagues 
in the same department.
Another professor at the same university, who had a much smaller office, 
responded to my enquiries by saying: ‘If you require information for 
research purposes I will give information but otherwise I will not.’ I had 
assumed that my own credentials were already clear, since I had been 
introduced as a researcher by another employee of the same university. 
Once further papers and a business card from the University of East 
Anglia had been displayed, the professor handed over copies of a number 
of his own seminar papers, on which he wrote ‘with best compliments’. 
One might have thought that any academic would want to distribute such 
material in the hope of getting it a wider audience.
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Other academics would respond with a gasp when I informed them of my 
topic of study and exclaim that it was very contentious. But then, quite 
unexpectedly, other contacts led me to a few free-thinking members of 
the university’s staff. It was those in the Geology Department who proved 
most open to discussion of the impacts and implications of bauxite 
mining, including the risks of pollution. This department had actually 
been marginalised by the politicisation of the bauxite issue, since their 
science no longer seemed to have any value. Not only were researchers 
in the department powerless in the face of an argument that ‘national 
treasures’ should be used for the public good; they could not even travel 
to the hills since people might mistake them for surveyors or otherwise 
associate them with the mine’s promoters. There were a few academics in 
other departments who felt that the secrecy surrounding the project was 
ridiculous and were happy to let me copy maps of the area that are not 
available for sale to the public. They could not provide me with full-sized 
originals in colour since they would struggle to get new ones from the 
Geography Department, which had control of this particular asset. But 
I later found that this was no obstacle, since the maps had already been 
scanned and could be printed in colour from a regular ‘Xerox’ shop.
Another interesting aspect of information control in the university 
world was the library, which was only accessible by means of a letter of 
invitation. Once inside, the only things immediately accessible on the 
dusty bookshelves were ancient books of little relevance for my purpose 
(or possibly any other). Statistics from the national census could be accessed 
from cupboards that were normally locked. Once permission had been 
sought from the head librarian in her air-conditioned office, photocopies 
could be made if the Xerox machine operator was present in his own 
office, which was not the case on the occasion of my visit. Possession of 
a digital camera, and the authority to walk past the information guardians 
with it still in one’s possession, was a partial solution to that problem, 
but only yielded a few pages of what in the end turned out to be not very 
useful ‘public information’.
Even these tactics were insufficient as a means to access copies of the most 
useful information on the bauxite deposits, which was contained in doctoral 
theses on bauxite ore geology written in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
These are kept in a separate section of the library, in a corner of the top floor 
with a librarian dedicated to guarding it. Here again, an invitation letter had 
to be produced, this time with the signature of the head librarian added to 
it. But in this case there was no point in looking for the absent photocopy 
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operator, since the theses could only be read in the adjacent reading room. 
The explanation for this was that some theses are yet to be published and 
free access could ruin the prospect. When I asked the guardian for guidance 
to finding a thesis of particular interest to me, the result was a vague nod 
towards a disintegrating card index system.
The geological reports prepared by the Geological Survey of India in the 
1970s, as advertised on its website, look to be more accessible, but still 
command a premium price. Reports on the bigger deposits cost hundreds 
of thousands of rupees (India 2008b). So that constitutes another kind 
of limitation on the flow of information.
The main characteristics of the aluminium industry, in terms of geological 
and operational characteristics, but also its negative consequences for local 
employment and the environment, were already known in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. They had been evaluated in numerous committees and 
subjected to comparison with international experiences. And yet the same 
debates were continuing 30 years later, and with very little in the way 
of openly available information. The older reports that already existed 
had largely been forgotten or hidden away, so nothing was being learned 
from them.
The experts are impressively effective at keeping information under 
control, and that is partly due to the direct influence exerted by the 
government. A company that leaks information will find it difficult to 
win new contracts from the government, as indicated in a letter written 
to one environmental consultancy firm: 
[T]here are reports that the [company] officials at certain levels 
are providing information to outsiders, without maintaining the 
confidentiality expected of a professional organization and this has 
resulted in unseemly controversies at the public hearings organized in 
respect of Irrigation Projects (Andhra Pradesh 2005f: 1). 
The government official who wrote this letter went on to advise the 
company to ‘induct competent officials with professional expertise 
related to irrigation projects and possessing integrity and high standards 
of efficiency’.
Other forms of information control are exemplified by the case in which 
experts in environmental management altered their own findings to suit 
dominant interests. I was told about surveys undertaken to determine 
whether sand mining along the Andhra Pradesh coastline should be 
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allowed or whether pollution levels for industries in the region were 
within prescribed limits. In both cases, information was collected and 
analysed according to prescribed procedures. But the expert author of 
the sand mining report then changed the crucial data in the final draft 
to reduce the number of turtle nests that had been found and hence to 
make sand mining seem a less harmful activity. Likewise, the pollution 
control laboratory applied a general procedure to ensure that measured 
test results would fall within the prescribed limits so that this finding 
could be used as the basis for a negotiation to have pollution control 
equipment installed, instead of leading to the denial of an environmental 
compliance certificate.
Individuals expressing opposition to the JSW bauxite project could expect 
visits from both government employees and representatives of the Jindal 
Group. However, since there was not much more that could be done to 
prevent those free from direct government or company patronage from 
speaking their minds, these visits could lead to an offer of benefits for 
those whose minds were changed. One NGO was reportedly approached 
by a representative of the JSW Foundation, the company’s corporate social 
responsibility division, promising that ‘anything you want us to do to 
avoid another Nandigram we will do’ (interview, activist, Visakhapatnam, 
4 January 2008).2 Academics were also approached with offers of 
funding to host a conference on bauxite mining.3 While support for the 
government could be rewarded with perks like these, the maintenance of 
an independent stance brought few personal benefits and could stall an 
academic career.
New Technology for Information Dissemination
New legislation and information technology (IT) offered some hope for 
improved access to information. The Andhra Pradesh Government has 
not only been keen to attract investment from IT companies but has also 
tried to use technology to modernise its governance. The government’s IT 
projects have included the eSeva project set up at local offices across the 
state for the payment of utility bills (amongst other things), a new web 
portal with information on its various agencies (www.aponline.gov.in/) 
2  Nandigram in West Bengal had recently been the site of violent clashes over land acquisition for 
a proposed petro-chemical plant.
3  The national seminar on bauxite mining in Andhra Pradesh and Odisha was held at Andhra 
University on 17–18 July 2009.
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and an e-procurement website for public tenders (www.eprocurement.gov.
in/). The central government has been even more proactive in its efforts to 
spread information through websites, and the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MoEF) has been at the forefront of this move. Right to Information 
(RTI) requests from the MoEF have, however, been denied on the grounds 
that the information is already available on its website. This is in spite of 
official websites being frequently inaccessible, and only a small minority of 
the population having access to a computer and the English-language skills 
required to navigate the site.
The Ministry of Corporate Affairs is another example of a ministry that 
has enabled the web to distribute information about registered companies 
all across India (www.mca.gov.in). However, this supposedly public 
information can only be accessed by users who are willing to pay Rs 10 per 
copied page and have a credit card to pay for it, and once the information 
has been ordered, the information seeker must visit the physical office of 
the Registrar of Companies in the state where the company is registered 
in order to obtain the copies. In the case of JSW Aluminium, this would 
be the office in Mumbai, even though the Jindal Group is based in Delhi 
and its project was in Andhra Pradesh. The service does not appear to 
be aimed at the public but at companies seeking information about 
other companies.
My experience of the limitations of IT as a vehicle for the spread of 
public information in Andhra Pradesh has been confirmed by Thomas 
and Parayil (2008), who found that access and use was much greater in 
the state of Kerala, not because of the size or quality of investment in IT, 
but because of people’s ability to make use of information, and to some 
extent their interest in doing so. Nevertheless, there was still evidence 
of change during the course of my research on the JSW bauxite project. 
The many RTI requests received by APMDC may have explained why 
that organisation started to post all mining agreements on its newly 
created website.4
4 apmdc.ap.gov.in/Home/RTI  (accessed 3 September 2018).
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The Poor Quality of Official Information
In the controversies over access to information, it became apparent that 
government information was at the centre of the argument. In  media 
debates and court cases alike, the government has been seen as the 
provider of the kind of information that comes from surveys carried 
out by authorised personnel and performed according to specific 
procedures that are deemed to give it legitimacy. But is this dependence 
on the government warranted by the quality and independence of the 
information it produces?
Government surveys of proposed industrial sites gave the appearance of 
being thoroughly politicised, as top Hyderabad bureaucrats and (at times) 
even politicians would bypass local (and usually unavailable) bosses and 
order local government workers to undertake them. This caused a great 
deal of confusion, since the workers had been trained to follow orders 
made in writing and passed through established bureaucratic channels, but 
there was no time for this when sudden phone calls were received. In what 
appeared to be uncoordinated pressure to get all the required surveys done 
at the same time, one Agriculture Department survey team was unable to 
complete its work because the Revenue Department had yet to produce 
the basic details of the land to be acquired. On the other hand, some 
government employees took great pride in the efficiency of their work on 
behalf of the corporate proponents. One such case was that of the Revenue 
Department official who bragged about finishing land acquisition for an 
earlier project in just a few weeks and thus getting handpicked to do the 
same for the more important AnRak Aluminium project.
The sheer complexity of local land tenure, and the poor information 
management skills of government employees who were largely stuck in 
a pre-computer era, with facilities dating from the 1950s, posed serious 
challenges to the quality of information production. Even though Revenue 
Department officials sometimes used satellite imagery to make plans for 
land acquisition, poor land records remained an obstacle to more detailed 
work at ground level. I witnessed a local surveyor involved in planning 
the JSW project take worn 1950s village maps from a steel cupboard in 
his otherwise bare office and repair them with a razor blade and tape. 
The result was an official land acquisition map labelled ‘JSW Aluminium’, 
rather than ‘Government of Andhra Pradesh’, even though the government 
was legally responsible for land acquisition. 
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The digitisation of such documents cannot compensate for the poor 
quality of the original data. The information contained on local maps had 
not been updated for decades, and thus failed to take account of numerous 
illegal land transactions. In the end, the government was not interested in 
providing compensation to anyone not present in its own ancient registers 
of title, as shown in Chapter 4. Even so, Revenue Department officials 
had to travel daily to the JSW project site daily by bus from their head 
office in Vizianagaram over a period of several months, even working 
on weekends, to sort out issues with the land records in order for the 
acquisition to proceed.
When combined with the deficiencies of the EIA reports discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, this indicates a basic lack of local knowledge about 
who might be affected by the project. There was simply not enough in 
the way of existing information about the local environment, nor any 
capacity to make up for this deficiency, to make plans for adequate 
compensation or mitigation. Even where relevant and reasonably accurate 
information did exist in the numerous and voluminous reports produced 
by the government and its various consultants, there was still uncertainty 
about the legal and regulatory standards that should be applied to it. This 
inevitably meant that the project would fail to demonstrate compliance 
with the best social and environmental practices.
Even though new to the aluminium industry, a company like JSW 
Aluminium would have known that the technical knowledge required to 
build a large alumina refinery is available in national and international 
markets, so it did not have to rely on its own resources or those of the 
government for that purpose. The international technology supplier could 
provide the equipment, an engineering group could prepare the site, 
and consultants could compile various planning documents. However, 
it seems that the company and its many consultants still did little to gather 
the social and environmental information that would have made it clear 
why so many people were protesting against it. Under these conditions, 
opposition actors and organisations will continue to find genuine reasons 
to object to bauxite mining and refining projects across central India.
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Information from the Bauxite 
Project Opposition
The wide range of groups and individuals who had come out against 
the bauxite project included activists, journalists and political parties. 
Information about the bauxite project was actively pursued by each of 
these groups, albeit with widely varying degrees of success, and put to use 
for specific purposes.
Moneyed NGOs and Struggling Activists
The way that information collection and dissemination took place amongst 
NGOs and activists was typical of many other actors during the period 
of my fieldwork. There were only a few organisations working on the 
issue with sufficient people and funds to collect information on a larger 
scale, and it was on these organisations that many other organisations and 
individuals, including journalists, had to rely. Journalists would reward 
access to information in the form of publications mentioning the name 
of the organisation or party that provided it, or simply by writing stories 
on topics favoured by the NGOs. The greater resources of the moneyed 
NGOs that were the main repositories of information naturally created 
a  fair bit of envy and resentment on the part of activists with smaller 
means, who did not have much to offer in return for it or who did not 
want to get involved in making such deals.
One of the most important documents about any industrial project is 
the EIA report. This is a document that people affected by a project are 
supposed to be able to read in their own language. It is supposed to be 
made available at a number of local government offices some weeks ahead 
of an environmental public hearing. It is also the only document that 
has to be made public, so the public hearing becomes the only venue 
where many aspects of a proposed project can be debated. According to 
one EIA consultant, the wide variety of concerns normally debated at 
such hearings have generally not focused on environmental issues because 
economic issues tend to dominate the agenda. 
In coastal Andhra Pradesh, it has mainly been the larger NGOs that 
have the capacity to receive advance information about the timing and 
location of a public hearing and hence the availability of the EIA report. 
These organisations know their rights and are able to demand access to 
Landlock
178
these public documents, which they can then pass on to experts across 
the country who can provide critiques of them. Other people with an 
interest in the report are then obliged to approach the larger NGOs in 
ways that are very similar to those by which people approach the local 
government for favours. While the NGOs need to show that they are 
doing good work in order to continue receiving support from their 
donors, their comparative wealth and perceived secrecy are sources of 
constant contention with other activists, who rightfully feel that a wider 
dissemination of information will help the common cause. 
There is a perception that activists used to get information from 
bureaucrats, at least occasionally, on an informal and friendly basis, but 
that this space has since been closed. In recent years, with an apparent 
reduction in the contacts between activists and individuals working in the 
government, some have resorted to the Right to Information Act. Despite 
the many benefits offered by this legislation, the use of legal means to 
extract information is unlikely to close the gap in understanding between 
activists and the government.
The use of public interest litigation to obtain information requires even 
more resources, since information is already required before plans can be 
challenged, and the legal basis of the challenge also has to be established. 
For these reasons, NGOs need to combine their own knowledge of the 
law with an ability to persuade lawyers to take on their cases at little or no 
cost. This activity may yield more information than RTI requests because 
the litigant will receive all the information that the court asks the other 
parties to provide.
The Media: Active and Free, yet Ultimately 
Ineffective
Some very competent journalists operated out of the small towns in the 
vicinity of the proposed JSW refinery and mine. The limited interest of 
the English-language press in covering rural stories made it necessary 
for opponents to talk to the Telugu media, and especially newspapers 
like Eenadu and Andhra Jyoti that were (unofficially) aligned with the 
oppositional Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Journalists at these papers were 
hard at work to press the government on its accountability for programs 
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and projects all over the state. The Telugu media had a readership keen 
on stories about corruption and poor people losing out as a result of 
economic development.
The state government responded to such reports by pursuing a few 
cases against the editor of Eenadu, but was otherwise largely obliged to 
allow the papers to publish what they wanted. Some saw the launch of 
the Telugu paper and TV station Sakshi, owned by the son of the chief 
minister, as a strategy to counter this critical press coverage.5 Critical 
stories about the proposed refinery included one about the withholding 
of information about land acquisition from people who would be affected 
(Anon. 2007i), another about the secret (and illegal) alterations made 
to the boundaries of the area to be acquired (Anon. 2008h), and a third 
about the extraction  of commissions from compensation payments 
made to local farmers (Anon. 2008i). English-language newspapers like 
The Hindu, Deccan Chronicle or New Indian Express only carried stories 
about the problem of water availability in the cities or reports of political 
party meetings, but The Hindu took a particular interest in tribal issues 
in the state. 
Some exaggerations were evident in the press coverage, and the capacity to 
obtain and interpret government documents varied enormously from one 
journalist to the next. Some got their hands on maps and other government 
documents on which to base their stories, but would not say how they had 
done so. One journalist claimed that he had made RTI applications and 
travelled to Hyderabad to obtain some of his information, but journalists 
generally seem to have obtained government information informally from 
local sources. On several of my own visits to government offices, I came 
across journalists casually chatting with government workers.
The many stories covering various aspects of the JSW bauxite project 
seem to have had very little actual impact. One S. Kota journalist expressed 
his frustration by exclaiming that the stories were just ‘cries in the wind’. 
This was not the fault of the journalists themselves but of the larger system. 
News stories spread information about the proposed bauxite project to an 
impressively wide audience in rural and coastal Andhra Pradesh, but they 
would not carry much weight in a court case, nor could they be used to 
initiate investigations since they were seen—perhaps somewhat unfairly—
5  Despite the recent spread and popularity of intensely competitive local TV news stations, the TV 
crews were rarely present in the locations where my fieldwork was conducted.
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as being ‘unscientific’ and biased in favour of the political opposition. 
Even if the media did a good job at shaping local public opinion, that too 
had very little relevance for actual outcomes.
Political Parties
As discussed in the previous chapter, all the opposition parties quickly 
decided to ‘be with the people’ and against any bauxite projects in coastal 
Andhra Pradesh. They included the TDP, which had formerly favoured 
mining when it was in power, as well as a number of left-wing parties.6 
Opposition politicians were generally very keen on meeting a foreign 
researcher like myself. The left-wing parties had cells that operated only in 
certain locations, and this seemed to restrict the amount of information 
they could provide. Limited resources and a lack of experience of ever 
being part of the government meant they were not able to discover much 
about its plans or shed much light on the ways in which it operates. And 
even if the left-wing parties did have access to information, they would 
have had few ways of putting it to use aside from fuelling more news 
stories in a media space that was already full.
Many left-wing parties, active for decades in coastal Andhra Pradesh, 
preferred struggle on the ground to information collection and 
dissemination. There was even disdain for information, among the more 
radical groups, as something inherently bourgeois. Since, in their opinion, 
the government was invariably going to be wrong and had to be opposed, 
they doubted the point in spending time and effort to rediscover this fact. 
Unfortunately, their ignorance of relevant laws and procedures meant 
that those working to mobilise farmers to reject land acquisition at the 
refinery site, despite the impressive levels of self-sacrifice, were rather like 
the blind leading the blind. Party workers who were not even aware that 
the proposed refinery site was located just outside of the Scheduled Areas, 
which allowed for the non-tribal ownership of land, insisted that all the 
land was scheduled and the whole acquisition was therefore illegal.
The TDP, which had been in power since the 1980s before losing office 
four years previously, and which has significant financial resources, also had 
a clear informational advantage. With the former member of legislative 
assembly (MLA) Ashok Gajapathi Raju and a number of panchayat and 
6  The policy turnaround has come full circle since the TDP returned to power in 2014 and once 
again came out in favour of bauxite mining (Anon. 2015a).
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mandal parishad seats in the S. Kota and Araku constituencies, it also had 
a significant local presence. However, as we saw in Chapter 6, the party 
chose not to capitalise on its available resources other than to host a few 
padyatras and meetings in the Visakhapatnam area and to make noise in 
the assembly. It could most likely have gathered any information it did 
not already possess about the politics and economics of the JSW project, 
so it was no wonder that even a left-wing party worker would put me in 
touch with TDP members to assist in my own search for information. 
A visit to the TDP headquarters in Hyderabad revealed an impressive 
library and a number of staff working full-time on information collection, 
but the purpose of their doing so remained unclear. Like other parties, 
the TDP does not usually engage in the sort of litigation for which such 
information would be crucial. It could have used its own information 
when making its frequent objections to the state government’s plans 
in the assembly, but this would have meant sharing the information with 
the left-wing parties that also have a few MLAs. It was perhaps more likely 
that the party was using its information in direct negotiations with the 
government rather than in public forums.
The Politics of Opposition and Information Control
As already indicated, my own interactions with activists and opposition 
party members were quite straightforward. There was not even much of 
a need for informal introductions, even when I was seen as being aligned 
with particular activists. Yet this does not mean that much information 
was being shared between the project’s opponents. My interview with one 
NGO leader initially prompted a 15-minute rant against Samatha, since 
I happened to mention that I had previously volunteered to work for them. 
The antagonism was based on the credit the organisation had received for 
the Supreme Court judgment, despite its many imperfections. The head 
of another, smaller NGO went so far as to argue that Samatha was really 
working for the government, apparently because the government had 
mentioned the existence of the judgment in the development agreements 
it signed with private companies. Once activists had calmed down, it was 
possible to discuss the issues in greater depth, and frequently to access the 
information that they had taken pains to collect. 
NGOs often do not get along due to ideological differences, and are in 
competition with each other to promote their own organisations and attract 
additional support. The  political parties functioned in much the same 
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way. The result was a lack of coordination in the gathering of information, 
as well as in actions that would have been more effective at achieving their 
common goal. A wide range of activists and political parties were invited 
to speak at meetings on the bauxite issue, but padyatras in rural areas were 
organised separately by each party, and if others were invited to join them, 
the timing would be such as to keep the organisers in the limelight. In one 
of the rare cases where NGOs combined forces, one NGO threatened 
to withdraw its funding from a joint activity when another NGO was 
thought to have taken too much credit for the campaign on its website.
The level of trust between parties and activists was also quite low. In one 
case, a local party worker blamed the head of a local NGO for being 
a ‘cunning fellow’ who was only interested in money, while the latter 
returned the favour the next day by accusing the party of sending out 
‘double messages’. Both seemed equally single-minded in their opposition 
to bauxite mining, but had somehow failed to understand one another, 
despite living in the same small town. Other activists saw politics as 
a necessary evil with which one had to engage in order to make an impact. 
It was only the parties who had the capacity to mobilise opposition on the 
ground, even though their support could be withdrawn as quickly as it 
had been created. 
The result was that each NGO, activist, party worker or journalist 
involved in opposition to the bauxite project was working in a single local 
cell, and had only a small piece of the puzzle, usually confined to that 
particular location or the specific issue that they were following. Only 
a few individuals had some capacity to circulate information between 
these different actors. Several of the findings presented in this book thus 
constitute my own attempt to combine the results of fragmented and 
time-consuming information-gathering activities by different members 
of the opposition.
Greater Access to Information at Local Sites
Having searched libraries across the state and enquired at what felt like 
countless other locations, it almost came as a shock when I discovered that 
detailed statistics about people and agriculture could be swiftly printed 
out from a computer at a local revenue office, and then copied to a thumb 
drive when the printer stopped working. Otherwise, despite the right 
introductions, access to information was just as challenging at the proposed 
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project locations as it was in government offices in Hyderabad. On any 
given day, it would be almost impossible to first find the tehsildar, the most 
senior officer in any given office, and then persuade him or her to authorise 
the right person to provide me with information. This would invariably 
require several visits, since the statistician or the surveyor would be absent 
on each occasion. In the case of the Agency, the problem was compounded 
by the fact that one statistician had information on the revenue villages and 
another on the forest villages. Only the person in charge of any particular 
document or map could bring this out of the locker for me or anyone 
else to see. On one occasion, a surveyor agreed to meet me on the day 
after a joint meeting with the tehsildar, but then immediately took leave, 
apparently without informing his boss.
The fact that I was able to gain any access to local government offices 
was nothing short of amazing to many activists. To put this into 
perspective, about six weeks before I sought information from one of 
the offices in December 2007, a group of 42 project-affected villagers, 
led by a group of politicians from all the major opposition parties, had 
spent four days blockading the same office, demanding to know the plans 
for land acquisition. The officials stayed away from the office until the 
blockade ended, when the police moved in and arrested about 30 people. 
The process of land acquisition actually started during the fortnight in 
which this core group of activists were being held in the Visakhapatnam 
jail. In the months that followed, the tehsildar refused to respond to 
letters objecting to the land acquisition notices, despite one such letter 
being handed over in person by the same set of opposition politicians 
in the presence of a large media gathering.7
While I was spending time at the proposed project sites, lower-level local 
government officials would actually call me to ask when we could meet 
and then show up at the appointed time. When doing so, they did make 
sure that they had political cover from a sarpanch and had consulted with 
local employees of the company before they would talk. The only thing 
that can really explain why it was easier to conduct my research at these 
sites, other than a general curiosity to meet foreigners, would have to be 
the altered power differential between the two sides. It was apparently 
harder to ignore a foreign researcher at this level than it was in Hyderabad.
7  A legal case was later launched against the tehsildar, but the land acquisition process continued.
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Every single person I sought out at the various project sites, especially the 
villagers, turned out to be forthcoming. If not necessarily eager to respond, 
they were seemingly only unable to provide information when it was really 
not available to them. I showed the villagers maps with the refinery area 
outlined on them in an attempt to work out where their own plots were 
located. I was surprised that this did not create too much interest despite 
the fact that some of the respondents had been arrested only a few months 
previously when they were demanding more information. It seems that 
they did not regard maps as substantial and reliable sources of information 
because they could be drawn today and changed tomorrow, just like any 
government plans. Several local farmers indicated that they had not 
received land acquisition notices, but had joined the local opposition 
group in the belief that they would be affected by a second phase of land 
acquisition. They did not know that there would be a second phase, but 
could not see why their land would not be acquired if this was happening 
to other people’s land. The documentation was of much greater interest 
to the teenage children of the largely illiterate farmers whose land had 
already been earmarked, yet their few years of poor schooling did not 
enable them to make much sense of the Revenue Department’s technical 
jargon in English. 
I did find one villager studying land acquisition maps and documents 
on the occasion of a visit to his home. This was a non-tribal man 
who had illegally bought land many years earlier, and was naturally 
tight-lipped about where he had been able to get hold of this information. 
Unfortunately, he also seemed to have little interest in sharing it with 
other villagers, even though he was nominally a member of the bauxite 
opposition.
The main problem with information collection in the villages was 
generally not people’s willingness to discuss and share what they knew, but 
the fact that they simply did not know what was going on. Nor did local 
government officials in the proposed mining area know much more of 
what was being planned than what they had read in the newspapers. They 
had not even been called on to conduct surveys as part of the planning 
process, unlike those at the proposed refinery site, since this work had 
been contracted to a consultancy firm.
The surprising amount of information in circulation at the refinery site 
found little productive use other than in a few local news stories and for 
individual bargaining on the part of those being displaced. It was not 
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being collected by the project’s opponents in ‘civil society’, who preferred 
to stay in the cities and spend a lot of their time filing RTI requests. This 
acceptance of the government’s authority as a producer of information 
does not seem to make much sense, given the poor quality of much of the 
information they were producing. Perhaps it was a strategy influenced by 
the demands of the courts, or simply based on their reluctance to travel 
to rural areas. Local villagers would have been better off if activists with 
the ability to access and interpret technical planning documents had come 
to explain what was about to happen, thus enabling the villagers to make 
more informed decisions on how to proceed.
Conclusion
The picture that emerges here is not one of an all-powerful alliance that 
has perfect information itself and the ability to prevent others from 
accessing it. Rather, the poor information flows seem to be the result of 
a widespread recognition of information as a valuable resource that needs 
to be protected and only released if something can be gained by doing 
so. This behaviour was found to reach far beyond the key state planning 
departments that the bauxite alliance could hope to control, not only to 
the rest of the government, but also to most of the other organisations and 
individuals that I encountered during my fieldwork, including researchers, 
journalists, opposition parties and NGOs. 
The informational struggles were almost exclusively concerned with data 
produced by the government. This information was seen to be authoritative 
because of its supposedly high quality and the strict procedures that were 
meant to guarantee independence from political influence. However, my 
own observation cast doubt on these perceptions. Survey workers were 
found to be heavily influenced by senior administrators and politicians, 
and to be using poor facilities and methods to produce the information. 
Combined with the many site-specific information gaps found in the 
public documents and special reports examined throughout this book, the 
government’s limited ability to produce truly authoritative information 
made it seem impossible to properly compensate land losers or mitigate 
negative environmental impacts according to principles of best practices. 
When mediation over land use change is impossible, future mineral 
projects are certain to generate continued protests.
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I am not suggesting there is such a thing as perfect information or 
a perfectly transparent mode of organising society. Even with better access 
to information, struggles would still have to take place to ensure that 
there is justice. The very promising Right to Information Act was found 
to have many procedural issues that limited its usefulness, but recent 
improvements in access to information provide some reason for cautious 
hope for improved communication in the future.
For now, I can only conclude that the sum of many informational 
problems currently prevents any meaningful communication from taking 
place. This breakdown in communication, with very limited options for 
meaningful deliberations, could be seen as a Habermasian nightmare, 
since it seems to imply that contestations over mineral projects in tribal 
India are destined to end in paralysing stand-offs where little that is 
productive can be accomplished. 
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A significant body of research on resource projects in indigenous territories 
around the world has shown that vast disparities of wealth and power 
usually play out to the advantage of the promoters and developers, at best 
with some form of consultation and perhaps compensation or a share 
of revenues for the traditional inhabitants.
[C]omplications and challenges … are almost always the same: 
environmental pollution and consequent community backlash; 
dislocation and relocation; new forms of poverty and inequality; and 
local-level grievances stemming from perceived minimal contributions to 
local economic development (Gilberthorpe and Hilson 2012: 1).
What is not quite so common in the literature, however, is a discussion 
of when and how an aggressive process of industrialisation is halted in its 
tracks. This book provides such an account, even if an incomplete one, 
since the pursuit of local self-determination remains unfinished and the 
development proposal is in limbo rather than being decided in favour 
of the local land users.
When the Jindal South West (JSW) bauxite project got stuck, the core 
conflict was over the question of whether the constitutionally protected 
Scheduled Areas should be used for mining rather than the low-intensity 
cultivation and extraction of forest products that constituted Adivasi 
livelihoods. Informational problems turned this dispute into something 
that no side was able to resolve. Examples included the serious problems 
with the land records available to the government, which did not allow 
for a swift and efficient process of land acquisition, and the reluctance of 
oppositional groups to share the information of admittedly poor quality 
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with one another. The result was a landlock—a complete paralysis over 
the question of how scarce land and natural resources should best be put 
to use. This has wider significance, given the many similar conflicts that 
continue to linger in a state of uncertainty as a multitude of industrial 
projects have been proposed, without providing significant local benefits, 
in rural parts of India. 
To explain the experience of deadlock between different forces, the analysis 
in this book has moved beyond a view of land conflict as something that 
involves exclusively material interests. If that were the case, then the state 
government and its private business partner would already have secured 
a decisive victory, given their superior access to resources. Instead, we 
have seen a long, drawn-out process of contestation, where the discursive 
resistance to Adivasi dispossession has strong historical roots and many 
active supporters. Since this particular struggle took place mainly in the 
arena of discursive claims made well beyond the proposed mining and 
refining sites, an account of governance processes allowed for a better 
understanding of the importance of informational problems in shaping 
the outcomes of the contest.
The chosen approach did admittedly entail the loss of a deeper 
ethnographic  or socio-cultural account of the people who lived at the 
proposed project sites. However, it allowed for a wider appreciation of 
the way that India’s geographically dispersed institutional landscape, 
and its many different actors, engaged with manifold controversies in a 
multitude of forums, and selectively interact in their attempts to influence 
outcomes. This has made it possible to produce a more general account 
of the way in which the all too common land conflicts across the country 
are negotiated in uncertain, frequently overlapping and even purposefully 
unclear processes. 
The proliferation of groups with a capacity to contest major resource 
projects, and indeed the wider process of industrialisation, has been 
a significant phenomenon across India in recent decades. The inclusion 
of more voices speaks well of Indian democracy when the rights of certain 
groups of people are being denied, and yet there are significant challenges 
when each of these groups has different modes of engagement. One gets 
the impression that the overall debate takes place between multiple actors 
using different means of communication, indeed different technical 
and natural languages, across multiple forums. The result has been that 
people appear to be talking past one another, with a breakdown in mutual 
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understanding. While the resulting deadlocks may protect some people 
from very harmful projects, they do not result in productive outcomes 
in the poverty-stricken parts of central India, as poor people are still 
threatened with the loss of their lands while investors waste their money 
in endless controversies. 
Land Rights and Adivasi Livelihoods
In Andhra Pradesh, it is no longer possible to refute the argument that 
Adivasis need their lands and forests:
Land and the produce of the forest remain their main source of livelihood, 
but [the] availability of land is restricted by forest reservation on the one 
hand and non-tribal encroachment on the other (Balagopal 2007b: 4029).
This book has attempted to show how strong support for land rights came 
to be institutionalised in the Visakhapatnam Agency, and to document 
the various past and present movements and actors who have ensured that 
such rights are recognised in law, and have since succeeded in blocking 
changes aimed at reducing their strength. The end result has been that the 
Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation 1959 remains 
in force, although it might not have been applied to bauxite project 
proposals had it not been for the non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
interventions that led to the Supreme Court Samatha judgment in 1997. 
Adivasi land has been subject to a ‘precarious balance’ (Balagopal 2007a) 
in recent decades, but attempts to reinterpret the land legislation through 
the use of a government proxy to allow private bauxite mining have shown 
the need for ongoing public awareness and pressure. Andhra Pradesh is 
in no way unique in demonstrating the inconsistency between formal 
Adivasi land rights and the reality of widespread alienation to commercial 
and other interests. Only a small amount of land is actually under tribal 
private ownership and control, given the alienation of agricultural land to 
non-tribal farmers and the vast stretches of nominally ‘forest’ land that is 
claimed by the government. Other loopholes include the many state-owned 
industries that continue to operate on Adivasi land, supposedly in the 
public interest, and the threats posed by the construction of mega-dams. 
Similar patterns of alienation have been observed in other parts of central 
India (Padel and Das 2010; Lahiri-Dutt et al. 2012). 
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Also important is the limited coherence of the Scheduled Areas, where any 
citizen is free to settle and work so long as no attempt is made to purchase 
or lease any land. The Visakhapatnam Agency is unusual in Andhra 
Pradesh, and more generally in central India, in having a predominantly 
Adivasi population, albeit with a great diversity of tribal groups, and 
a low level of land alienation to non-Adivasi people. The same level of 
tribal domination is not found in other Scheduled Areas for a variety of 
historical and demographic reasons, resulting in a mix of peoples that 
is far from the ideal of a protected region outlined in the Constitution’s 
Fifth Schedule. Adding to the confusion is the existence of other areas 
containing non-scheduled Adivasi villages, such as those at the proposed 
JSW refinery site. While the ideal of distinct Adivasi territories remains 
on paper, government policies continue to dilute its actual meaning. The 
Forest Rights Act is one example, given that it allows non-tribal forest-
dwellers to claim land rights based on long-term occupation of the land.
With so many loopholes and inconsistencies, it can be tempting to 
cast doubt over the need to persist with special land rights for Adivasis. 
It might even leave them ‘tied to nature in a particular place’ (Baviskar 
2005: 5110), thereby reducing possible livelihood alternatives available 
elsewhere in the country. Nevertheless, throughout the period of national 
independence, including the recent period of economic reform, tribal 
land transfer laws across India have not been repealed or even reduced 
in strength. From time to time, state governments show some interest in 
amending the laws to create more space for private mining, forestry or 
non-tribal agriculture (Rao 2003; Balagopal 2007a; Kumar et al. 2005; 
Yadav 2016), but these efforts have been blocked. Some fundamental 
rights have become established to the point where it is very difficult to 
change them, and land for tribal people seems to be one of them, even 
if it does not have a very good track record in terms of improved human 
development in an economy where most of the prospects are outside of 
the agricultural sector.
In the case outlined in this book, the land rights legislation certainly 
played an important role. At the refinery site, the people affected were 
located outside of the confines of the Agency and their land could be 
acquired much like any other land on the plains. Indeed, the refinery 
case seems to show that the land held by Adivasi farmers, as compared to 
privately held land, was preferred by the project’s promoters because of its 
weaker tenure, the confused nature of the many illegal landholdings, and 
the reduced capacity for protest on the part of the occupants. The blanket 
protection of Adivasi land in the Scheduled Areas was clearly preferable.
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But how is this related to the level of civil society opposition to bauxite 
mining proposals? In the context of widespread land alienation, the 
strength of this mobilisation is somewhat surprising. Although the bauxite 
industry certainly comes with a number of social and environmental 
costs, it is not obvious that it causes more damage than other extractive 
industries, or that the negative impacts are harder to mitigate. Large-scale 
coal and iron ore mines, strongly toxic chromium mines and radioactive 
uranium mines would seem to need more attention, given their scale 
and polluting potential. Another striking feature of bauxite project 
contestations is the lower level of protest directed against the alumina 
refineries as compared to the mines themselves, despite the evidence that 
refineries generate more polluting waste and use up more precious water 
resources in their operations. 
The strength of protests against bauxite mining can only be fully 
comprehended with reference to the location of the main ore deposits in 
tribal Andhra Pradesh and Odisha. It is as if this form of mining has come 
to be seen as an attack on the last green havens of the Adivasis. The lush 
forests of bauxite hills like Gandhamardhan and Niyamgiri in Odisha 
seem close to the ideal represented in the writings of Verrier Elwin in the 
early twentieth century, with strong remnants still present in activist and 
popular imaginations. This is in stark contrast to dominant accounts of 
Adivasi central India as a region of poverty and violence. The paradox in 
the cultural politics of bauxite mining becomes apparent when Adivasis 
have ‘to perform their marginality, their vulnerability, and, ultimately, 
their Otherness, in order to qualify as candidates before the [Forest Rights 
Act] and its accompanying discourses of tribal empowerment and security’ 
(Ramesh 2017: 173).
In such cases, the livelihood needs of the people themselves seem at risk 
of being forgotten. In our present case, if bauxite mining was prevented, 
thus allowing people the chance to stay on their land, how much would 
this help to reduce their poverty? While improved security of tenure 
could lead to poverty reduction, people in the Agency would still have 
to battle for their rights to forest land, while those in the refinery area 
would still struggle to pay off the debts accumulated in the preparation 
and cultivation of their land. Even if their rights were extended through 
the Forest Rights Act, what would this mean for their livelihoods? Land 
rights alone do not seem to be sufficient for Adivasis who often have 
significant areas of land under cultivation, if not outright ownership, and 
yet remain poor. Although the efforts to protect Adivasi land appeared 
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to be well intentioned, failure to challenge the existing power structures 
that continue to shape everyday resource relations could mean that such 
struggles simply ‘maintain a class system that further marginalises the 
poorest’ (Shah 2007: 1825).
Irrespective of the outcomes of the struggle over bauxite mining and 
refining, land is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for lifting 
Adivasis out of poverty, since people lack the capabilities and resources to 
use the land more productively. Opponents of the bauxite project would 
therefore have done well to formulate alternative models of development 
that could provide solutions to the endemic poverty of the Agency. This 
should not have been impossible, given the increase in coffee cultivation 
that was already happening, as well as the tourism potential of the hills. 
To outline development alternatives is not only an imperative for future 
livelihood improvements once tribal land rights have been secured, but 
an essential instrument in claims for legitimacy in the ongoing struggles. 
The bauxite industry promoters, with their plans to industrialise the region, 
offered some hope for a better future, at least for educated village elites, 
despite the many flaws in these plans. A search for suitable development 
alternatives needs to become a key part of activist movements hoping to 
be taken seriously in future political debate about resource use and social 
justice in the hills.
State Intervention with Little Public Interest
India’s economic reform process was supposed to open up the country to 
global markets, and yet mining has appeared in this book as a domestic 
affair dominated by big business and top-level politicians. It is certainly 
true that India’s mineral commodities are now traded internationally in 
ways that were not possible before the late 1980s. These changes, along 
with more specific ones related to aluminium technology, made the 
bauxite projects of Eastern India seem feasible, at least at the planning 
stage. This book has emphasised continuity, rather than novelty, as a way 
of understanding the relationship of economic reform to electoral politics. 
From this point of view, the importance of state patronage has not been 
diminished with liberalisation, and this relates particularly to the crucial 
role of the state in controlling the transfer of vital resources such as land 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Kohli 2009; Sud 2009; Chandra 2015), 
which is regarded as ‘the most important factor in inter-state competition 
for investment’ (Levien 2012: 944).
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The ‘developmental alliance’ (Kohli 2007) that sought to mine and refine 
bauxite in Andhra Pradesh certainly consisted of top-level state politicians 
and a big business group. Two features stood out amongst the decisions 
made by this group: first, the lack of public benefits in the initial agreement 
and in subsequent policy development; and second, the way that political 
interventions appeared to be directed against the implementation of 
environmental or social safeguards. The problem then is to explain such 
behaviour on the part of a democratically elected government that is 
supposed to work for the public benefit and is overwhelmingly dependent 
on the votes of poor rural people, some of whom are also tribal people.
The close collaboration between state and business was already apparent in 
the absence of any public debate over the memorandum of understanding 
(MoU). In that agreement, the private business partner committed to take 
care of virtually all technical and financial details, while the politicians 
could rationalise the inclusion of the state government as a vehicle to 
mediate in favour of the company on sensitive issues like the acquisition of 
land, the supply of ore that should have been reserved for the public sector 
under the terms of the Samatha judgment, and the obstruction of any 
democratic forums that were not directly under its control. The transfer 
of land itself required the state government to act as ‘direct purchaser, 
property dealer, law interpreter, policymaker, and so forth’ (Jenkins et al. 
2014: 17).
It was hard to detect any significant debates or disagreements within the 
alliance. Uncertainties about royalty revenues for the state government 
or compensation for the loss of forest land have created controversies 
across India for decades, but did not generate significant problems for 
the JSW bauxite project. The almost complete lack of monetary benefits 
for the state government did not seem to trouble decision-makers, the 
company or even the project’s opponents, all of whom chose to focus 
on other concerns. The preference to benefit private capital was not even 
accompanied by a clear strategy to achieve that outcome. This resembles 
the faltering national initiative to create ‘special economic zones’ across 
the country (Jenkins 1999; Jenkins et al. 2014).
Perhaps at no time in India’s modern history were the potential gains from 
mineral industry investment greater than they were in the first decade of 
the present century, as international mineral prices reached all-time highs 
and the Indian domestic economy was amongst the fastest growing in 
the world. Despite widespread protests and the more recent downturn 
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in international mineral prices, the industry remains a source of major 
profits for some investors, so further alliances between businessmen and 
politicians are likely to be formed around industries like alumina refining 
or steelmaking. The current collaboration is expected to continue so long 
as the politicians need to generate funds to ensure their own re-election 
and  big companies are willing to provide the money in return for 
preferential treatment. 
For politicians, any project is better than no project—however small the 
chances that it will actually be implemented—because of the possibility of 
collecting rents from projects that move ahead slowly or do not move at 
all. Indeed, this needs to be the case because large-scale industrial projects 
nearly always have a gestation period longer than five years, and elections 
every five years often throw politicians out of power. Frequent landlocks 
might even be preferred by some politicians who are then still needed ‘as 
facilitators rather than as overseers of business’ (Chandra 2015: 57). The 
state is not expected to undertake productive activities these days, but 
still has a role in the management of social protest. With different groups 
taking widely varying positions on whether and how projects should move 
ahead, protests are bound to continue. Since there is no apparent move 
to reduce the web of complicated, ambiguous and even contradictory 
legislation, just about any position on mineral extraction can find at least 
some amount of legal support to help intensify and further entrench the 
incidence of conflict.
One key question is whether India’s present approach to industrialisation 
will remain acceptable to domestic industrialists when ‘[t]he credibility of 
the Indian state as a broker of compromises on a large scale is so damaged 
by its repeated failures … that compensation-based schemes find few 
takers and become unviable as deadlock-breaking solutions’ (Jenkins 
2011:  62). The deciding factor might be the capacity of at least some 
projects to make headway. In spite of frequent landlocks, a signed contract 
might represent the reservation of an ore deposit in the name of investors 
who believe they will be able to profit from it at some point in the future. 
If, on the other hand, there are too many cancelled projects and too much 
uncertainty, there could be a point in the future where a loss of patience 
with the messy politics of industrialisation will result in a push to reform 
the whole system. This is not likely to result in a radical transformation 
of the wider political economy, and might even imply ‘a deepening of the 
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stake of business in procedural democracy’ (Chandra 2015:  56), given 
the length of time for which the present arrangements have been in place. 
It might, however, create the spaces where new alliances can start to form.
The large number of recent corruption cases in the mining sector might 
also indicate possibilities for improved accountability and governance.1 
Recent national legislation has even prescribed a minimum (26 per cent) 
public share of the profits to be derived from any mining project. While 
this would not have helped those people affected by bauxite mining in 
Andhra Pradesh, since the ore was to be sold at a self-determined price 
that would exclude the possibility of any meaningful revenues, it at least 
indicates a recognition of the existence of mine-affected communities that 
are not going to remain passive now that protests have started to gain 
more public notice. 
There is a longstanding need to rework national policy to open up the 
mineral sector to public influence and align it to the changing roles of 
the state and the private sector (Lahiri-Dutt 2007, 2014). Numerous 
arrangements need to be worked out at local, regional and national 
levels to ensure that resources and decision-making powers are shared 
more equitably, and to allow some level of accountability to permeate 
the system. These are clearly significant challenges that come with the 
additional risk of further complicating an already very complex system 
of governance. Yet there are presently no obvious alternatives to increased 
public voice in resource extraction, and this must surely be preferable 
to the conflicts that too often lead to dispossession and environmental 
degradation, not to mention the plunder of resource wealth by the few 
individuals who can push their projects forward.
Systematically Distorted Communication
The landlock discussed in this book was the result of a number of 
informational problems that prevented meaningful deliberations when 
there was a proposal to use tribal land for the mining and refining of 
bauxite. The contestation, which came to be mainly about mining, 
involved a wide range of discursive and non-discursive struggles. 
1  Newspaper coverage provides some details about the charges brought against a number of key 




A  considerable number of actors and organisations took part in these 
struggles, including industrialists, politicians, bureaucrats, judges, 
journalists, NGO representatives and political party workers. Material 
interests appeared to be a driving force for the first three groups of actors, 
and yet the multiplicity of groups involved in the contest, and the many 
separate public (and sometimes not so public) forums that were used to 
further their claims, also involved a set of discursively differentiated codes. 
These require the analysis of language and power in a setting like that of 
urban planning in Pakistan, where ‘[o]rder and disorder on every scale … 
are produced through the cease-less circulation of … maps, forms, letters, 
and reports’ (Hull 2012: 4).
The approach taken here is not intended to deny the importance of 
power and resources in influencing outcomes. Instead, I have tried to 
use these as a foundation for the account of discursive contestations over 
the bauxite industry. The distribution of power shaped the disposition 
of resources—especially land—that were at stake in the project. But as 
the contestation moved further and further away from the proposed sites 
of implementation, factors other than the immediate livelihood needs of 
tribal people, or even the national economic development proclaimed as 
the primary goal of the project’s promoters, came to be more important. 
The ability to access and make use of different forums were key to this 
contestation.
An analysis of how informational resources shaped the outcomes of the 
struggle represents a challenge to the idea of deliberation or deliberative 
justice as the best way to handle complex problems and move towards 
improved mutual understanding (Fraser 2009). It does this in two main 
ways. First, there was the strong reliance of all concerned on government 
information that was seen as being authoritative, despite a politically 
motivated process of data collection that used inadequate tools and 
methods. Second, the dispersed institutional setting across federal India, 
with its highly variable and challenging modes of access, ensured that only 
some in the opposition could hope to influence the outcomes and, when 
they did so, the result was a fragmentation of understandings.
The analysis in this book has drawn on Bohman’s (2000) discussion of 
Habermas to suggest that the avoidance of deliberation, as opposed to 
engaging and winning debates, can be a useful strategy for influential 
groups such as those promoting the bauxite project in Andhra Pradesh. 
It was found that two factors encouraged the promoters to adopt this 
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strategy. The first was the strength of the tribal land rights legislation and 
the knowledge that civil society objections to a potential amendment 
had spoiled earlier attempts to initiate bauxite mining in the state. It was 
well understood that oppositional groups and individuals would seek 
to challenge the plans and that an open contest would probably favour 
the project’s opponents. The second factor was a seeming acceptance of 
rent-seeking behaviour for political gain as the price of the preferential 
treatment granted to the private investors. The bauxite alliance was 
therefore notably silent despite strong efforts by oppositional groups to 
elicit a response. Fundamental problems of communication, which I call 
‘Habermas’s nightmare’, arose when the dominant alliance of politicians 
and industrialists was unable to take advantage of its control over 
information production and key forums to ensure that its project would 
be implemented.
In the stalemate between the two sides, the outcomes were not simply 
dependent on the opposition’s access to information. If they had been, 
then information could be viewed as a key resource in a political and 
economic power struggle. Instead, the opposition was found to have a 
relatively poor level of internal cooperation and sharing of information, 
but a great ability to organise protest meetings and to make use of the 
media and the courts to launch their challenges. These challenges 
restricted the operational freedom of the bauxite promoters and 
confronted the imperfect management of information within different 
government agencies. Uncertainty over the letter of the law in overlapping 
legal jurisdictions, at both state and federal levels, as well as in scheduled 
and non-scheduled areas, along with the limited capacity to obtain and 
process site-level information for use in planning documents, and the 
generally poor state of land records, were equally important in explaining 
the stalemate. At the same time, a setting characterised by complexity and 
uncertainty was seen as one that allowed for the manipulation of outcomes 
in favour of the bauxite promoters, thereby providing one answer to the 
question of why top decision-makers allowed the confusion to continue.
The opposition groups could have created alternative understandings, 
what Fraser (1989) would call alternative public forums, of what was being 
planned and who would be affected. But when many of the opponents, 
as well as supposedly independent experts, treated government plans and 
documents in very similar ways to the promoters, as resources to be used 
for political gain, what resulted was a fragmented understanding based 
on public information of deficient quality. To build functional alternative 
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public spheres, it would not only be necessary to improve the distribution 
of information, but also to complement the poor quality of that which 
already existed in government plans with some truly independent 
knowledge production. 
For now, the conclusion is that the many informational problems prevent 
any meaningful communication from taking place. This complete 
breakdown in communication seems to imply that contestations over 
mineral projects in tribal India are destined to move towards paralysing 
standoffs in which little productive work can be accomplished, and no 
advance is made in either the process of industrialisation or the advance 
of tribal social justice. Conversely, a few mineral projects with strong 
political support will be able to slowly push ahead, without mediation 
and despite the friction of local resistance, to the definite detriment of 
some of India’s poorest and most vulnerable people. 
Finding a way out of the current situation is clearly not a straightforward 
task. Increased transparency, mainly through freedom of information 
legislation, has been shown in this book to be at risk of creating further 
inequality, rather than reducing it, since procedural and other obstacles 
only allow those with superior resources to access the information. Even 
if greater transparency improves government behaviour, struggles will still 
have to take place to ensure that there is also justice. 
New, alternative public forums could enable better communication and 
dialogue between the opposing discourses on mining and land use in 
Andhra Pradesh, as well as elsewhere across central India.
While at an international level, the mining industry has at least 
acknowledged the importance of civil society organisations and 
stakeholders in their documents and policy papers, in Jharkhand, there is 
absolutely no space for people’s representatives, civil society organisations, 
or NGOs to sit and dialogue with the government and mining industry 
today (George 2010: 185–6).
The international connection created since Vedanta Resources decided to 
list itself on the London Metal Exchange has not so far opened up new 
possibilities for communication abroad, despite the different institutional 
setting and the new actors that have come to be involved (Kumar 2014). 
There is also a risk that international discussions might not improve 
communication at a national level, since there are already too many forums 
across India, and although these often perform important functions, they 
can lead to a fragmentation of debate, with separate litigation or media 
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strategies rather than collective and strategic interventions. While social 
concerns around mining projects are still relatively novel in India, and 
might become better articulated with the passage of time, it would seem 
that a reduction rather than an increase in the number of forums holds the 
promise of better outcomes. This is especially so if the remaining forums 
can be made more accessible to interested parties than is presently the case 
for any single forum.
The case presented here may not necessarily be typical of how land 
issues in Adivasi India are likely to play out, but a number of similar 
cases suggest that it is far from being unique (Oskarsson and Nielsen 
2014). The most well-known of the resource projects facing landlocks 
are Vedanta’s Niyamgiri bauxite mining and alumina refining complex, 
and the Posco steel plant and iron ore mine, both in the state of Odisha, 
and these have respectively lasted since 2003 and 2005.2 The inability to 
reach any shared view of what should happen in these areas, despite the 
many years that have passed since they were first proposed, have led to 
grinding tests of endurance. It is remarkable that in both cases, despite 
a wealth of evaluation reports, fundamental local land use details cannot 
be accommodated in project planning circles.3
A 2014 decision against bauxite mining at Niyamgiri initially appeared as 
a final victory for a collection of ‘heterogeneous actors and participants, 
with diverse interests and capacities, from around the world’ (Kumar 
2014: 196). And yet land struggles have, in a sense, been institutionalised, 
since Vedanta has already invested in a large refinery that is dependent 
on Niyamgiri ore, forcing the company to continue to seek support for 
mining the Niyamgiri hill. Not only do oppositional groups have virtually 
endless possibilities to launch different forms of appeal against new 
projects, the promoters can also object to decisions that go against them 
and find alternative routes, even in the face of seemingly clear denials. 
While bauxite ore only exists in a limited number of locations in India, 
the possibilities for appeals, modifications and workarounds create an 
endless circle of challenges and counter-challenges, with few options for 
more inclusive approaches to the politics of resource use.
2  Posco announced the suspension of its project in 2015 (Anon. 2015b). The movement against 
the project did not trust this announcement, however, nor was it able to secure a return of acquired 
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